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For two and a half decades the US has accumulated large current account deficits, mainly financed 
(though to different extents at different times) by the savings of the sluggish European and Japanese 
economies,  of  the  fast-growing  Asian  countries  and  of  the  oil-producing  nations.  This  peculiar 
situation represents what has been called the global imbalances phenomenon. This work reviews 
and analyses several contrasting contributions on a series of issues regarding global imbalances, 
namely their nature, their underlying forces, their past evolution and their expected developments. 
This  work  also  contributes  to  the  literature  in  that  it  distinguishes  and  clarifies  the  issues  of 
sustainability and vulnerability of global imbalances. In addition, this work tackles the relationship 
between global imbalances and the recent reforms and stance of the IMF, the link between global 
imbalances  and  international  reserve  accumulation,  the  implications  of  global  imbalances  on 
economic theory and modelling, and the compatibility of global imbalances with two alternative 
and stylized representations of the current international monetary system.  
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I. Introduction. 
 
Since  2000,  a  lively  debate  about  the  global  economic  conditions  has  engaged  many 
prominent economists, both academics and practitioners. This refers to the two and a half decade-
long  accumulation  of  large  current  account  deficits  by  the  US  vis-à-vis  the  rest  of  the  world. 
“Except for a tiny surplus in 1991, the US current account has been in deficit every year since 1982, 
and for the past five years the size of the deficit has grown in US Dollar terms, in real terms and as 
a share of GDP.” Buiter (2006, p. 3). These deficits have been mainly financed (though to different 
extents at different times) by the savings of the sluggish European and Japanese economies, of the 
fast-growing Asian countries and of the oil-producing nations. This peculiar situation has been 
dubbed  as  global  imbalances.  Despite  the  disagreement  about  whether  the  current  condition 
represents an unbalanced situation or not, the term has entered the economic and financial jargon 
and is now commonly used to indicate the current global state of affairs. Strictly speaking, a global 
imbalance cannot exist as long as resources are transferred across countries and financial and good 
markets clear. What is considered unbalanced is, rather, the current distribution of resources across 
the world with respect to its long run and sustainable equilibrium condition.  
There are, at least, four main aspects of the current global conditions that split economists’ 
views. The first refers to whether the situation can be conceptualised as an equilibrium or not. As a 
consequence of the answer to this first question, authors differ in their stance about a second issue, 
that is what forces have led to and still support the current distribution of resources. The third topic 
refers to the most plausible future scenarios and to the risks associated with the maintenance of the 
current trend, as well as with the diverse adjustment processes that might occur. The fourth issue 
regards  the  role  that  the  real  exchange  rates  are  likely  to  play  in  such  adjustment  processes. 
Notwithstanding the large disagreement in each one of these areas, there is, in fact, one related issue 
that meets a broad consensus. Independently of the answers given to the previous questions, many 
authors agree that there exists a tangible risk of mounting protectionist pressures both in the trade 
and  in  the  financial  sectors  in  developed  countries.  As  this  possibility  is  likely  to  affect  the 
incentives policymakers face while making decisions, I shall illustrate such concerns in a separate 
section. This choice does not entail that the permanence or the unwinding of global imbalances is 
independent of the governmental policies in developed and developing countries: the current set of 
economic policies is both an outcome and a cause of global imbalances. The permanence, abrupt 
reversal  or  gradual  unwinding  of  the  latter  depend,  among  other  endogenous  and  exogenous 
determinants, on the former.    4 
In the work I shall stress the difference between the issues of sustainability and vulnerability 
of global imbalances. As much as the resilience of the phenomenon does not say much about its 
sustainability  in  the  long  run,  its  potential  sustainability  does  not  imply  global  imbalances  can 
endure abrupt exogenous changes in market sentiment, in the economic policies of some emerging 
economies, and in the developments of key commodity markets. Given the sustainability and the 
vulnerability of global imbalances have often been mingled, this work contributes to literature in 
distinguishing the two in the discussion of possible future scenarios and of the role of global and 
individual policy adjustments aimed at redressing the imbalances. 
After a short presentation of the stylized facts that characterise global imbalances (section 
II), in section III I shall propose a comprehensive review of the literature on global imbalances. In 
order to make the extent and the reasons of the stark disagreement among researchers apparent, I 
shall split the various positions in a clear-cut, though admittedly rough way. The review I propose, 
however, is not meant to emphasise exclusively the controversial aspects and the nuances of the 
various positions in the debate. Without excessively stretching the interpretation of the various 
arguments, in fact, I shall also point out potential overlaps and implicit agreements among them. As 
economists  disagree  on  a  very  large  range  of  topics  -  starting  from  (consolidated)  accounting 
practices to more contentious theoretical modelling -, I believe that finding areas of overlapping 
consensus is not foregone.  
Besides  illustrating  and  commenting  the  diverse  rationalizations  of  global  imbalances 
presented  in  the  literature,  in  this  work  I  will  consider  some  specific  issues  which  are  strictly 
connected to global imbalances but have been treated only indirectly in the literature on the topic. In 
particular, I will address the relationship between global imbalances and the most recent reforms of 
the  IMF’s  framework  of  surveillance  and  look  at  the  connection  between  foreign  reserves 
accumulation and the growth of sovereign wealth funds. I will also present the issues at the heart of 
the recent debate about the merits and limits of new open economy macroeconomic models to 
conceptualise the economic interactions of agents in an financially globalized environment in which 
the determinants and the composition of gross country portfolios play a crucial, although often 
neglected, role.  
Accordingly,  after  reviewing  the  literature  explicitly  focused  on  global  imbalances  – 
conceptualisations (section III), origins (section IV), scenarios (section V) and implications for the 
US exchange rate (section VI)–, I shall then discuss the influence that global imbalances have had, 
at least in my view, on economic theory and modelling (subsection VII.1) and on other aspects in 
the realm of international economics, such as trade and financial protectionism (subsections VII.2.1 
and VII.2.2). I shall also devote a short section or sub-section to each of the following themes: a)   5 
the role the IMF has played in the debate about the appropriate policy reaction its members should 
undertake to redress global imbalances (VII.2.3); b) the causes and the implications of massive 
international reserve accumulation (section VIII); c) the impact of growing commodity prices on 
global  imbalances  (section  IX);  and  d)  the  nature  and  the  functioning  of  the  uncoordinated 
international monetary system (section X). 
Clearly, I shall not explicitly take a stance on each single issue I shall mention, yet I shall 
propose some personal comments where feasible. Given the mainly illustrative goal of the paper, I 
shall try to distinguish as clearly as possible my own position and those of the authors discussed. 
II. US current account deficits and global imbalances: some 
stylized facts. 
 
The US current account has been negative since the early 80s (with the sole exception of 
1991) and in 2006 the deficit has passed $800 billion. The current account balance is the result of 
cross-country flows of goods, services, income payments, and unilateral transfers.
1 Looking at the 
composition of the US current account balance is instructive to understand global imbalances. The 
US current account balance is mainly driven by the balance on goods while its other components 
vary less over time and tend to offset each other. (Fig. 1) Notably, the net income receipts on the 
international investment position remain positive and increase over time.
2 When expressed in terms 
of GDP, the US annual current account deficit has steadily grown since 1992 onwards and it has 
reached about 6% in 2005 and 2006.
3  
It has often been argued that the US is neither the first nor the only advanced country to run 
persistent and large current account deficits
4 and that much alarmism on the sustainability of the US 
position might be undue. Once the relative size of the US economy is taken into account, however, 
the importance of the US cumulated deficits in the global economy appears more clearly.
5 
                                                 
1 The current account (i.e. CA) is the sum of the net trade balance of good and services (TBGS), the net income 
compensation (NIC), the net unilateral transfers (NUT), the investment income earned on foreign assets abroad (i*A) , 




t t t t t t NIC L i A i NUT TBGS CA + - + + = - - 1 1
* . 
2 The fact that the US earns a return on its foreign assets higher than what it pays on its liabilities has been called the US 
“exorbitant privilege” by Gourinchas and Rey (2006). 
3 See Figures 21 and B.2. for the US current account as a ratio over GDP. 
4 To gauge to which extent this proposition is true, in appendix B I plot the current account balances (in terms of the 
domestic GDP) for a selected number of emerging and advanced countries in 2005 and, restricting the sample, for the 
longer period 1980-2006.  
5 Accordingly, in Figures 4 and 5, the current account balances and net foreign asset positions of a group of countries 
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Figure 1. The US current account balance and its components 1990-2006 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data.  
 
Given  such  pattern  of  current  accounts,  the  US  net  international  investment  position 
(hereafter  net  IIP)
6  has  steadily  worsened  over  time.  Figure  2  plots  the  US  gross  assets  and 
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Figure 2. The International Investment Position of the United States at Yearend, 1989-2006 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data.  
                                                 
6 The net IIP is also called the net foreign asset position or, somehow more improperly, the net external debt position 
The change in the net IIP is equal to the net financial flows (NFL) plus the changes in the value of external assets and 
liabilities due to fluctuations in exchange rates and asset prices and values (both portfolios and FDIs) (VAL). The net 
financial flows almost coincide with minus the current account balance.  t t t t t VAL CA VAL NFL netIIP + @ + - = D    7 
 
It  has  been  observed  that  cumulated  current  account  deficits  exceed  the  US  net  IIP  as 
calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This appears clearly in Figure 3 where I plot the 
net IIP at yearend and the position obtained by summing the annual current account deficits to the 
net IIP in 1989. The discrepancy between the two series is due to two factors: a) the dollar value of 
gross liabilities and assets is modified by US dollar exchange rate fluctuations (according to the so-
called “valuation effect” pointed out by Tille (2003)), and b) capital gains and losses in US foreign 
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Figure 3. The net IIP and the cumulated current account balances of the United States. 1989-2006 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data.  
 
In  effects,  the  uncertainty  about  the  reliability  of  the  data  on  the  US  net  foreign  asset 
position is high. First, the balance of payments and the IIP statistics are collected from different 
sources and large discrepancies exist between capital flows and stock investment data. Second, the 
IIP data are corrected by the BEA according to widespread, yet controversial accounting methods.
7 
Notwithstanding such uncertainty, the net debtor position of the US and the uninterrupted series of 
current account deficits stand as unprecedented.
8  
Given financial and real resources are transferred across countries so that financial and good 
markets  clear,  the  world  balance  of  payment  is  balanced  (but  for  statistical  discrepancies). 
Accordingly, the US current account deficits are mirrored by current account surpluses in other 
                                                 
7 I will examine this issue in greater detail in Appendix A and in the discussion of Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006). 
See Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006), Cooper(2006) and Gross (2006) on this. 
8 In fact, Backus et al (2005) contend that similar current account deficits (as a ratio over GDP) have already occurred 
in developed countries in the past and even in the US in the first half of the century. As they themselves admit, 
however, the size and the position of the US in the global economy prevents from finding analogous precedents. See 
also the appendix B on this.   8 
countries of the world and financed by capital inflows from private and official foreign investors. 
Given the Euro area and Japan together have reported small current accounts surpluses over the last 
decades (see Figure 4), emerging markets have turned out to provide the bulk of the net resources 
flowing into the US. These countries represent also the main source of the inflows of goods at the 
basis of the US trade deficits. The aggregate current account surplus of emerging market economies 
moved from $80 billion in 1996 to $300 billion in 2004 and $643 billion in 2006. The patterns of 
the current accounts (as % over the world GDP) for a group of selected countries and areas are 
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Figure 4. Current account for major countries an areas as % of world GDP. 1997-2006  
Source: IMF, WEO 2007 April, fig 1.14.  
 
The  net  foreign  asset  positions  of  the  same  regions  (expressed  in  terms  of  world  GDP)  are 
reproduced in Figure 5.  
                                                 
9 Clearly, the geographical distribution of bilateral trade balances and that of net capital flows have not to coincide: one 
country may run a current account surplus vis-à-vis the US without capital outflows towards it or it may run current 
account deficits and even receive positive financial inflows from the US. Other countries, on the contrary, may have an 
almost balanced exchange of goods and services with the US and finance the US debt by means of current account 
surpluses vis-à-vis other countries. The broad patterns described in the text, however, have clearly emerged in the last 
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Figure 5. Net foreign asset positions (for major countries and areas) as % of world GDP. 1997-2007 (estimates) 
Source: IMF, WEO 2007 April, fig 1.14.  
 
The US and the Euro area have been absorbing resources from the rest of the world, that is from 
developing and emerging economies: this is in stark contrast with what one would expect from 
traditional international macro-models and represents the bulk of the so-called Lucas’ paradox.
10 
Part of the financing needed by the indebted countries has been provided by private investors and 
part by official institutions.
11 In particular, Asian and oil exporting countries in the last 5 years have 
accumulated large international reserves and set up various sovereign wealth funds and sovereign 
investment authorities with the intent of diversifying investments abroad. I will come back on on 
sovereign wealth funds in section VII and on reserve accumulation in section VIII. For the time 
being, it is sufficient to highlight the upward trend in the reserve accumulation recorded in several 
countries. Focusing on a representative sample of four countries (that is China, Japan, Russia and 
Saudi Arabia), Figure 6 reproduces their level of international reserves expressed as a ratio over 
their domestic GDP, their external debt and their total liabilities.  
                                                 
10See Lucas (1990), Jeanne and Gourinchas (2007) and Kose et al (2006). 
11 The relative importance of official flows has risen after 2001. In the period 2002-2006, net official capital inflows had 
been equal to almost half of the US current account deficits. Nonetheless, private foreign inflows have always remained 
larger than the official ones. Over the period 2002 -2006, gross private flows were about $4,697 billion and gross 
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Figure 6. International reserves as ratio over national GDP, debt liabilities and overall liabilities. (%) 
Source: Milesi Ferretti and Lane (2006). 
 
Saudi Arabia and several other oil-exporting countries already experienced a massive boom in the 
level of reserves after the oil shocks in the 70s. The growth of their economies hides the fact that 
official reserves have recently reached levels similar to those recorded in the 70s. In the last 10 
years  China,  Japan,  several  other  Asian  countries  and  diverse  emerging  markets  have  rapidly 
increased their reserve holdings to unprecedented levels; the Asian crisis in 1997-1998 and the rapid 
development of the Asian countries have certainly contributed to fasten this process. 
  From a domestic perspective, the current account balance of a country can be seen as the 
difference between domestic (household, corporate and public) savings and investments. It follows 
that global current account imbalances are matched by different saving and investment patterns in 
the world. Figure 7 reproduces the patterns of global saving, investment and current accounts in the 
world, in the industrial countries and in the emerging markets. Despite a throughout discussion of 
the issue will be postponed until subsection III.2, some observations are in order. The ratios of 
global  savings  and  investments  over  world  GDP  have  trended  downwards  since  the  70s.  In 
particular, they reached historically low values at the beginning of the 2000s.
12 This global pattern 
masks different trends in diverse countries: the downward tendency in industrial countries contrasts 
with the upward trend in emerging and oil-producing economies. Since mid-90s, the former group 
has  exhibited  investments  exceeding  savings,  whereas  the  opposite  has  happened  in  the  latter. 
(Figure 7) 
                                                 
12 In 2002, probably because of the US stock market crash and the subsequent global slack, they reached the lowest 
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Figure 7. Investments and savings in the world economy and in groups of countries. (% of world GDP). 
Source: IMF, WEO  2005, September 
 
The aggregation level in Figure 7 is large and hides the heterogeneous situation of the various 
countries within each group. In Figure 8, therefore, I reproduce the disaggregated data for sub-
groups  of  selected  countries.
13  It  turns  out  that  the  negative  difference  between  savings  and 
investments in industrial countries is mainly due to the US large and negative position, while most 
of  global  savings  are  accumulated  in  East  Asia  and  in  oil-producing  countries.    Even  though 
China’s savings are larger than investments, China is one of the few countries where domestic 
investments have grown together with savings. Considering that Chinese savings are very large 
because of the peculiar historical, financial and demographic condition of the country, the overall 
amount of investments looks even more remarkable: gross capital formation in China fares above 
40% in recent years.
14 
 
                                                 
13 The data are expressed as ratio over each region’s GDP, not as a percentage of world GDP. 
14 See IMF WEO (2005). Rajan (2006b) and Makin (2006) discuss the consequences of overinvestment on misallocated 
capital, excess capacity in the domestic sector (and the credit crunch in 2003), increasing non performing loans in the 
hands of domestic banks, and exchange rate undervaluation. Makin (2006) extends the analysis to a comparison with 
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Figure 8. Saving and Investment in subregions. % of each subregion GDP. 
Source: IMF WEO 2005. 
 
 
The peculiar condition of the US deserves closer inspection. Investments, notwithstanding 
large cyclical swings, have kept up since 1980, whereas savings have not. As can be seen in Figure 
9, net private savings started falling in 2000 and public savings turned negative in 2002.
15 The joint 
presence of little net savings and current account deficits led some economists to argue that global 
imbalances  in  the  last  25  years  might  be  the  consequence  of  US  “twin  deficits”,  as  already 
                                                 
15 On the contrary, corporate savings, not in Figure 9, have remained very high because of high profit rates.   13 
happened in mid-80s.
16 For a series of reasons I will discuss later on, this is hardly the case for the 
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Figure 9. Current account, net savings (overall, government and private), net domestic investment in the US (% of 
GDP).  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.  27 August 2007 
 
Given such evolution of the global economic conditions, it would be natural to expect that 
the US exchange rate underwent some important changes over the long span of time of the global 
imbalances. This has indeed been the case. The trade-weighted real (CPI deflated) exchange rate 
index exhibits an appreciation in the second half of the 90s, a depreciation from mid-2001 to 2005, 
and  a  small  appreciation  afterwards.  This  pattern,  as  Figure  10  shows,  is  mainly  due  to  the 
movements of the nominal effective exchange rate of the US dollar.
17 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, Roubini and Setser (2004). 
17 The pattern of the US effective exchange rate hides the interesting movements of the various bilateral rates. This issue 
is crucial in accounting for global imbalances, in drawing policy prescriptions and in the political debate. I will come 











1990m1 1995m1 2000m1 2005m1
t
NEER REER
The US NEER and REER
 
Fig.10 US Real CPI deflated and nominal effective exchange rate. Monthly data 1990-2005 
Source: Rose 2006 (IMF) (2000=100) 
 
To conclude this illustration of the stylized facts regarding global imbalances, I plot the 
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Fig.11 US Real CPI deflated and nominal effective exchange rate. Selected countries (1990-2005) 
Source: Rose (2000=100) 
 
In the Euro area, a strong depreciation from mid-90s to the first years of the 2000s is followed by a 
relative  appreciation  and  subsequent  stabilisation  of  the  exchange  rate.  Notably,  the  nominal   15 
effective Chinese exchange rate has appreciated to a very limited extent vi-à-vis the US Dollar since 
mid-90s. 
On  the  basis  of  these  stylised  facts  and  patterns  characterising  the  global  imbalances 
phenomenon, I move on to illustrate the various contrasting views regarding the underlying causes 
and the prospective development of global imbalances. 
III. A critical account of contrasting views.  
 
III.1 The extent of the disagreement: how long is the plan or how close 
is the cliff? 
 
There is no doubt that the situation described in section II represents a peculiar state of the 
world. Many developing countries - because of large trade surpluses (generated either by export-led 
growth  strategies  or  by  the  persistent  surge  in  commodity  prices)  and  abundant  private  capital 
inflows -, have financed the richest country in the world (i.e. US) at a growing rate in the last 10 
years.
18 This has first happened because of foreign massive purchases of promising US stocks and 
then because of the foreign accumulation of remarkable amounts of international reserves in the 
form of low yield US treasury bonds.  
This situation, in fact, is per se neither unsustainable nor dangerous.
19 Even though the 
accumulation of large current account deficits by the US does indicate that the country is not living 
within its current means
20, this could be the result of a rational optimising behaviour if a)  US 
income is expected to grow fast in the future (as a permanent income hypothesis would suggest
21) 
or if b) the US enjoys a key position in the global financial markets which allows it to obtain credit 
in  exchange  of  some  other  intangible  services.
22  This  would  mean  that  the  US  is  an  “oasis of 
prosperity”.
23 The issue around which the debate revolves is whether this second description fits or 
not  current  conditions.  In  addition,  economists  and  policymakers  argue  about  whether  such 
                                                 
18 Before 1995, US deficits were mainly financed by other industrial European countries and Japan. (Xafa 2007 p. 60) 
19 The definition of sustainability I borrow is proposed by Catherine Mann. “A sustainable situation is one where the 
stock or flow imbalance generates no economic force of its own to change its trajectory.” (Mann (2004) p.263) 
20 In fact, Backus et al (2005) argue that Americans are not living beyond their means because net worth has not fallen 
over time. Even though the government’s net worth has gone down, consolidated household and government net worth 
is above post-war average. The authors explain this fact with the large capital gains in the assets households have. If 
consumption increases in net worth, this also helps to explain the high US consumption rates.  
21 Interestingly, the permanent income hypothesis is not expected to hold in a complete markets environment where 
countries share idiosyncratic risks via cross-country holding of financial assets. However, to the extent that markets are 
incomplete, financial integration is incomplete, some shocks are permanent and investors are risk averse, a less stringent 
version of the permanent income hypothesis holds. See Fracasso (2007). 
22 As pointed out by Faruqee et al (2006), this is one possible way of interpreting the “Lawson doctrine”. The presence 
of large public sectors,  market imperfections and  market  failures, however, inhibits the straight application of the 
Lawson doctrine to the current situation. 
23 Mann (2002) p.131.   16 
conditions are destined to change, and, if so, when and in which way a reversal is more likely to 
occur.  
To be sure, the attention of researchers has first gone to the underlying conditions which 
have led and still sustain global imbalances. Notwithstanding a prolonged and vivid debate, a large 
disagreement  among  researchers  remains  around  numerous  points.  There  are  several  possible 
different  logic  explanations  of  the  current  situation.  Each  refers  to  one  of  a  series  of  different 
aspects that, to varying degrees, have surely played a role in the evolution of global imbalances. 
Among the most frequently cited, I recall the US low private and public-sector savings (due to 
financial innovation, US asset price inflation and household wealth effects), the global “saving glut” 
(due to demographic factors in rich countries, capital market imperfections in emerging markets and 
limited investment opportunities in developing countries)
24, the allegedly misaligned exchange rates 
of  many  fast  growing  countries,  the  willingness  of  emerging  markets  to  hoard  international 
reserves, the large and persistent growth of commodity prices, and the like. 
As I will try to make clear, most research has gone in the direction of evaluating whether the 
current situation is compatible with an optimising behaviour of rational agents. In effects, it seems 
plausible that, sic stantibus rebus, current global conditions represent a market clearing equilibrium 
at relatively stable international prices. This issue, however, does not solve the key problem with 
global  imbalances,  that  is  whether  they  are  sustainable  or  not.  Even  situations  which  can  be 
conceptualised as self-sustaining equilibrium outcomes need not be sustainable. In my view, three 
issues, at least, make the current situation problematic. The first refers to the way foreign credit is 
spent in the US. Were it devoted to investments, it would spur prospective growth and contribute to 
the maintenance of the current conditions. Being this not the case in the most recent years, it is 
possible that US current account deficits have now more to do with public and private profligacy 
than  with  investment-driven  borrowing  strategies.  The  second  qualm  refers  to  the  stability  and 
persistence of the underlying (financial,  economic and political)  forces  that have supported the 
situation so far. Were they doomed to fade out, the situation would unravel. Some of the changes 
occurred in the last 10 years need be neither permanent nor irreversible simply because they have 
proved to be long lasting. The third worry refers to the possibility that, were the current conditions 
really unbalanced, a disorderly adjustment could begin. While these concerns do not demonstrate 
the  situation  is  unsustainable,  they  strengthen  the  cautionary  position  of  those  who  urge 
policymakers to intervene so as to avoid a disruptive adjustment process, which could be incepted 
by any political, economic or financial shock.  
                                                 
24 This brief account of the global saving glut view is consistent with the investment drought view as long as net desired 
savings are considered.    17 
A curious image, first used by Paul Krugman (2007) and then circulated in some financial 
press, conveys the current concerns regarding global imbalances. He argues that the current global 
economic conditions may look like the famous “Wile E. Coyote”’s runs in mid-air. Typically, Wile 
E.  Coyote  runs  off  a  cliff  and  remains  floating  in  the  air  until  the  moment  he  reckons  his 
unsustainable position. Then, he plummets fast and crashes against the ground. Those who sustain, 
as Krugman does, that global imbalances are risky, make the hypothesis that myopic investors 
might have not recognised the necessary ultimate depreciation of the dollar and, thus, keep on 
travelling in mid-air expectations. Once they will become aware that the run cannot last, they will 
fall  and  drag  the  economy  with  them.  This  view  needs  not  be  catastrophic.  It  is  possible  that 
investors are still in time to change their minds and adjust before they start making serious losses. 
Let me elaborate on the metaphor. If investors see where the plan actually ends, they do not need to 
fall: they might take a downward slope which drives them to a new plan. In other words, there is no 
need of an abrupt fall in the price of US assets, but a correction on the route seems warranted. If this 
correction does not occur, however, an abrupt adjustment will be eventually needed because the 
plan, ultimately, ends.  
Those who argue the current global situation is fine, instead, claim the economy cannot float 
in the air and the situation we observe, by definition, is an equilibrium of opposing forces. The fact 
that Wile E. Coyote runs in mid-air for a little while is clearly unfeasible: in the real world this 
cannot  occur  for  any  person  would  abruptly  fall  as  soon  as  off  the  cliff.  The  fact  the  current 
situation is an equilibrium of opposing forces does not mean that no adjustment will ever occur; 
however, as long as the underlying forces will last, global imbalances will last too. The economy 
always runs on a plan and when the plan changes shape, the economy follows.  
In fact, most contributions that conceptualise global imbalances as an equilibrium outcome 
that ensues some structural changes in the global economy, do not deal with the very question asked 
by Krugman: is the current situation on a rational-expectations saddle path? The key issue, in my 
view, is where the plan on which the economies run ends. Accordingly, the disagreement derives 
from what the various researchers look at: optimists justify the current situation on the basis of 
optimising heterogeneous agents which are subjects to fundamental frictions and persistent shocks 
(that  is,  they  look  at  the  plan),  whereas  sceptical  researchers  look  at  ‘mid-air’  (unrealistic) 
expectations taking for granted that an adjustment in the medium-long run has to occur (that is, they 
look at the cliff). Myopic investors might believe the plan is longer than it really is: the extent of 
their (possible) mistake determines the sharpness, the length and the speed of the adjustment in the 
future.    18 
In the next subsections, I will illustrate the contrasting views on the issue. I will start from 
the  contributions  where  the  current  situation  is  considered  as  unsustainable  and,  therefore, 
unbalanced.  I  will  then  discuss  the  position  of  those  who  believe  global  imbalances  are  an 
equilibrium outcome of opposing long-lasting forces. To conclude, I will present the contrarian 
views of those who believe global imbalances are the mere results of accounting standards and 
practices. 
III.2 The conventional wisdom: true imbalances.  
 
  The claim that the current global situation is unbalanced  (i.e. the conventional wisdom) 
hinges, in my view, on two main arguments. The first refers to the results of traditional new open 
economy macroeconomic (NOEM) modelling
25, the other to the historical experience of countries 
that had large and sustained current account deficits in the past. I will illustrate these two lines of 
reasoning in what follows. 
In traditional NOEM models, capitals move to satisfy countries’ balance of payments. The 
direction of these flows depends on expected returns differentials and is subsumed in the interest 
rate  parity  condition.  The  quantity  of  flows,  instead,  depends  on  the  evolution  of  net 
international/intertemporal  trade;  trade,  in  its  turns,  stems  from  domestic  consumption  and 
production patterns. Consumption and production are determined on the basis of standard models of 
intertemporal household utility and firms’ profit maximization. Given current account deficits drive 
capital flows, the international allocation of financial resources ultimately descends from national 
investing  and  saving  behaviours.  Consumption,  production  and  trade  are  also  affected  by  the 
relative international prices of the goods and, hence, by the real exchange rate.
26 It follows that the 
nominal exchange rate is a key determinant of the global equilibrium. Even though the speed and 
the extent of the transmission of exchange rate shocks vary according to presence of pricing to 
market, price stickiness and other sources of imperfect and incomplete pass-through
27, changes in 
the nominal exchange rate may have large effects on the trade balance. In the same token, exchange 
rate arrangements preventing changes to the nominal exchange rates (such as the Asian pegs to the 
US  dollar)  alter  the  re-balancing  process  that  would  occur  through  the  adjustment  of  nominal 
variables.
28 Several shocks may hit an economy and drive it off its steady state, such as productivity 
and  preference  shocks,  changes  in  government  expenditure,  commodity  prices  fluctuations, 
                                                 
25 For a standard reference see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
26 Real exchange rate and terms of trade may or may not differ if i) there is home bias in consumption, ii) there are non 
tradable (or non-traded) goods, iii) international transactions exhibit trade costs and iv) prices are somehow sticky. 
27 See Flamini (2007) and Frankel et al (2005) on this. 
28 This is even more the case when the pegs are accompanied by monetary interventions (i.e. sterilization)  which 
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movements in demographic trends, oscillations in investors’ appetite for risk, changes in the degree 
of trade and financial openness, and the like. All of these shocks and structural changes cause 
fluctuations in the determinants of the current account and, thus, in the current account itself. In 
these models, thus, current account deficits can be conceptualised as temporary fluctuations around 
a long run equilibrium balance; the magnitude and duration of the swings depend on the nature of 
the shock and on the flexibility of the factor, good and exchange rate markets.
29 Finally, it has to be 
noted that expected permanent shocks to relative productivity may generate large fluctuations in the 
current account in the short and medium run; the intertemporal budget constraint of each country, 
however, has eventually to hold and the current account has sooner or later to revert to equilibrium. 
Accordingly, the series of current account deficits in the US seems to defy such “gravity” law: the 
longer the current account balance remains in the negative territory, the more likely will occur a fast 
reversal in global conditions. 
The second line of the traditional argument focuses on a comparative and historical analysis. 
Many developing countries in the past have run large and sustained current account deficits. In most 
cases these have been followed by sudden stops and capital reversals, which have most often led to 
harsh  financial  crises  and  abrupt  currency  depreciations.  In  my  view,  this  line  of  argument  is, 
though sensible, not fully convincing. The US is a large country, it does not face many of the 
financial market imperfections that afflict developing economies, it holds the most developed and 
liquid financial markets in the world, its currency is used as international reserve and it remains the 
destination  of  capitals  in  any  flight-to-quality  episode.  These  provisos  limit  the  extent  of  a 
comparison between the US as it is today and the experience of small and medium size countries in 
the past. It remains true, however, that if international investors will withdraw their funds from the 
US, this will inevitably incept an adjustment process which may resemble, in several dimensions, 
some precedent capital reversal episodes. 
Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (2000,  2004,  2005,  2006),  Blanchard,  Giavazzi  and  Sa  (2005), 
Eichengreen (2004,2006a, 2006b), Feldstein (2006), Roubini and Setser (2004 and 2005), Bergsten 
(2005), Cline (2005), Goldstein (2005) and Krugman (2007) are some among the economists that 
denounced such situation as unbalanced and unsustainable. Most of them argue along the lines of 
the conventional wisdom. The standard analysis shows that the capitalisation of a persistent current 
account deficit around 7% of the GDP in an economy growing in nominal terms at a rate of 5% 
leads to an eventual ratio of the US net external debt over GDP far above 100%. At such a level it is 
                                                 
29 Notably, the story for the trade balance is similar, yet not identical. In fact, in equilibrium, positive investment 
income flows (stemming from the inherited net foreign asset position) may counterbalance permanent trade deficits and 
produce an overall balanced current account. Clearly, even though the trade balance can be permanently different from 
0 in equilibrium, its ratio over the GDP cannot grow forever.   20 
likely that foreign investors become less willing to allocate increasing part of their savings in the 
US and, similarly, US citizens get less comfortable with letting foreigners accumulate a growing 
chunk of their domestic assets. Given foreign investors have to finance not only the net position but 
all gross external liabilities, the argument seems compelling. Once foreign investors will realise that 
the  growing  imbalances  and  a  prospective  US  dollar  depreciation  threaten  their  accumulated 
investments, they will reduce their financing (at least at the margin) and  capital flows towards the 
US  will  decline.  This  will  make  the  service  of  the  debt  more  and  more  costly  since  the 
compensation required by foreign investors to lend money to a highly indebted country will step up. 
One possibility is that this occurs gradually: capital flows slow, US dollar and US asset prices 
decline, the interest rates rise, and the US trade balance improves. Another possibility is that this 
evolves fast. If foreign investors will rush out of US dollar and financial assets, instead of simply 
adjusting their portfolio at the margin, they will cause a sudden fall in the value of such assets and 
of the dollar. This, in turn, will depress consumption and investments and reduce the external trade 
deficit. A corollary is that the longer the needed adjustment is delayed, the shaper and the more 
abrupt the dollar depreciation is likely to be in the future. 
III.2.1 A bird-eye view on the contributions of the conventional wisdom. 
 
  Having briefly discussed the common features of the group of works which question the 
equilibrium  properties  of  global  imbalances,  I  will  proceed  now  with  a  critical  account  of  the 
differentiate position of some researchers who contributed to the debate along this line.  
Barry Eichengreen (2006b) reviews four perspectives on global imbalances and starts with the 
standard analysis I illustrated above. He sympathises with the cautionary view and he questions the 
sustainability of global imbalances. He argues that the debt over GDP ratio that would come out of 
a  persistent  series  of  US  current  account  deficits  similar  to  those  recently  recorded  is  hardly 
feasible. This is due to the fact that a) foreign investors may find lower and lower incentives to 
invest a growing share of their portfolios on claims on the uncertain US future production and b) 
US authorities and citizens may eventually oppose to the possibility that a large part of the national 
capital stock is transferred into foreign hands. Even though he does not take a position on the 
probable nature of the adjustment process
30, he calls for an urgent management of the adjustment 
process.  
A similar reasoning is offered by Michael Mussa (2004) who claims that there is an upper limit 
for the external liabilities beyond which external debt financing becomes problematic even for a 
country as big and solid as the US. If such ceiling, expressed as a ratio over US GDP, is reasonably 
                                                 
30 He refers to Faruquee et al (2006) for an assessment of the different scenarios.   21 
around 100%, as he argues, then “current account deficits of 5% o more of the US GDP are not 
indefinitely sustainable.”(p.114). An adjustment process is necessary and, if it will not start soon, it 
will occur faster and sharper in the future. 
Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (2006)  move  from  the  assumption  that  a  reversal  in  the  US  current 
account has to occur so that the economy can go back to its long run equilibrium.
31  In their model, 
which includes traded  (both domestically and foreign produced) goods and non-traded goods, the 
authors consider the pattern of adjustment generated by a switch in global demand towards the US 
goods. The presence of nontraded goods cum home bias in consumption requires a relatively large 
real  depreciation  of  the  dollar  for  global  conditions  to  rebalance.  They  argue  that  the  dollar 
depreciation due to the switch in the relative global demand can be even larger in presence of 
nominal  and  real  rigidities  in  the  good  and  factor  markets.  Policy  interventions  can  alter  the 
adjustment process and reduce the depreciation otherwise necessary to close the current account 
balance; they are, therefore, commendable.
32 Favourable exchange rate valuation effects, instead, 
have only a limited impact on the current account balance. Obstfeld and Rogoff move from the 
conviction that, sooner or later, the US has to go back to a full balanced current account because, 
even if foreign investors remain willing to finance US debt for a long while, the adjustment has 
eventually to take place. They conclude that the day of reckoning can be postponed by deeper 
global  capital  markets,  yet  not  avoided.
33  I  will  come  back  on  the  merits  and  limits  of  this 
contribution in the next section. 
Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) look at US external imbalances through the lens of a 
portfolio balance theory à la Kouri in which the world interest rate is given, foreign and US goods 
and  assets  are  imperfect  substitutes  and,  thus,  the  interest  parity  condition  is  relaxed.  These 
assumptions imply that shifts in the global demand affect relative prices of assets. They argue the 
US current account deficits are mainly due to two phenomena: first, an increase in the US demand 
for foreign goods and, second, an increase in the foreign demand for US assets.
34 This pattern has 
been accompanied by a real dollar appreciation in the second half of the 90s until late 2001 and a 
real depreciation afterward, accelerating in the most recent years. The exchange rate plays a crucial 
role in their model because, besides affecting the trade balance, it influences portfolio allocations 
                                                 
31 The authors do not try to explain the origins of the US current account deficits and note in passing that the relatively 
high productivity growth in the US non-traded sector may be part of the underlying causes. 
32 The IMF in the WEO 2005 has similarly argued that if policies are not consistent with a credible strategy aimed at 
closing global and internal balances, expectations may not be well anchored and investors may lose confidence in the 
benign nature of the adjustment process. This could lead to overshooting phenomena and crises. 
33 The authors do not explicitly model the issues relative to capital market integration and financial development. In 
NOEM models, as said, capitals flow to finance current account deficits, but cannot cause them. This prevents the 
analysis from linking current account balances and the features of domestic and international financial markets.  
34 This change in the foreign demand of US asset is due to an increase in foreign private demand for US equities in the 
second half of the 90s and in a spur in foreign central banks’ demand for US bonds in the 2000s.   22 
between the imperfectly substitutable domestic and foreign assets. The first long-run equilibrium 
condition they derive requires that, ceteris paribus, the larger the net foreign debt position of a 
country, the lower the equilibrium value of its real exchange rate. The assumptions of home-bias in 
portfolio holdings and imperfect sustainability of US and foreign assets are the key determinants of 
such  long-run  portfolio-balance  equilibrium  condition.
35  The  real  exchange  rate  has  important 
effects also on the foreign and domestic relative demand of goods according to classical terms of 
trade effects. In addition, unexpected changes in the real exchange rate affect the net debt position 
through  valuation  effects
36  and  their  strength  depends  on  the  size  of  the  gross  international 
investment positions of the countries. Besides changing the value of the gross and net investment 
positions, the valuation effect (due to unexpected changes in the real exchange rate) tends to reduce 
the cost of the interest payments on the debt: this helps the adjustment process and reduces the 
required  real  depreciation.  Notwithstanding  this  beneficial  impact  in  the  adjustment  process, 
valuation effects cannot importantly modify the ultimate required adjustment. In equilibrium, in 
fact, valuation effects cannot occur and the exchange rate level has to be consistent with the stock of 
outstanding external debt. The second long-run equilibrium condition they derive requires that, in 
order to have a balanced current account, the larger the net foreign debt position, the lower is the 
equilibrium level of the real exchange rate: the latter has to be capable to create a trade surplus 
sufficient to cover the interest payments on the debt and to balance the current account. This means 
that both the current account balance condition and the portfolio balance condition imply a negative 
relationship between net foreign debt and the real exchange rate. These two steady state conditions 
lead the authors to conclude that, the growing US negative external position must be matched, 
sooner or later, by a real depreciation of the dollar. The elasticities of asset holdings with respect to 
their  relative  investment  returns  (which  are  linked  to  the  degree  of  substitutability  of  the 
international assets) are crucial for the path and the speed of the adjustment process (i.e. for the 
dynamics of the adjustment), but not for the steady state. The real depreciation of the US dollar, 
therefore, cannot be avoided. Blanchard and co-authors also show that, in order to achieve both 
external and internal balance, the depreciation of the US dollar must be matched by other policy 
measures affecting domestic savings and investments in the various countries. Neither the latter can 
substitute the former, nor vice versa.  
                                                 
35  It  should  be  noted  that  the  portfolio  home  bias  is  a  key  assumption  since  it  justifies  the  long  run  equilibrium 
relationship between the real exchange rate and the net foreign asset position. When wealth is transferred from the US 
to the rest of the world (for instance via US debt accumulation), home bias leads to a decrease in the demand for US 
assets if the latter is not counterbalanced by a decrease in the level of the real exchange rate.  
36 Notice that even if a gradual US dollar depreciation is expected, a valuation effect favourable to the US can take place 
as long as foreign investors are willing to hold US assets at a lower rate of return than foreign investments because of 
some intrinsic features of US assets.   23 
  Some authors, such as Roubini and Setser (2004), argue that if current account balances 
primarily  depend  on  domestic  investments  and  savings,  persistent  deficits  can  be  attributed  to 
inappropriate domestic behaviour of the US private and/or the public sector.
37 This reasoning entails 
that a large chunk of the responsibility for the current global situation remains in US hands. In 
particular, from 2001 onwards, US citizens have reduced their saving rates to extremely low levels 
and budget deficits have grown after the tax cut. These authors do not deny that the effects of the 
apparent US “profligacy” have been magnified by current international monetary arrangements
38, 
the rapid growth of China and other Asian economies, and the steady growth in commodity prices. 
Nonetheless, the actual changes in the behaviour of private and public US agents remain key to 
understand global imbalances.  
Even though the controversial position of the IMF will be dealt with in section VII, it is 
worth noticing it goes along with the positions of the conventional wisdom. Accordingly, the IMF 
policy recommendations to tackle the imbalances look very much similar to those suggested by the 
abovementioned sceptical authors.  
Beside  the  stance  that  the  current  imbalances  will  create  financial  turbulence  in  world 
markets, there are another views according to which “the imbalances are the harmless outcome of 
various events such as differences in productivity growth or business cycle volatility, demographic 
dynamics, a ‘global saving glut’, or valuation effects.” (Mendoza et al 2007 p. 1). This list of 
differences, despite broad, is not exhaustive and other factors are allegedly behind the growing of 
global imbalances. The explanations and conceptualisations of why the world has ended up with 
such large imbalances are numerous and diverse. In the next section I will give an account of such 
viewpoints and contributions. 
III.3 The revisionist view: an equilibrium condition. 
 
Several  researchers  hold  a  perspective  on  global  imbalances  which  strays  from  the 
traditional view. In a nutshell, they argue that in an era of increasing financial globalization
39 and 
                                                 
37 This is a version of the so-called “twin deficits” hypothesis. 
38 Under the international monetary arrangement, the US dollar is the major international reserve currency and US 
assets (in particular Treasury bonds) are used to accumulate international reserves. Asian countries - in the attempt of 
preventing  the  nominal  appreciation  of  their  currencies  and  building  a  self-insurance  buffer  in  the  case  of  capital 
reversals – and oil exporting countries – whose current account have been boosted by growth in the international price 
of oil –accumulate growing shares of US public debt.  
39 Financial globalisation has contributed to create an environment in which large current account imbalances have 
emerged because capital has circulated relatively easily and domestic credit constraints have been relaxed by foreign 
lending.  In  addition,  the  growing  leverage  in  the  countries’  external  positions  has  created  an  environment  where 
valuation effects can facilitate the adjustment process in the industrial countries (IMF WEO (2005)). On the other hand, 
financial integration has increased the exposure to market and exchange rate volatility, as made evident by the sub-
prime market and banking crisis in August 2007.   24 
rapid US productivity gains, the foreign accumulation of US assets and the large US current account 
deficits  recorded  for  a  prolonged  period  of  time  represent  a  situation  that  is  both  logical  and 
sustainable. Since the US current account deficits do not represent a real threat to investors, a fall in 
the value of the US dollar is neither desirable, nor necessary.  
Even among these optimist economists, however, there is some disagreement. Some point 
out that foreign investors have no real investment alternative to US assets because of the limited 
financial development in their own countries. Others argue that emerging countries need to buy 
foreign  assets  a)  to  maintain  their  currencies  undervalued  with  respect  to  the  dollar  so  as  to 
stimulate exports and, ultimately, growth and b) to self-insure against private capital flow reversals. 
The disagreement about the underlying reasons (i.e. development policy versus portfolio allocations 
versus financial frictions) why emerging market economies purchase US assets and why these latter 
seem  to  have  some  intangible  advantages  over  foreign  assets  have  direct  consequences  on  the 
expected permanence of global imbalances. With this in mind, I will proceed with illustrating some 
of the rationalisations in this class of contributions. 
Among the first to put forward the idea that global imbalances are an equilibrium condition 
given the current economic circumstances is the US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. In a 
famous speech of his (Bernanke 2005), the governor points to the joint presence of exceptional 
external conditions and particular US domestic factors as the deep reasons of the global current 
account imbalances. His argument, I believe, can be summarised as follows. A great number of 
concurrent forces have created a significant increase in the global supply of savings -- which he 
dubs a “ global saving glut” – directed to one of the most promising and safe countries in the world, 
i.e. the US.  This phenomenon is at the basis of the increase in the US current account deficits and, 
also, of the relatively low level of long-term real interest rates in the world.
40 The significant change 
in the non-US saving patterns is evident in Figures 7 and 8 and is linked to the capital outflows 
(including reserves) from developing and emerging market economies.
41 The reasons why the world 
has ended up in a global saving glut, according to Bernanke, are several. First, many developed 
countries have increased savings in view of an ageing population and because of  “an apparent 
dearth of domestic investment opportunities”. Second, emerging markets have accumulated foreign 
reserves  for  self-insurance  reasons  and  to  maintain  relatively  undervalued  exchange  rates  to 
                                                 
40 The so-called Greenspan conundrum has to do with the fact that the yields of long term bonds have remained low 
even after the short term interest rates started moving up in 2005. The conundrum has probably ended in June 2007 
when US long term interest rates increased, causing an increase in the mortgage delinquency rate, a collapse in some 
hedge funds and a squeeze interbank monetary markets. 
41 Obviously, while stressing the relative importance of global factors, Bernanke does not underplay the role of US 
policies and private behaviours. Rather, he moves the focus on the global scenario to find some global sources of a 
global phenomenon. See section IV on this.   25 
promote export-led growth.
42 Third, the rapid growth in commodity prices (oil in particular) has 
boosted  current  account  surpluses  in  those  countries  where  consumption,  social  spending  and 
productive investments are historically low.
43  
Bernanke also notes that “the experience of the United States in recent years is not so nearly 
unique among industrial countries as one might think initially” and “a number of key industrial 
countries other than the United States have seen their current accounts move substantially toward 
deficit since 1996”, with Germany and Japan as principal exceptions to the trend. “A key difference 
between  the  two  groups  of  countries  is  that  the  countries  whose  current  accounts  have  moved 
toward  deficit  have  generally  experienced  substantial  housing  appreciation  and  increases  in 
household wealth, while Germany and Japan--whose economies have been growing slowly despite 
very low interest rates--have not.” All in all, Bernanke seems convinced that a) some of the reasons 
for  the  large  US  current  account  deficits  are  external  to  the  country,  b)  purely  inward-looking 
policies, though useful, are unlikely to redress the problem, and c) the factors underlying the US 
current account deficits are likely to unwind only gradually. This stance has been often interpreted 
as a new form of benign neglect for the fortune of the US dollar and the global current account 
imbalances. While the first conclusion might be right, I do not see the second one consistent with 
some arguments proposed by Bernanke, such as the fact that the external and domestic factors at the 
basis of the current situation are somehow exceptional.  
Bernanke’s viewpoint has certainly several merits but, in fact, it has been the object of some 
criticism. One point that has been observed by Raghuram Rajan (2006) is that global savings have 
not increased, but reduced over decades (see Figure 7). If global savings were responsible for the 
low US and world interest rates, US investments would have increased: this has not occurred. The 
global saving glut, therefore, would be more appropriately described as a prolonged “investment 
drought” episode (with the exclusion of China which clearly over-invested
44). It is possible that 
such  a  reduction  in  investments  is  an  optimal  response  by  several  Asian  countries  to  over-
investment in the past, to the depressing effects of the financial turmoil in 1997-1998 and to the 
recognition  that  volatile  cross-border  capital  flows  require  emerging  markets  to  a)  build  self-
insurance tools and b) moderate historically lax fiscal and monetary policies. Global imbalances 
have first arisen, according to Rajan,  as “a temporary and uncoordinated response to a crisis rather 
                                                 
42 Bernanke claims that this export-led growth strategy should be seen as a mercantilist form of export promotion since 
many East Asian countries face a too narrow domestic demand. Following the 1997-98 financial crisis, many countries 
have high domestic rates of saving and depressed levels of domestic capital investment (at least in comparison with 
historical norms). This suggests that their growth strategy is mainly export-driven.  
43 These three observations go almost unchallenged. The IMFC’s policy recommendations to smoothly unwind  global 
imbalances (which I will shortly illustrate in subsection VII.2.3) clearly builds on them. 
44 See Rajan (2006b),  Makin (2006) and IMF WEO (2005) September for further analysis on the extraordinary Chinese 
investment rates.   26 
than a permanent and perverse international order”. More recently, the oil price boom and the fixed 
exchange  rate  regimes  adopted  by  large  and  fast  growing  countries  have  accentuated  the  trend 
initiated in the late 90s. The process has been further boosted by the industrial (in particular Anglo-
Saxon) countries that have conducted accommodative policies to respond to and mitigate the effects 
of the financial turmoil in the early 2000s (Rajan 2006b). These policies, as pointed out also by 
Bernanke, boosted consumption and lowered private savings, in particular, through credit-fuelled 
growth.
45 
Another objection to the global saving glut view comes from the reasoning put forward by 
Caballero et al. (2007). If savings had been so abundant in developing countries, how come that 
there were no asset bubbles (and even a decline) in their domestic financial markets as it usually 
occurs when savings massively exceed domestic investment opportunities? One possibility, they 
argue,  is  that  savings  in  Asian  and  oil-exporting  countries  were  not  freely  channelled  to 
domestically  productive  use  because  of  the  limited  financial  development  and  the  regulatory 
restrictions in these countries. Caballero et al. (2007) develop a theoretical model to explain three 
related economics facts recorded since early 2000s, that is the pattern of low real interest rates, the 
lasting current account imbalances and the raising importance of US assets in global portfolios (see 
Figure 12 for the latter phenomenon).  
 
Figure 12. Share of US assets in Rest of the World as a fraction of domestic output and financial wealth(%). 
Source: Caballero et al (2007) fig. 1 
 
The  model  represents  an  original  framework  to  analyze  global  equilibrium  and  its  response  to 
shocks and structural changes. Contrary to the NOEM models, this model is designed to emphasize 
the  role  of  global  asset-markets  rather  than  intertemporal  consumption.  This  is  key.  While 
consuming and saving behaviour is highly stylised
46, the authors model asset supply so as to take 
                                                 
45 For a concise account on how financial improvements, increasing house prices and sophisticated financial products 
(such as mortgage equity withdrawal)have contributed to this, see Feldstein (2007). 
46 Their simple consumption and saving function, nonetheless, requires the Ricardian equivalence does not to hold and 
this is not an innocuous assumption. In a non-Ricardian setting, an increase in the share of income capitalized into 
tradable assets increases the total supply of financial assets and affects global equilibrium allocations.   27 
into account the limited financial development of emerging countries. These limitations turn out to 
shape global capital flows, interest rates and portfolios allocations.  
As in a series of previous papers (such as Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Caballero 
(2006)), the authors investigate the role of private collateral in international transactions and show 
the implications of the differences in countries’ ability to produce assets that can be internationally 
traded  because  backed  by  valuable  private  collateral.
47  In  particular,  Caballero  and  co-authors 
consider two possible phenomena which, in their view, produce implications on the global economy 
in  line  with  the  three  abovementioned  stylised  facts.  They  look  at  the  effects  of  a  collapse  in 
emerging asset markets (such as that experienced by emerging markets in the late 1990s) and the 
gradual integration of fast growing economies. The idea is that when a local asset bubble crashes in 
emerging markets
48, savers look abroad for valuable investment opportunities in order to store their 
savings and capitals flow towards industrial countries.
49 The integration in the world economy of 
countries with a different ability to generate valuable financial assets and with different rates of 
growth  has  magnifies  this  trend.
50  A  decline  in  the  supply  of  valuable  financial  assets  by  fast 
growing emerging markets then tends to boost the value of US financial assets, thus US wealth, 
consumption and current account deficits.  
This conceptualisation on how global imbalances have grown is sensible and puts the right 
emphasis  on  the  protagonists  of  the  last  15  years,  that  is  capital  flows.  In  a  nutshell,  the 
heterogeneity  in  the  degrees  of  financial  market  development  in  different  regions  of  the  world 
affects the impact of global shocks and structural changes on the global allocation of goods and 
assets. The authors argue that heterogeneous degrees of financial developments may explain capital 
flow patterns: in fact, they motivate the increase in US asset demand with a collapse in emerging 
market asset markets, the increased integration of large and growing developing countries and the 
US ability to produce internationally valuable assets. These are peculiar events and this opens a few 
questions: how long the current condition will last? In general, emerging market’s ability to create 
                                                 
47  Such  private  collateral  has,  as  empirical  counterpart,  export  proceeds.  Although  both  focusing  on  the  idea  that 
collateral is key to explain global imbalances, the analyses of Caballero et al (2007) and Dooley et al (2007) are not 
easily reconciled given Dooley and co-authors see export proceeds as insufficient empirical counterpart and look at the 
gross stock of US assets as collateral. I will come back on the issue later on . 
48 See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) for a model of bubbles in emerging markets as the outcome of the limited 
ability to produce valuable financial assets. Caballero (2006) claims that the global shortage of financial assets may find 
its origins in the emerging market crises in late 90s and in the rapid growth rates of domestic savings in China and oil 
producing countries. 
49 In fact, it could be argued that, because of financial repression and limited capital account convertibility, a great deal 
of the financial flows directed towards the US have come from emerging markets’s central banks rather than from 
foreign private investors. Given the behaviour of the former is hardly a substitute of the latter, the explanation offered 
by Caballero and co-authors does not fit equally well the various circumstances that led to accumulation of US assets in 
diverse emerging markets. 
50 In one extension of the model the authors give account of the US relatively higher returns from FDI. By allowing for 
an investment margin, they rationalise FDI and the consequent asset heterogeneity magnifies the effects of a collapse in 
emerging asset markets on global imbalances.   28 
valuable assets is increasing over time, financial development is improving and China seems not 
destined  to  remain  “emerging”  for  too  long.  In  addition,  will  Asian  countries  continue  to 
accumulate Treasury bonds or will they start purchasing more profitable assets? The establishment 
of several new sovereign wealth funds seems to suggest that a change will occur. Will the US assets 
preserve those intangible virtues that make them preferable to the alternatives? A loss of confidence 
in the liquidity (e.g. credit crunch) or the reliability (e.g. following a scandal à la Enron) or the 
availability  (e.g.  for  restrictions  due  to  financial  protectionism)  of  US  assets  may  occur  if  US 
growth prospects change. Even though the issue is not discussed by Caballero and co-authors, the 
sustainability of global imbalances remains strictly linked to the occurrence of any of these shocks 
and to the persistence of the behaviours and features of the emerging markets which led to this 
point. A change in the current setting would be able to unset global imbalances and the problem of 
sustainability  remains:  it  follows  that  if  the  continuation  of  global  imbalances  and  the  further 
accumulation of US deficits can incept a change in the environment, then global imbalances might 
ultimately be unsustainable.  
Also  Mendoza  et  al  (2007)  develop  a  model  to  focus  on  the  characteristics  of  the  US 
financial system. The model predicts that increased financial integration creates, endogenously, a 
reduction in US savings and an increase in the foreign demand for US assets. These authors do not 
assume  differences  in  resources,  preferences,  and  production  functions  across  countries:  mere 
differences  in  the  structure  of  the  domestic  financial  markets  lead  to  external  imbalances  once 
financial integration overcomes a certain critical threshold. The degree of financial integration has 
steadily increased over time, as shown by the Chinn-Ito index plotted in Figure 13, and financial 
integration implies more and more countries enter the global markets and financial asset prices 
equalise. 
 
Figure 13. Financial openness index 1970-2004 
Source: Mendoza et al (2007). 
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The authors allow for endogenous production and include both (individual) endowment and 
production risks.
51 Endowment risk is beyond the control of the agents while the investment risks 
can be avoided: if the agents do not buy the productive asset, they do not produce and bear no risk. 
If asset markets were complete, agents would perfectly insure against both risks. Market frictions, 
however, limit the set of feasible claims in each country and agents face a portfolio choice between 
risky  and  risk  free  assets.
52  Countries  differ  in  the  extent  these  market  frictions  bind  and,  in 
particular, the degree of enforcement of financial contracts varies.
53 Countries, in fact, are diverse in 
their institutional, legal and contractual environments 
This rationalisation shares some similarities with the ideas of Caballero and co-authors, such 
as  the  key  role  of  the  heterogeneity  of  domestic  financial  systems.  However,  the  financial 
imperfections  considered  in  this  work  generate  differences  in  the  demand  of  assets,  not  in  the 
country’s ability to supply assets. In addition, the presence of risks and uncertainty is vital whereas 
it is absent in Caballero et al (2007). These differences have important implications on the sources 
of the global imbalances. While in Caballero et al (2007) different shocks to the growth rates and/or 
structural changes in the country’s ability to supply valuable assets (i.e. crises) are the forces behind 
global imbalances, in Mendoza et al (2007) the international integration of capital markets is the 
underlying  change  that,  interacting  with  the  peculiar  features  of  the  various  domestic  financial 
markets, generates global imbalances.
54,55 
Even  though  I  will  not  dwell  on  them  here,  some  contributions  have  focused  on 
demographic differences as ultimate sources of the emergence of  global imbalances. Henriksen 
(2005) looks at the population dynamics of the US and Japan, while Attanasio et al (2006) enlarge 
the scope to demographic patterns in developing countries. Demographics heterogeneity matters in 
                                                 
51 Notably, aggregate shocks  are absent and international  risk-sharing  motives do not generate cross-country asset 
holdings.  Productive  assets  are  internationally  immobile  and  cross-holding  of  productive  assets  is  necessary  for 
international production.  
52 This  modelling choice  helps to explain the composition of  gross asset portfolios,  not just the net foreign asset 
positions (i.e. the typical aspect of global imbalances investigated in most of the other works). 
53 In the model, the enforceability constraint comes from the assumption that shocks are not verifiable and agents can 
divert  part  of  the  incomes  from  endowment  and  production  at  a  certain  cost.  The  possibility  of  agents  to  divert 
investment incomes generated abroad is a function of the environment of the residence country, not the foreign country. 
54 In Caballero et al (2007) financial integration simply increases the size of the “rest of the world” ( R ) region which 
accumulates current account surpluses and finances US deficits. This different way of representing financial integration 
produces different results from Mendoza et al (2007). 
55 Chinn and Ito (2007) find that macroeconomic attributes (such as the stage of development, the demographic profile, 
the  legal  environment  and  the  level  of  institutional  development)  are  important  determinants  for  current  account 
surpluses (and thus for saving and investment decisions). They conclude that data do not support the argument that the 
more developed financial markets are, the less saving a country undertakes. In countries with low developed legal 
systems and open financial markets, such as the East Asian ones, greater financial development is found to produce 
lower, not higher, saving. It is only in institutionally advanced countries that financial development increases savings. 
In Asian countries, an investment drought over the post-crisis period seems more likely to have occurred. The authors 
also find that the budget balance is an important determinant for industrial countries and for the East Asian countries .    30 
the determination of savings patters, yet it does not account for the composition of the capital flows 
and the portfolio allocations. For this reason, I will not discuss them in greater detail. 
A  few  authors  support  the  view  that,  besides  being  an  equilibrium  condition,  global 
imbalances are a desirable allocation of capital in a world in which countries have different growth 
strategies and levels of development. In what follows, I will illustrate the contributions of Dooley, 
Garber and  Folkerts-Landau (2007) and Cooper (2004). According to Dooley et al (2007), the 
Achilles heel of NOEM is the implicit and unrealistic assumption that “threats to deprive the debtor 
countries  of  gains  from  trade  provide  incentives  for  poor  countries  to  repay  more  than  trivial 
amounts of international debt.”
56 In the real world, they argue, collateral is required to sustain gross 
capital flows and, thus, the NOEM models fail to take this aspect into account. Dooley and co-
authors maintain that net capital movements between emerging and industrial countries can provide 
themselves  a  strong  incentive  for  repayment.
57  The  argument  goes  as  follows.  Fast  growing 
developing  countries manage to generate large savings, but domestic financial markets waste a 
fraction of them because of limited financial development. The domestic capital stock that would 
come out of this weak process would be modest if part of such domestic savings were not moved 
offshore  so  as  to  “be  intermediated  by  foreign  intermediaries  and  re-exported  back  to  the 
developing economy through FDI”. Such trade in assets is consistent with the very large gross 
capital flows that produce the net capital flows and stocks at the basis of global imbalances.
58 
Without  corrections,  in  such  a  context  the  risks  for  the  residents  in  both  countries  would  be 
unbalanced  because  of  the  well  known  inability  of  sovereigns  to  enforce  (debt)  contracts 
internationally.  Dooley  and  co-authors  argue  that  governments  in  developing  countries  cannot 
commit not to expropriate foreign investments and need to accumulate a proper form of collateral to 
be able to attract foreign capital flows. The solution to the problem is the identification a credible 
threat to sovereign debtors that enhances the chances the repayments will be carried out.
59 The  
classical incentive scheme used in the literature - based on the concession and withdrawal of trade 
                                                 
56 The authors refer to the works by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoff (1989a and 1989b),   Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996) and, despite not cited, Rose (2006b). 
57 “Specifically, we have argued that net capital outflows from poor countries provide collateral to support the far larger 
gross capital flows between economies of different stages of development and creditworthiness that are at the heart of 
successful development. As a result, large US current account deficits do not generate ever-rising global risks. To the 
contrary, the cumulating net accounting imbalances exist to preclude the risk imbalances that would otherwise cumulate 
to stifle the gross capital flows.” (2007 pp. 2-3). 
58 According to Roubini and Setser (2005), however, this is not consistent with the relative low private capital outflows 
from China towards financially developed countries sine 2003. This could indicate that “China is exporting financial 
intermediation – attracting world’s savings and reinvesting those savings in dollar asset through the PBOC’s balance 
sheet”. (Roubini and Setser (2005) p. 22). 
59 This description of the world is consistent with the factual observation of numerous sovereign debt defaults, with the 
limited and pro-cyclical capital flows towards developing countries (the so called Lucas’ paradox (1990)), with counter-
cyclical and volatile risk premia in emerging markets (See Kose et al 2006)).   31 
and financial market access by the foreign lenders - is neither a sufficient and nor a credible threat.
60 
In fact, it is necessary that the countries that desire to receive foreign private flows accumulate 
collateral in a form that makes feasible foreign retaliation in case of default or expropriation. They 
argue that government’s international reserve assets could be used as collateral and, indeed, they 
are.  Looking at actual data, they  find a close correspondence between  the level and growth of 
reserves in many emerging markets and the collateral that would be necessary to insure the gross 
foreign equity inflows in these countries. The analysis is consistent with the persistent and large US 
current account deficits, with the ability of the US to borrow at low interest rates and with the 
willingness of central banks to purchase US low yield assets. The story has some shortcomings and 
I will come back on them in section VIII. 
The idea of reserves serving as collateral is not the only contribution Dooley, Folkerts-Landau 
and  Garber  have  offered  to  the  debate  on  global  imbalances.  A  precedent  and  compatible 
explanation  of  theirs  for  reserve  hoarding  and  the  permanence  of  global  imbalances  puts  the 
emphasis on the relationship between current capital flows and emerging economies development 
strategies.  Dooley,  Folkerts-Landau  and  Garber  (2003)  argue  that  the  current  pattern  of  US 
external  deficits  is  consistent  with  a  revived  Bretton  Woods  system,  which  they  call  “Bretton 
Woods II”.  Developing countries aim at maintaining competitive (i.e. undervalued) exchange rates 
so as to sustain the more productive exporting sectors and to foster growth in a measure that is 
sufficient to absorb the large amounts of rural workers in the industrial sector.
61 Crucially, this is an 
optimal development strategy and it will continue as long as growth will remain an overarching 
goal of domestic policymakers. Accordingly, global conditions do not represent a threat to global 
investors  and  to  the  world  macroeconomic  environment  but  a  logical  development  of  the 
circumstances. They also argue that, given the size of unemployed population and peasants in many 
emerging  countries
62,  there  is  no  serious  reason  to  believe  central  banks  will  reduce  their 
willingness  to  purchases  US  assets.  In  other  words,  it  is  unlikely,  in  their  view,  that  global 
imbalances will unwind because of a shock in the reserve accumulating process. I will come back 
on this view in sections VIII and X.  
An alternative, optimist view, which is commonly identified as the “new economy view”, is 
based on the underlying idea that the appetite of foreign investors for US claims is (and will remain) 
high because the rapid productivity growth and high corporate profitability in the United States 
                                                 
60 See footnote 47. 
61 Caballero et al (2007) underplay some of arguments put forward by Dooley and co-authors. For instance, they argue 
that reserves are indirectly  held by emerging  market local private sectors through (quasi-collateralized) low-return 
sterilization bonds because of limited capital account openness. See also Calvo and Talvi 2006 on this. 
62 The share of population employed in the agricultural sector has fallen from 70% in 1980 to 40% in 2006. (Makin 
(2006) p. 310).   32 
make US investments attractive. According to such a view, “financing even a $1 trillion current 
account deficit, which is what a 7 per cent deficit currently implies, requires less than 15 per cent of 
the more than $8 trillion of gross foreign savings outside the United States. And placing that share 
of foreign savings in the United States is attractive.” (Eichengreen (2006b) p.647). Morevoer, if US 
economic growth accelerates relative to its trend thanks to such foreign investments, the ratio of US 
net  IIP  over  GDP  is  destined  to  grow  even  slower.  Accordingly,  the  classical  capitalisation 
exercises that do not consider such feedback of FDIs inflows on US growth miss an important effect 
and overestimate the likelihood the situation is unsustainable. Notice, however that the condition 
that foreigners invest in US productive assets is, in fact, controversial. In most recent years net 
foreign capitals have been directed towards low yield US treasury bonds. While this has allowed the 
US to derive a positive net investment income despite its negative IIP (i.e. the exorbitant privilege 
of  Gourinchas  and  Rey  (2006)
63,  and  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti  (2006)),  bonds  are  a  highly 
unproductive investment from the point of view of the US. In addition, foreign claims on future 
output grow with the interest rates whereas capital flows do not produce positive effects on US 
productivity and production growth.
64  
This notwithstanding, Cooper (2004) claims that, assuming a  US  growth around 5% in 
nominal terms, the US current account deficit can remain constantly equal to 500 billion dollar each 
year  without  any  major  problem.  Given  the  current  net  investment  position  and  assuming  5% 
interest rate forever, economic growth will contain the growth of the ratio of US net external claims 
to  GDP  to  46%.  This  upper  limit  will  be  reached  after  15  year  and  this  ratio  will  decline 
indefinitely. In Cooper (2006), the author reviews his calculations and still concludes that “viewed 
from the perspective of a knowledge-based economy in a globalized world undergoing dramatic 
demographic change”, the US current account deficit is a natural phenomenon that can last for 
many more years. In light of this, Cooper notes that, given gross world savings are about 8 trillion 
dollar, a mere 10% of them invested in the US would be sufficient to finance a current account 
deficit about 800 billion. Once the US size and the relative importance of the dollar are also taken 
into  account,  it  is  not  unconceivable  that  the  world  will  keep  on  putting  10-15%  of  its  whole 
savings into the US economy. Updating the calculations in his 2004 paper, Cooper maintains that if 
the current account balance will remain constant and equal to 2006 current deficit also in the future, 
the ratio of net IIP over GDP will grow only until 2019 and decline afterwards. A noteworthy aspect 
of the work is that Cooper discusses just in passing the sustainability of a different case, that is the 
                                                 
63  They  find  that  one  third  of  the  excess  return  of  US  assets  reflects  the  fact  that  the  US  is  a  world  financial 
intermediary: it borrows mostly in the form of low-yield dollar denominated loans and debt and invests in high yield-
foreign currency denominated risks assets (such as equity and FDI). Return differentials within asset classes amount to 
the remaining two thirds of the total return differential. 
64 See Cooper (2006).   33 
permanence in the future of a constant ratio of the current account over GDP around recent levels. 
Even though he does claim that US deficits would be sustainable also in this case, the implications 
of this alternative scenario for assets’ ownerships are not considered. This is odd given this is the 
scenario maintained as unsustainable by the economists holding the traditional view. In a nutshell, 
Cooper’s optimist conclusions refer to a scenario where the current account deficit remains constant 
in absolute value and do not hold for the continuation of a current account deficits between 5% to 
7% of the GDP. In such a case, projections are less rosy and financial protectionism gets more 
likely. 
Contrary to market commentary, Cooper argues that this pattern of deficit accumulation by the 
US will not lead to the transfer abroad of the ownership of a large share of US capital stock. Even 
though foreigners will certainly own more of the US capital stock, this will not create any serious 
transfer of ownership given the several layers of financial assets above capital stock the US has: the 
ownership of about 20% of capital stock in net terms is worth less than 10% of total US financial 
assets. A related reasoning is put forward by Backus et al (2005), who argue that non-residents will 
eventually own a larger share of claims on the US economy, yet this will not reduce the value of US 
net worth given the projects in which domestic and foreign funds are invested are highly profitable. 
As said, this is reinforce by the fact, as Cooper stresses, that since foreign capital inflows allow the 
US capital stock to increase, they enhance US growth and, in so doing, help to make the net IIP 
more sustainable.  
This reasoning is also consistent with the conclusions of Bonatti (2006). In his unbalanced 
growth model, he shows that, even in a world of perfectly integrated good and capital markets, 
heterogeneous  equilibrium  rates  of  productivity  growth  can  support  persistent  current  account 
deficits in the fast growing country. The increase in the long term GDP growth due to capital 
inflows from the slow growing economy enhances the ability of the receiving country to sustain its 
external debt.
65 The empirical papers which look at this rationalisation, on which I will come back 
later,  show  that  while  it  cannot  account  for  the  post  2000s  global  economic  conditions,  it  has 
certainly a lot to do with what occurred between US and UE in mid and late 90s.  
Eichengreen  (2006b)  objects  to  some  points  in  Cooper’s  reasoning.  Eichengreen’s  main 
reservations  are:  a)  the  high  US  attractiveness  may  reduce,  yet  not  eliminate  the  US  external 
funding concerns in the long run, b) Cooper’s description of foreign flows is in contrast with the 
fact  that  foreign  resources  are  concentrated  on  US  debt  securities,  and  not  FDIs  or  stocks,  c) 
                                                 
65 Interestingly, Blanchard et al (2005), making reference to Ventura (2003), mention that growth differentials may 
support  sustainable  and  steady  current  account  deficits  in  equilibrium.  However,  they  overlook  the  case  in  their 
subsequent calculations. Also Caballero et al (2007) use their model to describe the impact of the US-EU growth 
differential on their current accounts.   34 
productivity growth is higher in many emerging markets than in the US
66, d) in past years, it was 
not US investments to grow but US savings to fall, e) most of the external finance has recently 
come  from  foreign  central  banks,  not  from  allured  private  investors,  f)  the  US  net  investment 
income  from  abroad  is  positive  and  this  signals  that  US  investments  abroad  are  still  more 
productive than foreign investments in the US. If, as argued, this is due to the fact that US assets are 
growth (i.e. “potential”) stocks (because they entail returns that have not yet materialised), then it is 
hard to see why investors recently put their money into US debt rather than US stocks and why the 
US returns have been systematically lower than the foreign ones.  In addition, even if the new 
economy story was right, this would not change the stringency of the long run inter-temporal budget 
constraints in the conventional view: the accumulation of net foreign debt will eventually make 
harder and harder to sustain persistent US external deficits and some adjustment will have to kick 
in.  
An alternative optimist view (that Barry Eichengreen refers to as the “savvy investor view”) 
is put forward,  for instance, by  Kitchen (2006).  In  a nutshell, the argument is that US-owned 
foreign assets provide higher returns that foreign owned US assets because US investors are more 
savvy than foreigners (and also because the dollar has so far depreciated against many currencies). 
Since this situation is likely to be preserved and the differential between the US capital gains and 
the  foreigners’  capital  losses  is  likely  to  continue,  there  is  no  reason  to  worry  for  an  abrupt 
unravelling of global imbalances. The capital gain differential will tend to reduce the value of the 
US net external debt even if the current account will remain (moderately) negative. The standard 
view, neglecting these considerations on returns differential, predicts a too high level of debt over 
GDP:  this  weakens  the  claim  that  current  condition  are  unsustainable.  Even  though  Kitchen’s 
observations were right and the return differential were destined to last forever, the reasoning does 
not eliminate but only postpone and reduce the size of the ultimate adjustment. In fact, it would 
require a huge differential to offset the negative impact of current account deficits on the net IIP. In 
addition, such a rosy scenario depends on the maintenance of return differentials as large as those in 
the last years : this would imply more a “dumb foreign investor” story, than a “savvy US investor” 
view.  Certainly,  this  view  remains  compatible  with  the  idea  that  US  assets  provide  implicit 
additional  services  to  foreigners  and  that  part  of  the  return  differentials  is  due  to  the  limited 
substitutability of foreign and US assets. These explanations, however, are not sufficient to account 
for the differential between the returns on all US foreign assets and liabilities. In addition, while it is 
not hard rationalising why US FDIs abroad had outperformed foreign FDIs in the US in the last 10 
years, is this superiority destined to last? Will the US assets continue to provide their embedded 
                                                 
66 The productivity differential story is, in effects, most valid for the different current account trends in developed 
economies, such as US, Japan and UE.   35 
services even if an adjustment process will kick in? Will EU, Swiss and Japanese assets remain on a 
side? The persistence of the underlying forces, in my view, remains an unaddressed, yet key, issue. 
Engel and Rogers (2006) tackle the issue with both a traditional and innovative approach. 
The authors investigate whether the US current account deficits can be consistent with plausible 
assumptions and an intertemporal optimizing behaviour. They develop a long-run world equilibrium 
model where countries are expected to grow at different rates: this differential alters the future 
shares of world GDP with respect to the current ones. The current account of each country, in its 
turn, is determined by the expected discounted present value of its future share of world GDP 
relative to its current share. They conclude that the US current account deficit in 2004 is consistent 
with some plausible assumptions regarding the (long-run) future US growth relative to the other 
advanced countries.
67 One interesting problem remains: the dynamics of the current account deficit 
since mid-90s are harder to explain than its value in 2004. In particular, the maximum value of the 
US current account dynamics should have been observed at the beginning of the period of expected 
growth,  not  in  recent  years.  The  actual  pattern  cannot  be  explained  under  the  assumption  that 
expectations of future US growth follow a Markov-switching model for predicting net GDP shares. 
On the contrary, the expectations derived from survey data on forecasted GDP growth in the G-7 
countries make the predictions of the model consistent with the actual evolution of the US current 
account  balance  in  the  last  decade.  The  intuition  is  that  markets  underestimated  the  brilliant 
performance of the US economy relative to the rest of the advanced countries and this has led to a 
gradual emergence of the US current account deficits. This might explain why the current account 
deficit have reached the apex so late.
68 The increased access of foreign investors to US capital 
markets has contributed to boost cross-country lending. As the authors admit, there is not role for 
emerging markets in their analysis; this limitation makes the analysis more relevant for the late 90s 
than for the 2000s. It is interesting to notice that this work conceptualises global imbalances as an 
equilibrium situation under the assumption of a relatively high future US growth but, at the same 
time, shows that their actual dynamics can be accounted for only if past expectations of future US 
growth  had  been  systematically  lower  than  the  actual  data.  Notice  this  contrasts  with  the  new 
economy view which, instead, revolves around optimistic expectations about future US growth in 
the second half of the 90s. 
                                                 
67 The reasoning echoes the reasoning in Cooper (2004) and Bonatti (2006) 
68 In addition, the authors recall the facts that consumption takes time to adjust, the relaxation of credit constraints for 
many US households occurred after 2001 and the widening of US budget deficits started in 2001 too.   36 
 
Figure 14. US actual and forecasted shares of G-7 GDP. 
Source: Engle and Rogers (2006), Fig. 7 p. 1088  
 
I believe these findings can be related to the “Wile E Coyote” syndrome described by Krugman: too 
pessimistic expectations may account for the growth of the current account deficits in the past and, 
maybe, too optimistic expectations about the future US conditions and future US dollar value for its 
recent continuation. Engle and Roger (2006)’s paper, under this light, links the traditional to the 
revisionist view: current account imbalances may be the fruit of optimising agents with incorrect
69 
expectations. 
Among the economists who support the view that global imbalances come from an efficient 
allocation  of  capital,  a  few  push  the  reasoning  even  further  and  argue  that,  in  fact,  global 
imbalances  are  the  result  of  imprecise,  outdated  or  ill-conceived  accounting  practices.  I  will 
describe such positions in next subsection. The reason for dealing separately with these views is 
illustrative. Many of the ideas these authors put forward are implicitly accepted and employed by 
economists  in  favour  of  the  equilibrium  view.  Given  the  harsh  criticism  these  positions  have 
heaved, it is not so common to find explicit references to their works and it is hard to juxtapose 
them with other positions.  For this reason, I treat them separately. 
III.4 The contrarian view: any problem at all? 
 
Besides showing that US deficits accumulation is feasible and sustainable under a certain 
perspective (see subsection III.3), Cooper (2006) tackles the common contention that Americans 
save too little for future generations. Cooper argues that once R&D, expenditures in education and 
durable consumption are included among investments rather than consumption, the ratio of US 
                                                 
69 Expectations need not be biased, just incorrect.   37 
saving  is  approximately  equal  to  34%  of  US  GDP.  Therefore,  accounting  practices  bias  the 
evaluation of actual saving behaviour.  
Other  authors  claim  that  current  statistical  and  data  collection  practices  have  direct 
consequences on the perception that a global imbalances problem exits. A lively discussion, for 
instance, has been raised by a provocative and ingenious paper by Hausmann and Sturzenegger 
(2006). In this work Hausmann and Sturzenegger argue that current account statistics provide a poor 
indication of the actual evolution of US net foreign assets. This is due to a series of factors related 
to a biased accounting of net capital gains in the current account estimates. To prove this, the 
authors show that, despite the US accumulated current account deficits in the period between 1982 
and 2005 amounted to $5.27 trillion, in 2005 the net return from the US IIP was equal to $17.6 
billion, that is just half of the $30 billion the US obtained in 1982 when the net IIP was positive (i.e. 
$329 billion). The main reason of the inconsistency between the large accumulated deficits and 
positive net returns is that capital gains on net foreign assets have modified and improved the US 
net IIP in a way that is not fully accounted for by official statistics.
70 In fact, part of the capital gains 
are considered in the official IIP statistics: the BEA corrects the US net IIP to take into account both 
the valuation effects coming from exchange rate fluctuations and other capital gains not recorded in 
the balance of payments statistics.
71 This adjustment adds some $2.25 trillion to the total US net 
foreign assets, which are equal to -$2.69 trillion
72  instead of -$4.94 trillion
73.  
Notwithstanding such correction, an inconsistency remains between the US net investment 
position (which depict the US as a debtor country) and its positive investment income.
74 Hausmann 
and Sturzenegger claim that two phenomena are responsible for such apparent inconsistency. The 
first one is that US foreign assets are not properly measured.  In particular, US FDIs are more 
productive than foreign FDIs in the US since US FDIs benefit of home expertise and know-how, 
which  are  transferred  to  affiliates  abroad  even  though  they  are  not  properly  “exported”.
75  This 
implies  that  the  BEA  current  value  correction  of  the  value  of  FDIs  is  incomplete:  the 
underestimation  of  the  stock  of  FDIs  (and,  therefore,  of  net  IIP)  remains  large  even  after  the 
adjustments of the BEA. The authors argue the main reason is that the BEA treats US and foreign 
FDIs as equally productive while calculating their current values. The second phenomenon which 
                                                 
70 See Section II and Appendix B for a deeper treatment of this issue. 
71 In particular, the BEA corrects the book value of FDIs. In the baseline data it uses an evaluation at the current cost. In 
an alternative evaluation it corrects asset values for the stock market performance and in this way it obtains an estimate 
of FDIs at market value.  
72 In the period 2000-2005 this adjustment leads to a deterioration of the US international position equal to $1.3 trillion, 
instead of the $ 3.26 trillion of cumulated current account deficits. 
73 This is the sum of the cumulated deficits in 2005 minus the positive net IIP in 1982. 
74 The fact that the US looks as a debtor country even tough it continues to receive positive investment income has 
made several economists (such as Cline (2005) and Gross (2006)) think that the US IIP and current account statistics 
might be inconsistent. Few authors, however, who, however, go as far as Hausmann and Sturzenegger. 
75 This reading of the FDI return differential is consistent with the “savvy investor view”.   38 
explains the discrepancy between net investment position and income is that, considering all forms 
of returns (i.e. bond yields, dividends and capital gains), there seems to be a persistent ex post return 
differential in US and foreign assets. This allows the US to draw a positive net income stream from 
a negative net foreign investment position.
76 
The existence of a return differential on the US international gross assets and liabilities is 
known  in  the  literature  since  early  2000s.
77  Hausmann  and  Sturzenegger,  however,  use  this 
observation  for  a  more  general  purpose  and  assume  such  a  differential  to  be  an  equilibrium 
phenomenon, which depends on some intrinsic virtues entrenched in the US assets. In particular, the 
latter offer to foreign holders some embedded services in addition to their explicit yields. According 
to the authors, the capitalised value of such embedded services should be added up to the US net IIP 
in the same way the capitalised value of the returns from intangible assets are calculated in national 
accounting.  Hausmann  and  Sturzenegger  call  dark  matter  the  difference  between  the  net  IIP 
measure calculated with the capitalisation of net returns differential and the net IIP position as 
currently recorded by the BEA. Using the adjusted net IIP values to derive the current account 
(which is the difference between two consecutive net IIP, however calculated), the authors find an 
“adjusted  current  account”,  which  includes  the  implicit  exports  of  such  intangible  embedded 
services.
78 It turns out that the US adjusted current account is positive and the adjusted US IIP are 
positive too. Accordingly, they conclude global imbalances are not as bad as many pundits think 
and the US is not a debtor country. 
On the basis of these findings, the authors try to identify the nature of these embedded 
intangible  exports.  The  implicit  services  of  US  (but  also  of  Swiss  or  German)  bonds  are  a) 
insurance  (holding  US  bonds  represents  an  insurance  instrument  in  volatile  countries)  and  b) 
liquidity (holding US dollars allows emerging economies to participate in global markets).
79 The 
implicit  services  in  the  US  FDIs  are,  as  said,  expertise  and  know-how.  The  price  of  all  these 
embedded exports is the negative return differential that foreigners are willing to bear in order to 
invest in US assets.  
The authors concede that other sources of dark matter are possible. Some could come from 
aid flows or debt relief in some countries. Furthermore, as argued in Dooley et al. (2004), US asset 
accumulation allows peripheral countries (with export-led growth strategies) to keep undervalued 
                                                 
76 Curiously, Higgings et al (2005) and Gourinchas and Rey (2006) differ widely in their conclusions on which classes 
of assets are characterised by the larger and more persistent return differentials. The former point at FDIs (among fixed-
income securities, i.e. government or corporate bonds, banking and other interest-paying claims, equities, and FDIs) as 
generating most of the positive income stream. The latter, instead, consider a more comprehensive measure accounting 
for capital gains and find that there are large differences in all assets, but FDIs.  
77 See, for instance, Tille (2003), Higgins et al (2005), Cline (2005) e Gourinchas and Rey (2006). 
78 Hausmann and Sturzenneger refer to Ulan and Dewald (1989) for this way of computing the current account. 
79 When foreigners hold US currency, i.e. dollars, the US current account deficit is financed through seigniorage. When 
they hold low yield US bonds, instead, it is an unmeasured provision of financial liquidity services.    39 
their  exchange  rates.
80  These  countries  may  also  purchase  US  assets  at  lower  expected  returns 
because these assets guarantee a) the access of their products to US good markets
81 and b) serve as 
collateral to US gross FDIs (as pointed out also in Dooley et al (2004b))
82. To a certain extent the 
dark matter hypothesis seems consistent also with Caballero et al (2007), which link the current 
imbalances to a form of financial backwardness in fast-growing countries. Since these countries 
cannot write claims on productive assets, their residents are forced to buy foreign assets with their 
savings.
83  
Hausmann and Sturzenegger find that bilateral dark matter is statistically related to some of 
these alleged causes. In addition, once dark matter is taken into account, global net international 
investment positions appear to be relatively stable. The US turns out to be an exporter of dark 
matter and this is responsible for the accumulation of positive (not negative!) net foreign assets. 
Intangible  service  exports,  in  other  words,  offset  the  deficits  in  the  ‘traditional’  trade  balance. 
Hausmann and Sturzenegger claim that US exports of dark matter are steady and large enough to 
keep  the  US  net  asset  position  stable  also  in  the  future:  global  imbalances,  besides  not  being 
present, are also unlikely to occur in the future. 
Commenting such provocative paper is as hard as refraining from doing it. The proposed 
revisions to the accounting methods to derive the net IIP and the current account measures are 
important and challenging. The paper, in addition, follows the recently fashionable approach to take 
into account various valuations effects and this makes it compatible with the intuitions of other 
researchers.  The  paper,  however,  remains  rather  unconventional  because  of  the  choice  of 
capitalising the return differential as a way to calculate the embedded services provided by US 
assets and liabilities. I will start with pointing out two aspects of Hausmann and Sturzenegger’ 
exercise  I  deem  controversial.  First,  I  am  not  convinced  it  is  correct  to  capitalise  the  return 
differentials in all countries, in particular those exhibiting high volatility. As emphasised by the 
authors  themselves,  the  return  differential  need  be  an  equilibrium  condition  to  be  correctly 
capitalised. The high volatility of returns and exchange rates, by definition, violates this essential 
requirement. It follows that the conditions for the capitalisation of the return differential may hold 
when large regions of the world are considered, but not for every country. Second, the capitalisation 
exercise directly transmits the volatility of the underlying economic differentials to the adjusted IIP. 
                                                 
80 I will come back on this in section X when I will discuss the so-called “Bretton Woods II” system. 
81 In Hausmann and Sturzenegger’ words these countries “would be  ‘purchasing’ the access to the US market, another 
form of trading dark matter.” 
82 The US operates as financial intermediary which borrows in low yields-low risk assets and invests, provided valuable 
collateral exist, in the high yields-high risk activities.   
83 This occurs also because central authorities intermediate most of purchases of foreign assets.   40 
The stock of foreign assets becomes more volatile than usual: this is bizarre and at odds with the 
very “sluggish” nature of stock  variables. 
To meaningfully capitalise the return differential, it is important  that the former is constant 
over time so that its annual fluctuations do not cause large variations in the capitalised stock of net 
assets. Yet, is this the case? The persistence of such differential cannot be taken for granted and the 
very same worries of those supporting the traditional view apply also here: how long can current 
conditions (and their underlying forces) last? As I tried to make clear since the beginning of this 
work, the main contentious point is the sustainability of global imbalances, not their plausibility. 
The dark matter explanation seems more focused on the latter than on the former. In fact, even if 
this explanation manages to capture and “quantify” some of the features making the US assets so 
attractive, it does not provide a useful measure to asses the sustainability of the system. Imagine 
that, for some reasons, foreigners have already accumulated enough dark matter deficits; they will 
stop  buying  US  assets  until  the  return  differential  will  be  reduced  along  with  the  diminished 
demand of intangible services embedded in the assets. This change worsens the US current account 
(both the traditional one – via lower investment income transfers - and the dark matter ‘adjusted’ 
one) and lowers the US net international investment position.
84  
This scenario of gradual adjustment follows an exogenous fall in the demand of dark matter. 
However, in my view, it does not take into account the endogeneity in the supply of dark matter. 
The value of the alleged intangible services provided by the US currency and bonds is not intrinsic 
in the assets but stems from the widespread recognition of their qualities. If the US public debt 
becomes riskier because of its growing size, or if central banks start substituting the Euro for the 
Dollar  as  major  reserve  currency,  the  services  embedded  in  the  US  assets  lose  part  of  their 
attributed value without any fall in the world demand of “dark matter” services. The permanence of 
global imbalances and the occurrence of some shocks, therefore, may incept a vicious circle that 
spoils those peculiar features of the US assets that, according to Hausmann and Sturzenegger, are 
currently exported as intangible embedded services. Put another way, if dark matter is what sustains 
the  global  system,  any  adjustment  that  undermines  the  intangible  values  of  the  US  assets  may 
seriously affect the equilibrium conditions. 
The capitalisation of the net return differential carried out by Hausmann and Sturzenegger 
hinges on the assumption of an unchanged confidence in the stability of the US economy, in its 
ability to provide insurance, internationally accepted and liquid assets. Yet a multiple equilibria 
environment seems more plausible to me: as long as the US economy will be considered stable by 
foreign investors, it will manage to export enough dark matter to finance its tangible consumption; 
                                                 
84 If this change is accompanied by a US real exchange rate devaluation the trade balance may improve and a positive 
valuation effect may partially offset the worsening of the net IIP.   41 
once the accumulated exported dark matter will become excessive and will weaken foreigners’ 
confidence, the system will unravel.  
Furthermore, following Hausmann and Sturzenneger’s reasoning, the reduction in the EMBI 
spreads and emerging market volatility after 2002 should have reduced the US exports of dark 
matter: in such an environment the insurance services embedded in the US assets should have lost 
part of their importance. This, in fact, has not occurred. A plausible reason is that, at that time, oil 
exporting and Asian countries started accumulating foreign reserves in the form of US treasury bills 
for purposes that differ from self-insurance. As different countries accumulate reserves for different 
reasons at different times, the determinants of dark matter exports change over time too. This shows 
that each of them is likely to eventually come to a halt: there is no certainty a new force will 
compensate the fading one.   
In light of this, it could be concluded that the question of sustainability is not answered by 
Hausmann and Sturzenegger, yet simply transformed: how much exported dark matter is enough 
and how persistent are the forces supporting its supply and its demand? 
  The dark matter view has been severely  criticised along other lines that differ from the 
considerations I offered above. Buiter (2006), for instance, attacks both the stock and flow measures 
used by Hausmann and Sturzenegger.
85 In addition, he rejects their capitalisation method and the 
idea  that  past  ex-post  return  differentials  can  be  taken  as  a  guide  to  future  expected  returns.
86 
Eichengreen (2006b) highlights three main weakness in the dark matter argument. First, the low 
returns on US assets may be due to the temporary anti-deflationary policy the Fed put in place after 
the financial crisis in 2001. This lax condition is not likely to last, also because the accumulation of 
public budget deficits will contribute to raise the  yields of public bonds in the future. Second, 
Eichengreen  stresses  that  the  dark  matter  view  is  inconsistent  with  the  “new  economy”  view, 
thereby foreign investors deal with US investments as growth stocks. While Cooper (2006) claims 
that the US would be lucky if foreigners will continue to invest in US assets, since this would 
ultimately increase the US capital stock, this process would amount to a reduction in US dark 
matter exports. When the return differential will start shrinking, dark matter will decline too. Third, 
net income payments are probably recorded with error as much as current accounts and the net IIP 
are
87.  This  contention  is  discussed  at  length  by  Gross  (2006),  who  argues  that  data  on  US 
investment income receipts and payments are both biased.  
                                                 
85 With the exception of the liquidity services due to seigniorage earned on the stock of US currency held abroad. 
86 Buiter claims that the dark matter analysis “is tantamount to discounting risky returns using a risk-free discount rate” 
(2006 p.8). 
87 This point is made also by Buiter (2006) and Gross (2006).   42 
Gross (2006) argues that the huge difference in the returns on foreign FDIs in the US and 
US FDIs abroad is mainly related to a persistent differential in the reinvested (or retained) corporate 
earnings as reported in the balance of payments. The latter are not cross-border investment income 
flows because, being retained, do not “flow” abroad, as dividends or interests do. Because there are 
no international flows to be recorded in the balance of payments, the official IIP data on reinvested 
earnings are calculated from the reports of the profits made by the individual companies abroad 
minus repatriated profits: as long as firms have an incentive to underreport their profits in the US so 
as to reduce their tax liabilities, official data on foreign reinvested profits in the US tend to be lower 
than their actual values. Since retained profits correspond not only to implicit investment income 
flows, but also to further investments abroad, the double entry system of the balance of payments 
creates two distortions. The underreport of foreign profits in the US makes i) the current account 
look  better  and  ii)  foreign  investment  positions  in  the  US  look  smaller.  Balance  of  payments 
statistics, thus, draw an image of the US condition that is even better than it really is: smaller 
current deficits and a larger net investment position. Gross (2006) points out that some other items 
in the official statistics are calculated in a way that biases the interpretation of important sub-items 
of the investment income position: in the end, cross-border payment flows statistics (in the balance 
of payment) and international investment position statistics draw on different data sources. The 
BEA tables (reported in appendix B) on the components of changes in the net US international 
investment position over time reveal that the item “other changes” (such as those linked to data 
revision, change in coverage and adjustments in the value of the IIPs) are responsible for a large 
proportion of the overall change in the net IIP. Data revisions are indeed due to the fact that data on 
financial flows and IIP come from different sources and need to be reconciled a posteriori.
88 The 
item “other changes” is, in the end, the difference that reconciles the official data on the IIP with the 
capital  flows  recorded  in  the  balance  of  payments.  Large  data  revisions  indicate  that  the  data 
collection process suffers some serious problems and the series used in the current account and net 
IIP are inconsistent. Notably, the conclusion Gross draws from these observations is that a correct 
interpretation  of  the  official  statistics  of  the  US  current  account  and  net  investment  position 
indicates the US is a debtor (and not a lender, as argued by Hausmann and Sturzenegger) and its 
position unsustainable.  
                                                 
88 For instance, “a share of a US companies held by a European would thus not appear in the US net IIP if the share is 
not held with a US-based custodian. But the purchase of the share would have been recorded in the balance of payments 
as a flow in the year the purchase took place.” (2006 p. 254). A similar reasoning holds for the foreign ownership of the 
real estate.   43 
IV. At the origins: the forces sustaining the process. 
 
  To  summarise  some  of  the  explanations  for  the  occurrence  and  maintenance  of  global 
imbalances, I will follow Barry Eichengreen’s account (2006a). The first view I consider is what he 
defines as the “deficient U.S. savings view”. This consists in the idea that low national savings rates 
in the United States are the crucial determinants of US current account deficits. In their turn, low 
household savings are the consequences of low US interest rates and high private wealth (grown 
thanks to capital gains in the stock and real estate markets). Negative public savings, instead, are the 
result of a somehow lax fiscal policy the US government has implemented since 2001. The “new 
economy view” (Cooper (2004) and (2006)), instead, is based on the idea that the attractiveness of 
investment in the United States has driven large foreign capital inflows, in particular in the second 
half of the 90s. The “global savings glut view” (Bernanke (2005)) supports the hypothesis that the 
main  factors  behind  global  imbalances  are  the  high  saving  rates  in  the  rest  of  the  world.  The 
“investment drought view” (Rajan (2006)) differs from the “global saving glut view” in that low 
investment rates in the rest of the world, and not high savings, are responsible for the large capital 
flows  in  the  US.  The  view  that  Eichengreen  dubs  as  “Sino-American  codependency”  includes 
different explanations, all hinging on the peculiar economic relationship between Asian countries 
and the US (Dooley et al (2003), (2004), (2007)). This set of explanations focus on the fact that 
Asian countries have changed their development strategy since the crisis of 1997–8 by reducing 
both domestic demand and investment rates and by accumulating reserves as a way i) to keep the 
exchange  rate  undervalued  and  ii)  to  self-insure  against  private  capital  flows  reversals.  Other 
rationalisations  refer  to  the  presence  of  capital  market  imperfections  in  fast  growing  (both  in 
economic and demographic terms) emerging markets as the key determinant of global imbalances. 
(Caballero  et  al  (2007),  Mendoza  et  al  (2007),  Dooley  et  al.  (2007))  Accordingly,  I  dub  them 
“financial underdevelopment view”. Since developing countries strive to produce marketable assets 
because of some deep institutional weaknesses and domestic financial frictions limit the extent of 
domestic financial intermediation, savings are directly or indirectly sent abroad to diversify the risk 
and to maximise expected returns. The US plays the role of a financial intermediary which gathers 
such savings and reinvests part of them in high risk investments in the countries where they come 
from.
89  
These views are not necessarily in contrast one with each other. Bernanke, for instance, 
provides an explanation for the occurrence of global imbalances in the late 90s that, I think, is a 
                                                 
89 As noted by Eichengreen (2006a p. 9), this explains the direction of gross capital flows between Asia and US, not the 
size of the US current account deficits. Some additional explanations are necessary to account for both facts.   44 
combination  of  a  revised  “new  economy  view”,  the  pure  “global  savings  glut  view”  and  an 
amended “low US savings rate view”. In the late 90s, the rising US productivity, the development 
and the adoption of new technologies, together with the US “long-standing advantages such as low 
political risk, strong property rights, and a good regulatory environment, made the U.S. economy 
exceptionally attractive to international investors during that period” (Bernanke (2005)). Such US 
favourable conditions
90 and the fact that investment opportunities were smaller than savings in the 
rest of the world led large capital outflows from these countries towards the US (Bernanke (2005) 
and Rajan (2006)). These latter fuelled a remarkable growth in the US stock markets and a steady 
appreciation of the US dollar. The latter contributed to deteriorate the trade balance, which was 
already negative since early 90s. After the Enron scandal, the stock market collapse and the attacks 
on 9/11, things have profoundly changed. Even though the overall impact on the US current account 
of the new conditions has not changed, “the transmission mechanism changed” (Bernanke 2005) 
both within and outside the US. New capital investment waned around the world, monetary policy 
in many countries was relaxed to provide liquidity to the financial markets stressed by a series of 
large negative shocks and the real rates of interest fell almost everywhere (leading to the so-called 
Greenspan conundrum). The low real interest rates, taking the place of high stock prices, became 
the main cause of lower US savings. The market for residential investment boomed because of low 
mortgage  rates:  the  consequent  positive  change  in  the  values  of  the  houses  offset  the  negative 
wealth effects related to the stock-market crash. Such strong gains in housing prices, in turn, led 
consumers  to  increase  borrowing  and  spending.  Developments  in  financial  intermediation, 
securitization and financial innovation contributed to this trend since they magnified the impact of 
wealth gains on consumption.
91 Furthermore the US government, in order to prevent the economy 
from falling into a deflationary trap in 2002-2003, increased public-sector expenditures, reduced 
taxes  and  worsened  the  budget  deficit:  in  so  doing,  it  contributed  to  the  deterioration  of  net 
domestic savings and, ceteris paribus, of the current account.
92  
  Many views, admittedly, put a great emphasis on the US determinants of global imbalances 
because industrialised countries have been affected in different ways by the same changes in the 
global economy and in many developing countries. This makes important to look at US specific 
conditions  to  understand  why  the  US  has  been  affected  the  most  by  the  changes  in  global 
investment and saving patterns and this is the reason why the “US savings deficiency view”, even 
                                                 
90 This view is consistent with Mann(2002) and Cooper (2004). 
91 See Feldstein (2007) on this aspect. 
92 Budget deficits are neither the unique nor the main cause of US current account deficits. First they cannot explain 
global imbalances before 2001. Second, they cannot explain, per se, the decrease in US and global interest rates, given 
the impact would have been the opposite one.    45 
though  not  capable  to  explain  a  global  phenomenon,  has  some  merits  too.
93  Bernanke  clearly 
claims: “That inadequate U.S. national saving is the source of the current account deficit must be 
true at some level; indeed, the statement is almost a tautology. However, linking current-account 
developments  to  the  decline  in  saving  begs  the  question  of  why  U.S.  saving  has 
declined.”(Bernanke 2005). I think the correct approach is to relate this decline to variations in US 
household  behaviour,  to  modifications  in  the  economic  policy  in  the  United  States,  and  to  the 
structural changes and shocks occurred outside the United States, in particular in East Asia.  
  Focusing  on  the  domestic  determinants  of  current  account  deficits,  Bems  et  al  (2007) 
investigate which US internal factors were driving forces of the deterioration of the US external 
balance.
94 Structural shocks can explain up to 30% (at 12 quarters horizon) of the deterioration and 
subsequent reversal of the US trade balance in the 80s, but fail to account for the worsening in the 
trade  balance  in  the  second  half  of  90s.  These  findings  suggest  that  external  factors  may  be 
important to explain the evolution of US current account dynamics over time. Given the timing of 
the events, Bems and co-authors exclude Chinese reserve accumulation (which started only in 2001) 
and  petrodollars  (which  became  relevant  after  1999)  as  relevant  external  factors.  Since  2001 
onwards, productivity improvements and fiscal and monetary policy easing seem to have played an 
important role in the maintenance and in the growth of the current account deficits.
 95,96  
Hunt and Rebucci (2005) and Faruqee et al (2006) conduct simulations based on multi-
country,  multi-sector  models  with  nominal  rigidities  which  encompass  both  typical  features  of 
NOEM and factors which relate to capital flows. Hunt and Rebucci (2005) find that productivity is 
a co-determinant of the US real exchange rate appreciation and the trade balance deterioration in the 
second half of the 1990s. However, it turns out that a portfolio preference shift in favour of US 
assets  is  necessary  to  give  a  better  account  of  the  data.
97  Faruqee  et  al  (2006)  look  at  the 
determinants of global imbalances since early 2000s. They consider the expansionary US fiscal 
policy, the declining US private savings rates, the increase in the foreign demand for US assets, the 
productivity growth in emerging Asia, the sluggish productivity growth in Europe and Japan and 
the growing export competitiveness in emerging Asia. In the baseline scenario, global imbalances 
                                                 
93 Several researchers, among which Corsetti and Muller (2006), Backus et al (2005), Erceg et al (2005), argue that the 
fall in the US savings adds up, yet cannot explain global imbalances and the low interest rates.  
94 Several separate VAR on US data over the period 1982:2 to 2005:4 are used to identify structural shocks which 
determine the US business cycle. The analysis shows that a multi-factor productivity positive shock has a negative 
impact on the current account, an investment-specific technology shock has a relatively small negative impact, fiscal 
revenue and spending shocks have a negative impact, and a monetary policy shock has a positive and very small impact.  
95 Oddly, the stock market bubble is a domestic US phenomenon which is not taken into account in their analysis. 
96 Erceg et al (2005) show that budget deficits have a relatively small effect on the US trade balance and this is in line 
with a limited role of fiscal factors in making for global imbalances. 
97 In addition, some uncertainty and some learning about the persistence of the shocks on productivity and portfolio 
preferences is necessary to explain the actual pattern of the data. This is somehow in line with Engle and Rogers (2006).   46 
can be attributed to a combination of several phenomena, that is exogenous shocks and structural 
changes both in the US and abroad.  
In  the  attempt  to  theoretically  account  for  the  occurrence  and  maintenance  of  global 
imbalances,  Blanchard  et  al  (2005)  analyse  the  effect  on  global  allocations  of  two  separate 
unexpected shocks, that is an increase in the US relative demand of non-US goods and an increase 
in the foreign demand of US assets. These shocks entail the same long run real depreciation of the 
dollar,  but  very  different  short  run  dynamics.  The  financial  shock  is  characterised  by  the 
appreciation of the US dollar in the short run, followed by a far larger subsequent depreciation, 
whereas the demand shock causes a gradual depreciation of the US currency. None of these two 
effects alone is able to explain the occurrence and maintenance of global imbalances over the last 
15 years. The first cannot account for the increase in the US dollar until 2001. The second cannot 
explain that part of the current account depreciation which is not a consequence of the appreciation 
in  late  90s.  Their  combination,  in  contrast,  represents  a  possible  explanation  of  what  has  been 
observed. Crucially, both shocks entail a US dollar depreciation in the long run that remains the 
long run equilibrium condition of their portfolio model, illustrated in section III.2.1. 
  These empirical and theoretical findings suggest that the determinants of global imbalances 
may have switched over time. From this viewpoint, the various contributions focusing respectively 
on global  factors, on the US situation and on  emerging markets’ conditions should be seen  as 
complements rather than substitutes. Each of the views I illustrated in section II seems to have some 
merits and some flaws.
98 In particular, none seems to be valid over the whole period. This point, I 
believe,  is  one  of  the  main  message  one  can  draw  from  Bernanke  (2005)’  speech.  Despite  its 
message being commonly identified with the “global saving glut view”, Bernanke does, in fact, 
account for diverse and compatible explanations of the US current account dynamics and he claims 
their  relevance  has  changed  over  time.  One  set  of  explanations  can  help  accounting  for  the 
evolution over the period between 1996 and 2000, while another set applies to the years after 2000.  
More  than  one  story  can  be  valid  for  the  same  period  of  time,  yet  diverse  stories  are 
necessary for different periods.
99 In a nutshell, the discussion can be summarised as follows. While 
in the late 90s the attractiveness of the United States as an investment destination was due to the 
technology boom and its expected effects on productivity, to the depth and sophistication of the 
country's financial markets and to the international status of the US dollar as vehicle currency, after 
2000  the  driving  forces  of  the  persistent  US  current  account  imbalances  are  the  large  US 
                                                 
98 I have not included the “dark matter view” as a proper account of the sources of global imbalances in this section. 
The reason is twofold. First , Hausmann and Sturzenegger ultimately claim there are no global imbalances. Second, the 
alleged sources of “dark matter” are present also in other views.  
99 This is consistent with Barry Eichengreen (2006a) who argues that several explanations are all parts of a larger story 
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government deficits and the expansionary monetary policy, the US residential market bubble, the 
increase in the international commodity prices, the accumulation of international reserves in East 
Asian and oil-exporting countries, and the persistent exchange rate misalignments associated with a 
large scale trade liberalisation process.
100 
V. Looking ahead: plausible scenarios.  
Even assuming the forces illustrated in previous subsections are those that created and still 
sustain  global  imbalances,  some  issues  remain  open.  The  sustainability  of  global  imbalances 
requires  not  only  they  are  an  outcome  of  rational  decisions  of  optimising  agents,  but  also  the 
permanence of such underlying forces. Clearly, if the forces underlying global imbalances are not 
permanent or their consequences are politically unsustainable, an adjustment process will be likely 
to  take  place  sooner  or  later.  The  pattern  of  such  an  adjustment  process  is  the  object  of  this 
subsection. 
Whether  global  imbalances  are  sustainable  or  an  adjustment  process  will  materialise 
ultimately depends on whether the policy and structural changes that led to global imbalances are 
likely to last. Some researchers are optimist. Dooley and co-authors (2007) claim the Asian hunger 
for US assets will not abate given that exchange rate manipulation and collateral accumulation 
remain crucial concerns of the authorities. The international differences in the degree of financial 
development and the US enduring advantage in intermediating world savings (see Caballero et al 
(2007))  are  also  likely  to  persist.  The  serious  frictions  in  the  financial  markets  of  developing 
countries (see Mendoza et al (2007)) are unlikely to disappear soon and, similarly, the US may 
preserve higher long run growth prospects than the rest of the world. Commodity prices are unlikely 
to fall and this may support persistent capital outflows from the oil exporting countries with limited 
productive  capacity.  Finally,  saving  rates  are  likely  to  remain  high  in  fast  growing  emerging 
markets at least until domestic political and financial improvements are achieved and the current 
demographic evolution settles.  
On the contrary, pessimist economists argue such forces are not permanent since their relatively 
long lasting permanence increases the chances of a reversal. The incessant accumulation of foreign 
reserves by emerging markets’ central banks, for instance, is destined to make harder and harder 
further hoarding. The growing stock of US external debt is, sooner or later, likely to increase the 
bonds’ yields and this may worsen the US net investment income stream and reduce the incentives 
for foreigners to buy US assets. Furthermore, some of these forces may be affected by a variety of 
exogenous  shocks  which  may  prove  sufficient  to  unwind  global  imbalances.  Given  the  current 
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situation is hardly sustainable, pessimists call for a coordinated adjustment strategy which makes 
sure the adjustment will neither hurt US and global growth, nor create turmoil in the world financial 
markets.  
The adjustment process will have to involve both exchange rate movements and changes in the 
demand patterns in several countries. A depreciation of the US dollar vis-à-vis the other currencies 
is warranted: its size and speed, however, are likely to depend on the timing and the coordination of 
the accompanying policies and on the occurrence of exogenous shocks. Such US dollar depreciation 
can be brought about by a direct revaluation of the parities at which some currencies peg to the 
dollar, or it can be the endogenous result of major changes in saving and investment behaviours 
around the world, or the outcome of clear shifts in the economic policies of some key countries. The 
adjustment, furthermore, can be forced by the financial side if non-US investors stop directing their 
savings towards the US and ask larger returns to hold US assets.  
The US and world economic prospects differ considerably under these various alternative 
scenarios. For instance, the speed of the adjustment imposed by a reversal in the financial flows is 
likely to be higher and more harmful than under other scenarios. This is the reason why, besides 
understanding where  global imbalances are aiming to, it is crucial to be aware of the possible 
triggering shocks and the consequences associated with the diverse paths of adjustment.  
Even  accepting  the  idea  that  an  adjustment  process  will  eventually  take  place,  several 
questions remain at stake. Is the global economy going to adjust naturally to a new sustainable path 
without any major reversals? Is the adjustment process going to be smooth and gentle or sudden and 
disruptive? Which shocks are more likely to occur and which are their consequences on the world 
economy? Which are the risks linked to the various scenarios? Which are the possible pre-emptive 
and proactive policies that both reduce the risks and help to deal with the averse consequences of a 
fast unwinding of  global imbalances? I  will discuss some of these issues in the following two 
subsections. 
V.1 Looking back: any reason to worry? 
 
Looking at past experience, Edwards (2006) tackles the question of which could be the 
effects of a large reduction in the US external deficit on its own economic activity. Even though no 
such  a  large  industrial  country  has  ever  run  persistent  current  account  deficits  of  the  same 
magnitude,  Edwards  (2006  and  2005b)  analyzes  past  international  evidence  on  abrupt  and 
significant current account reversals to draw insights for the current situation. He finds that the 
probability of experiencing a major current account reversal is positively affected by the size of the 
current  account  deficits,  the  deterioration  in  terms  of  trade,  and  the  presence  of  expansionary   49 
monetary  policies.  These  results  suggest  that  the  probability  of  the  US  experiencing  a  current 
account  reversal  has  grown  in  recent  years.  Even  though  the  central  role  of  the  US  in  the 
international monetary system, the size of its financial sector and its level of financial development 
make the US a country sui generis, Edwards concludes that the probability of a reversal has grown 
over time. 
Several  other  authors
101  look  at  the  past  to  draw  insights  on  the  adjustment  process  of 
external imbalances. Most of the works distinguish the various reversal episodes according to some 
criteria: the rate of growth in the adjustment (Crooke et al (2005) and IMF (2007)), the export or 
import patterns (Sturzenegger et al (2003)), the size of the countries (Edwards (2005)), and the 
results of a cluster analysis (Algieri and Bracek (2007)
102). Their conclusions vary considerably 
because of changes in the samples, in the statistical and econometric techniques, in the nature and 
frequency of the data, in the definition of the adjustment, and the like.
103 Unsurprisingly, these 
studies reveal a high diversity in the patterns of adjustment. In general, the adjustment episodes 
become more likely the larger is the current account deficit. However, not in all circumstances large 
current account reversals are associated with major economic reduction in GDP growth. In addition, 
there is no historical precedent of disorderly exchange rate adjustment in developed countries where 
inflation is under control.
104 
V.2 The good, the bad and the ugly: the possible trajectories of the 
global imbalances. 
 
In rough terms, the adjustment process can be gradual and relatively benign (as argued by 
Blanchard et al. (2005), Helbling et al. (2005), Cavallo and Tille (2006), Faruqee et al. (2006)), but 
it can also be abrupt and destructive (Roubini and Setser (2005)). The first case has been dubbed the 
“soft landing” scenario and the second the “hard landing” scenario. I think the scenarios are, in fact, 
three. The “good” one consists in a natural unwinding of global imbalances with minor effects on 
the US and world growth. This scenario is unlikely to occur spontaneously but may take place if 
                                                 
101 See, for instance, Sturzenegger et al (2003), Crooke et al (2005), Freund C. (2005), Edwards (2005), Freund and 
Warnock (2006), Algieri and Bracek (2007) and Debelle and Galati (2007). 
102 Algieri and Bracek (2007) find three groups of adjustment. The first is characterised by a slow down of real GDP 
and little exchange rate movements. According to event studies and logit estimation, the authors claim this pattern is 
associated with deficits due to buoyant domestic demand growth; the adjustment occurs during the slowing down phase 
of the business cycle and entails the unwinding of precedent asset prices growth. The second is characterised by large 
depreciations without significant changes in the GDP growth. This pattern is associated with deficits due to large 
overvalued currencies and sluggish growth. The third pattern is characterised by slower growth and exchange rate 
depreciation and occurs in a crisis-like environment. It is usually associated with an overvalued exchange rate and 
potential overheating of the economy. These patterns are spread across all types of countries.  
103 See Algieri and Bracek (2007) for a review of these issues. 
104 See Croke et al. (2005) and Xafa (2007) on this.   50 
governments coordinate their policies. The “bad” scenario corresponds to the “soft landing” with no 
major negative effects on growth, yet market forces are left to close the alleged global imbalances. 
Welfare losses may be small and equally distributed across the world, yet some losses will occur. 
The “ugly” scenario corresponds to the “hard landing” scenario where financial markets, moving 
fast, incept and accelerate the adjustment process. Losses may be large, badly distributed (both 
domestically and internationally) and their effects may turn out to last for a while. In what follows I 
will discuss the analysis and the projections proposed by various researchers. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006) consider the global equilibrium implications of an unwinding 
of the US current account deficit and focus on the role of traded and not traded sectors. They update 
previous estimates (2000) and argue that the extent of a potential collapse of the dollar has grown 
with respect to their previous calculations. Focusing on the long run equilibrium, the authors claim 
that the US current account has to balance and the adjustment process has to be conducive to this 
condition. Global capital market deepening cannot change this long run requirement; it may provide 
a modest help to mitigate the dollar decline, yet the extent of the dollar adjustment depends on the 
determinants  of  the  trade  balance,  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  traded  and  non-traded 
goods, and between foreign and domestically-produced traded goods. The flexibility and the degree 
of integration of both good and factor markets, therefore, are the key determinants of the pace and 
the extent of the adjustment.  
Also Blanchard et al. (2005) maintain that a US real exchange rate depreciation is necessary 
in equilibrium; the reason is that, in order to keep attracting foreign investments, the larger is the 
US net IIP, the more depreciated the currency has to be. The adjustment process, however, may 
vary according to the evolution of the global economic environment. A reversal in the conditions 
that led to an increase in the relative demand of non-US goods in the US is possible. If US relative 
growth slows down or if US import elasticity lowers, the current account deficit may improve 
without a large depreciation of the currency. On the contrary, other shocks to the global economy 
may induce an even larger adjustment in the exchange rate. Shocks that may seem to support the 
continuation of the imbalances - such as  a further increase in the demand of  US assets, or an 
increase  in  US  interest  rates
105,  or  the  continuation  of  Asian  pegging  to  the  US  dollar  -,  will 
ultimately enlarge the extent of the depreciation needed to close the current account balance. In all 
cases valuation effects will reduce the extent of the adjustment but will not eliminate it. Blanchard 
and co-authors conclude that a substantial depreciation of the US dollar is ultimately necessary to 
bring the global economy in equilibrium.  
                                                 
105  This  may  reduce  the  US  dollar  depreciation  in  the  short  term  but  will  postpone  and  magnify  the  prospective 
depreciation, since time makes the overall debt level and the costs of the service grow.   51 
That the adjustment has to balance the current account in the long run, however, is assumed 
as equilibrium condition and it is not the result of the model. Once GDP growth differentials are 
taken into account (as, for instance, in Engle and Roger (2006 ) and Bonatti (2006)), the external 
deficit does not need go back to 0 in order to keep constant the debt over GDP ratio. Furthermore, 
Blanchard and co-authors do not consider the consequences of changes in some of the exogenous 
variables  they  encompass,  such  as  the  US  and  foreign  supply  of  assets.
106  Some  researchers, 
however, argue that global imbalances come from the differential in the US and foreign growth 
rates of these variables.
107 Two last reservations regard some of the assumptions at the basis of the 
calculations on the prospective US dollar depreciation
108 and the characterisation of the rest of the 
world as an homogenous environment.  
Notwithstanding these qualms, the theoretical implications of the model remain plausible 
and compelling. In particular, the author show that no catastrophic scenario is necessary. Exchange 
rate  depreciation  and  US  contractionary  domestic  policies  may  allow  some  global  rebalancing 
without  causing  domestic  or  world  havoc.  A  gradual  process  of  depreciation  cum  slower  debt 
accumulation is therefore feasible without a meltdown. 
Rogoff  (2006)  argues  that  “the  main  driver  of  the  adjustment  is  likely  to  be  shocks  to 
underlying  national  savings  and  investment  balances,  rather  than  an  autonomous  exchange  rate 
shock”  (p.  696).  Despite  in  line  with  the  conclusions  in  his  joint  work  with  Maurice  Obstfeld 
(2006), this claims leads to suspect that the lack of physical investment in their model undermines 
the quantitative predictions about the magnitude of the future exchange rate adjustment. In fact, 
other strong assumptions make those predictions unlikely to be precise. Engler et al (2007), for 
instance, show that allowing for endogenous production and sectoral (traded vs. nontraded goods) 
reallocation of factors dramatically reduces the size of the exchange rate depreciation required to 
close the current account balance. It is also worth noticing that Rogoff seems to refer more to the 
vulnerability of US to various shocks and structural changes than to the sustainability, as defined in 
this work, of the current situation. 
In Blanchard et al (2005) and in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005 and 2006) valuation effects play 
a limited role. To stabilise the US net IIP, Obstfeld and Rogoff impose that the current account 
balance has to close instantaneously: valuation effects impact exclusively on the dollar value of the 
net interest payments and, therefore, matter to a very limited extent. Cavallo and Tille (2006), 
instead, consider an adjustment scenario in which valuation gains from the depreciation of the US 
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107 It is worth noticing that changes in the relative demand of US assets do not require a shock to investors’ preferences 
as long as the income and wealth accumulation processes are different across countries. 
108 Some assumptions (such as that import-export elasticities calculated around trade balance can be applied to current 
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dollar allow to finance ongoing current account deficits. The US net IIP is assumed to remain 
constant in equilibrium and a gradual depreciation of the dollar produces a valuation effect that 
“finances” part of the ongoing, though reduced, current account deficits. Even though the US dollar 
does eventually depreciate to close the current account deficit (and the size of the depreciation does 
not differ much from Obstfeld and Rogoff’s projections), valuation effects do allow for a smoothed 
adjustment trajectory over a period of 10 years. The conclusion is that, as the current account will 
move into balance, adjustment will occur in a smooth fashion and the current account will shrink 
only gradually. A similar conclusion is reached by Faruquee et al (2006), whose baseline scenario 
predicts that US public and foreign debt will eventually stabilise at high levels and that the dollar 
will undergo a gradual and innocuous depreciation. Also Calvo and Talvi (2006) expect a smooth 
landing for the US economy because US assets remain the ultimate destination of the flight-to-
quality capital flows which would follow any drastic change in the current global conditions.
109 
They argue, on the contrary, that the most vulnerable emerging markets are the most prone to suffer 
from the capital flow reversals (and the sudden stops) that could materialise if the world savings 
will contract. 
The disruptive consequences of a sudden and abrupt adjustment are analysed by Roubini 
and Setser (2005) and, among other scenarios, by Faruqee et al (2006). The grim scenario is one in 
which  foreigner  investors  will  stop  financing  US  current  account  deficits  before  the  policies 
necessary to guarantee a smooth adjustment get implemented. Such capital flow reversal will cause 
a fall in US bond prices and an increase in long-term yields. These will go together with a US dollar 
abrupt depreciation and fears that the latter might percolate to inflation will induce the Federal 
Reserve to raise the Federal Fund rates. The increase in short and long run interest rates, in turn, 
will have negative consequences on asset and real estate prices and, thus, will lead to a contraction 
of the real sectors. In addition to the depressing effects of high interest rates on investment, drastic 
losses in asset and real estate markets will be transmitted to US consumption via negative wealth 
effects.
110  The  following  reduction  in  the  US  rate  of  growth  and  prospects  will  have  severe 
repercussions on the rest of the world, whose growth is currently pulled by US imports.  
The abrupt change in foreign investors’ willingness to lend to the US might be caused by 
several events and, in particular, by counter-shocks to the structural changes which have caused 
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sustained  global  imbalances.
111  However,  and  this  is  the  most  concerning  scenario,  an  abrupt 
decline of foreign investors’ willingness to lend to the US can also derive from the realisation that 
the US external position is or will soon become unsustainable. In such a case, foreign investors’ 
portfolios would not be properly balanced and rewarded and their rebalancing could incept the 
unravelling of  global imbalances. This latter scenario is, in my view, in line with the Wile  E. 
Coyote story by Paul Krugman, where investors lately realise their expected returns are excessively 
high and flee the US.  
Paul Krugman (2007) claims that current market values suggest investors’ expectations in 
the last years have not been consistent with the long run equilibrium values of the US economy. A 
gradual adjustment would, in theory, be possible if investors gradually adjust their expectations and 
their portfolios for the likely depreciation of the US dollar: a gradual financial adjustment could 
smooth the movements in the exchange rate and reduce the size of the overall adjustment. The 
presence of myopic investors, however, is likely to postpone adjustment until a moment when a 
smooth landing is not feasible anymore. It follows that the likelihood of a grim scenario depends on 
the extent capital flows have been driven by incorrect expectations. Krugman finds some evidence 
that this is likely to have been the case. He argues that, even discounting nominal GDP growth and 
favourable valuation effects, the US dollar real depreciation required to keep the eventual debt-GDP 
ratio to a reasonable level remains high: current return differentials reveal that foreign investors are 
not compensated  for the fast prospective depreciation of the dollar. Even though the imperfect 
substitutability of the US and foreign assets justifies a permanent real return differential in favour of 
the US, a large expected dollar depreciation requires a return differential against the US that is 
much higher. In particular, investors from developed countries do not derive from the US assets the 
same advantages (i.e. liquidity and insurance) that justify emerging markets’ massive investments in 
the low yield US bonds.
112 Assuming Krugman is right, there is no need of an external shock or a 
structural change in the conditions which have sustained global imbalances to make them unravel: 
once investors will find out that their portfolios need rebalancing and that they are flying in mid-air 
(as Wile E. Coyote), they will start a fast adjustment process. 
A key observation in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006) that goes almost unchallenged is that not 
all  domestic  and  external  shocks  to  demand  and  productivity  which  may  ultimately  close  the 
imbalances are consistent with a gradual and limited depreciation of the dollar. Faster productivity 
growth in foreign tradable goods, for instance, may exacerbate the US adjustment problem, while 
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matched by an increase in the foreign private capital inflows or if financial scandals in the US will reduce the appeal of 
US corporate assets. 
112 The global saving glut story, in his view, may contribute to explain why the US real interest rates have remained low 
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faster  relative  productivity  in  the  non-traded  sector  may  tend  to  close  the  US  current  account 
imbalance in a smoother way.
113 The sign, the speed, the global effect and the redistributive impact 
of the adjustment process depend on two aspects: first, the nature and the extent of the shocks, and, 
second, the economic features of the various countries.
114 
 
From  this  bird-eye  view  on  the  possible  adjustment  trajectories,  a  disruptive  adjustment 
appears to be possible, yet not necessary. Only if some of the forces that sustain global imbalances 
will abate fast or if investors will hastily leave the dollar, the grim scenario is likely to materialise. 
However, even in such cases, the adjustment may still proceed gradually if appropriate policies are 
undertaken and if the economy is sufficiently flexible. Accordingly, solving global imbalances and 
preventing global growth to slow down require coordinated policy interventions which a) reduce the 
probability certain shocks occur and b) make sure the policies in each country are consistent and 
effective. Even though the ultimate message of the IMF’s WEO 2007 April is that the US dollar 
depreciation  need  not  be  as  large  as  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  prospect,  its  conclusions  on  policy 
coordination  are  consistent  with  the  observations  above:  the  more  flexible  the  economies  (i.e. 
factors relocation, competition, free entry, and the like) and the more coordinated the economic 
policy interventions, the more responsive trade balances will be to real exchange rate modifications 
and the smaller the ultimate depreciation of the dollar will have to be.  
That the adjustment will bring about a depreciation of the US dollar real exchange rate is a 
view shared by several authors.
115 This, however, does not and cannot represent the only major 
change that has to occur. As Blanchard et al (2005) point out, the need of maintaining both the 
internal and the external balance in each country will ultimately require a global redistribution of 
savings and expenditures.
116 Faruqee et al (2006) elaborate the projections of a soft landing scenario 
in which macroeconomic policies in the various areas are implemented so as to accompany the 
adjustment process. The various scenarios differ according to which exchange rate regime will be 
implemented in Emerging Asia. Faruqee and co-authors argue that if these countries maintain the 
peg to the US dollar they will suffer overheating pressures and, if prices will be allowed to move 
more freely, higher inflation. Since the appreciation of the real exchange rates of these currencies 
vis-à-vis the US dollar cannot be dumped on a catastrophic US deflation, some changes will have to 
take place in these countries too.  
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115 See Buiter (2006), Mann (2002 and 2004), Roubini and Setser (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2006), Blanchard, 
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Similarly, the IMF (WEO 2007 April) concludes that while real exchange rates movements 
can facilitate the unwinding of external imbalances, policymakers should accompany the exchange 
rate depreciation with fiscal consolidation and domestic savings increase in the countries in deficit. 
In  this  case  the  prospective  adjustment  can  be  smooth  and  with  minor  consequences  on  GDP 
growth.  The  rebalancing  forces  in  the  surplus  countries  are,  in  fact,  very  delicate.  While, 
historically, a real exchange rate appreciation and an increase in domestic demand have occurred in 
the presence of large current account surpluses (IMF (2007)), little contribution is to be expected in 
the short and medium term from the countries now experiencing the surpluses (Edwards (2007)). 
Historically, persistent surpluses are hard to be redressed via the reallocation of global GDP growth 
and usually require large exchange rate movements. 
Pessimists argue that once some forces underlying global imbalances will fade, the latter 
will necessarily unravel. This scenario is plausible, yet it is also possible that other forces will take 
the place of those fading out. Apparently, this is what happened in 2001 when East Asian countries 
started  accumulating  reserves  in  dollar-denominated  assets  and,  in  so  doing,  compensated  the 
contemporaneous reduction in private capital flows towards the US stock exchange. Similarly, a 
slowing down in the accumulation of international reserves in the future - which is the most natural 
outcome of the sustained growth of accumulated reserves – need not incept the unwinding of the 
imbalances if East Asian central banks’ capital outflows towards the US are substituted by private 
purchases  of  US  assets.
117  For  this  scenario  to  happen  emerging  market  economies  need  to 
undertake  some  interventions  and  reforms;  in  particular  they  need  to  i)  develop  their  domestic 
financial markets and reduce domestic financial repression, and ii) gradually grant more flexibility 
to the exchange rate. It follows that the speed at which the political and economic authorities will 
reform domestic institutions and regulations will determine the extent public financial flows will be 
substituted by private ones and, thus, will influence the path of the adjustment. This example shows 
that each of the forces sustaining global imbalances need not be persistent to prevent imbalances 
from unravelling: it is sufficient that some forces remain and others take the place of those fading. 
This conclusion, however, is very sensitive to the political interventions established by each of the 
major players involved in global imbalances. 
                                                 
117 This is consistent with the North-South capital flows model (with diminishing returns, production risk and default 
risk) in Dollar and Kraay (2006) who show China will eventually become a net debtor once domestic frictions will be 
removed. Calvo and Talvi (2006) argue that if a central bank that sterilises reserve  hoarding stops accumulating 
reserves, it simultaneously stop issuing interest-bearing domestic debt. Once such a policy change deprives savers of 
domestic bonds, they will look at foreign markets to store their savings. This may call for a change in interest rates but 
the extent depends on the substitutability of the assets. Cooper (2006) claims that once Asian private investors will be 
allowed to export capitals in place of their central banks, they will continue to finance US current account deficits since 
capitals will flow towards the relatively more productive uses and this will help to maintain the equilibrium.   56 
The uncertainty surrounding adjustment is indeed very large. William Buiter, in his critique 
(2006)  to  the  “dark  matter  view”,  argues  that  an  adjustment  process  is  to  come.  He  recalls  a 
corollary  to  Herbert  Stein’s  Law
118  due  to  Rudiger  Dornbusch,  which  can  be  paraphrased  as 
follows:  “Something  that  can’t  go  on  forever,  can  go  on  much  longer  than  you  think  it  will.” 
However, Buiter recalls also a second corollary which refers to the following adjustment phase: 
“The speed and magnitude of the eventual turnaround will always take you by surprise.” (2006 p. 
13)  
VI. The exchange rates and global imbalances.  
Any adjustment process is likely to require a mix of policy interventions in the financial and 
real sectors in almost all countries. Even though the exact nature of this mix determines the extent 
and direction of the movements of the various economic variables, few researchers deny that a real 
dollar depreciation is at the horizon. Since central banks around the world are committed to keep 
inflation low (at least insofar as they are able to control it), a US dollar depreciation is most likely to 
come  through  a  depreciation  of  the  US  nominal  effective  exchange  rate.  In  addition,  as  Rajan 
(2006) points out, the latter has to regard the currencies of all the US relevant trading partners, not 
just those that are currently floating their currencies against the dollar. For these reasons, the role of 
the exchange rate in the adjustment process has attracted and still attracts a great deal of attention in 
the academic and political world.  
VI.1 The exchange rate in the adjustment process: channels of 
transmission. 
 
Exchange rate movements are key in most adjustment scenarios. First, a real depreciation 
improves, ceteris paribus,  the competitiveness of US goods and boosts net exports. Second, a real 
depreciation makes the price of non-traded goods in the US fall relative to traded goods and this 
leads  US  consumers  to  re-allocate  part  of  their  expenditure  towards  non-traded  goods.  The 
quantitative  importance  of  these  two  channels  is  not  clear  yet:  the  impact  of  exchange  rate 
fluctuations on import and export quantities, on price setting and on overall spending depends on a 
series of factors which are state and country dependent.
119 In fact, besides these traditional channels, 
there is also a third channel through which the exchange rate fluctuations are transmitted to the 
economy. Given the degree of financial integration has increased (see  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
                                                 
118 The Stein’s Laws says that "If something cannot go on forever, it will stop". 
119 The traditional empirical approach used to predict the impact of exchange rate modifications on exports and imports, 
the so-called elasticities approach, does not take the state specific nature of the elasticities in due account. In the next 
sub-section I will come back on this and discuss the criticism McKinnon raises on such method.   57 
(2006), Obstfeld (2004), and Tille (2005)) and cross-holdings of financial assets across countries 
have surged since the early 1990s, changes in the exchange rate affect the value of the outstanding 
stocks of gross assets. The extent of this channel - called valuation effect - depends on the currency 
leverage  of  the  gross  international  investment  position
120,  that  is  the  currency  composition  of 
country’s assets and liabilities. Clearly, capital gains and losses due to exchange rate movements 
can either magnify or smooth the adjustment process.
121 Those developing countries that did not 
manage  to  issue  debt  in  domestic  currency  (i.e.  the  so-called  “original  sin”  problem)  have 
historically suffered when the domestic currency was depreciating. On the contrary, the US, that 
issues debt in domestic currency and buys foreign currency denominated assets, gains from the 
depreciation of the dollar because the latter decreases the value of the outstanding stocks of foreign 
liabilities: the depreciation of the dollar produces capital gains for the US and improves its net 
IIP.
122 It is crucial to realise that the valuation channel can be more or less important according to 
the  adjustment  process  one  considers.  If,  as  in  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (2005,  2006),  the  overall 
expected currency depreciation has to close the current account, valuation effects have a limited 
impact on its magnitude since they have only minor effects on the determinants of current account 
in the long run. On the contrary, if what matters is the sustainability of the level of the net IIP (as in 
Cavallo and Tille (2006)), valuation effects help smoothing the adjustment process.  
The  valuation  channel  as  described  above  is  the  consequence  of  a  partial  equilibrium 
analysis. Gross (2006) enlarges the picture to a general equilibrium setting and warns that valuation 
effects may not necessarily work in this way in all circumstances. For instance, since the exchange 
rate depreciation has a relatively larger impact on the profits of the firms in the tradable sector, the 
direct positive valuation impact of the US dollar depreciation on the US net IIP may be offset by the 
lower value of the US investments in the foreign companies engaged in the tradable sector and the 
higher value of the foreign investments in the US companies in the same sector.  
Ghironi  et  al  (2007)  study  the  valuation  channel  in  a  dynamic  stochastic  general 
equilibrium model with international equity trading in incomplete asset markets. They conclude that 
the quantitative importance of this channel in the adjustment of external imbalances depends on 
features of the international transmission mechanism. In particular, they show that, given a certain 
                                                 
120 The US net IIP is a leveraged portfolio in that it is short in dollar denominated US assets (equity, corporate and 
government debt, inward direct investment) and it is long in foreign-currency denominated foreign assets (Japanese 
equity, direct investment in China and Europe, UK gilts, and the like). 
121 See Gourinchas and Rey (2007). 
122 In fact, there are other factors that affect the US net IIP, such as movements in asset prices, changes in data coverage, 
capital gains on FDI and the like. See appendix B on this and footnote 172.   58 
value of financial market integration, the size of financial frictions, the substitutability across goods 
and the persistence of shocks play a crucial role.
123  
  
VI.2  A  difficult  paso-doble:  the  Dollar-Renminbi  controversial 
relationship. 
 
Part  of  the  debate  regarding  the  real  exchange  rate  adjustments  required  to  redress  global 
imbalances regards the destiny of the Chinese Renminbi, in particular vis-à-vis the US dollar. While 
some argue that the Chinese authorities should eventually allow the currency to appreciate against 
several  foreign  currencies,  others  support  the  choice  of  the  authorities  of  gradually  and  slowly 
sequencing  the  liberalisation  of  good,  capital  and  exchange  rate  movements.  On  the  one  hand, 
Chinese authorities are regularly enlarging the number of private institutions allowed to undertake 
autonomous  foreign  operations  and  this  increases  the  probability  that  greater  exchange  rate 
flexibility will be allowed; on the other hand, they have so far kept control of the real exchange rate 
by pegging the nominal rate, intervening intensively in the market and controlling inflation (by 
direct price controls and massive sterilisation). Many aspects of such policy conduct have been 
questioned: its ultimate reasons, its optimality in the long term and the feasibility of its continuation 
in the future.  
It is worth pointing out that  global imbalances do not uniquely depend on the  US-Chinese 
exchange rate and their bilateral current account balance. First, the US-China bilateral trade and 
financial exchanges account only for a limited part (at most 30%) of the US current account deficits 
and capital flows (Figure 15). Second, China’s relative size in the world economy has grown since 
the beginning of the 2000s when the US current account problems were already evident. 
                                                 
123 Interestingly, greater international financial integration increases international risk-sharing trough asset markets and 
valuation changes (which have positive effects on welfare), but this reduces their relative importance in the overall net 
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Figure 15. Chinese contribution to US current account balance. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2007  
 
Admittedly,  however,  the  impact  of  China  on  the  US  deficits  is  more  complicated.  Many 
emerging  market  economies  which  compete  with  China  on  foreign  good  markets  have,  so  far, 
pegged their currencies to the Chinese Renminbi and, thus, to the Dollar; this has extended the 
influence of the Dollar- Renminbi exchange rate on the US trade balance. In addition, since the high 
Chinese growth has caused a steep increase in the demand and in the international price of several 
commodities (i.e. raw materials, oil and food), this has had a negative impact on the US trade 
balance and a positive impact on the current accounts of the oil exporting countries. 
In order to give a taste of the current debate on the issue and to illustrate the reasons in favour 
and  against  a  rapid  Renminbi  appreciation,  I  will  illustrate  the  contrasting  positions  of  Ronald 
McKinnon and Nouriel Roubini. Their accounts do not summarise all the various stances in the 
debate, yet exemplify various concerns and points of view.
124  
The contributions of Ronald Mc Kinnon on the topic are numerous.
125 For this reason I will 
discuss here those  I  consider his main concerns and observations. China’s relative productivity 
growth, its larges trade surpluses, its (direct or indirect) peg to the US dollar
126 and its constant 
                                                 
124 Several authors have contributed on the debate regarding the misalignment of the US dollar and Renminbi exchange 
rate. Among those who argue the alleged undervaluation of the Chinese currency is smaller than usually claimed I recall 
Cheung et al (2007), who focus on refined versions of bilateral and effective exchange rates (via extended behavioural 
equilibrium exchange rate models), and Frankel and Wei (2007). On the other hand, Coudert and Couharde (2007) 
argue the Renminbi is indeed undervalued even though an appreciation is unlikely to redress the US trade deficit vis-à-
vis  China.  Devereux  and  Genberg  (2007)  reach  similar  conclusions  about  the  impact  of  nominal  exchange  rate 
devaluations on US-China bilateral trade balances.   
125 See for instance McKinnon R.I (2006), McKinnon R.I (2007) and McKinnon R.I and G. Schnabl (2004) and (2006). 
126 China has fixed its exchange rate at 8.28 Renminbi to the US Dollar since 1994. On July the 21th 2005 the peg to the 
dollar has been changed to a small and steady appreciation of the Renminbi against a currency basket. Although the 
composition of the basket has not been made public, many argue the Dollar counts for ¾ of the basket.   60 
accumulation of large dollar exchange reserves in the last 7 years have led to a phenomenon that 
Mc  Kinnon  calls  “China  bashing”.  The  latter  consists  in  a  series  of  US  initiatives  to  push  the 
Chinese authorities to change their policies in a way that is in harmony with US interests.
127 Among 
such proposals, I recall the strong American pressure on China to speed up the appreciation of the 
Renminbi,  the  numerous  initiatives  of  US  Congressmen  to  review  or  pass  bills  to  reduce  the 
competitiveness  of  Chinese  merchandise,  and  the  more  or  less  explicit  US  official  threats  of 
opening a procedure against China before the WTO. The “China bashing” expression takes after the 
pressures the US put on Japan in the 80s (i.e. “Japan bashing”) to review its policy stance; these, 
eventually, led to the massive nominal appreciation of the yen and to the voluntary export restraints 
in Japan. McKinnon highlights the similarities and differences between China and Japan bashing. In 
particular, he warns that a Renminbi appreciation need not reduce China’s trade surplus and might 
create problems, as it already happened in Japan. While most empirical works that calculate the 
depreciation required to close the current account balance hinge on the elasticities approach to the 
trade balance, large changes in the nominal exchange rate may have a impact on wealth, FDIs and 
domestic  GDP  growth  which  modify  the  partial  equilibrium  projections  of  such  simplistic 
approach.
128 Mc Kinnon points out that if China will allow the Renminbi to appreciate too fast 
against the US dollar, the very same threat of a large Renminbi appreciation could reduce towards 
zero those Chinese nominal interest rates which are allowed to move. This is what happened in 
Japan in the period 1978 -1995: an overvalued currency coupled with a zero interest liquidity trap 
highly contributed to the Japanese “lost decade” (i.e. 1990s). McKinnon wonders about whether a 
real exchange rate appreciation of the Renminbi forced by a nominal appreciation can be sustained 
in  the  long  run:  “Among  financially  open  economies,  nominal  exchange  rates  and  national 
monetary policies are mutually determined.  For  a discrete nominal exchange rate change to be 
sustained, it must reflect relative monetary policies expected in the future: relatively tight money 
and deflation in the appreciated country and relatively easy money with inflation in the country 
whose currency depreciates.” (2006 p.5) McKinnon argues it is unlikely Chinese authorities will 
accept the deflationary scenario associated with a large revaluation of the currency. 
                                                 
127  Frankel  and  Wei  (2007)  show  that  the  forward  premium  on  the  Renmbinbi-US  dollar  exchange  rate  widened 
substantially in 2004, in particular after US officials increased pressures on Chinese authorities. 
128  For  instance,  the  expenditure  switching  effect  of  a  depreciation  on  the  current  account  can  be  reduced  by  a 
sufficiently large income and wealth effect of opposite sign. Similar considerations are proposed by Cooper (2006) with 
respect  to  the  general  equilibrium  effects  of  a  US  dollar  depreciation  against  the  currencies  of  surplus  countries. 
Developed countries, such as Japan and Germany, would badly react by increasing domestic savings: this response is a 
post-Wold War II legacy which gives export performance a crucial importance in driving expectations, investments and 
business sentiment. A revaluation of the Renminbi, in addition, would incept a systemic adjustment of bilateral parities 
whose effects are hard to guess and, therefore, hard to recommend. In addition, the revaluation of Asian currencies risks 
to worsen serious domestic sectoral imbalances.    61 
McKinnon stresses the currency asymmetry associated with the current world “dollar standard”: 
any  international  creditor  country  that  cannot  lend  in  its  own  currency  cumulates  a  currency 
mismatch that creates the “syndrome of conflicted virtue” (as defined in McKinnon and Schnabl 
(2004)). In a creditor country, as the stock of dollar claims grows, domestic holders of dollar assets 
worry  about  a  self-sustaining  run  into  the  domestic  currency  since  this  would  tend  to  create  a 
valuation effect against them and it would lead to deflation. If this does not happen, on the other 
hand, foreigners complain that the ongoing trade surpluses are unfair and come from a currency that 
is  kept  artificially  undervalued.  “As  runs  out  of  dollars  into  the  domestic  currency  begin,  the 
government is “conflicted” because appreciation could set in train serious recession and deflation - 
particularly  if  the  domestic  price  level  was  already  stable  or  falling  slightly.  Nevertheless, 
foreigners  may  threaten  trade  sanctions  if  the  creditor  country  in  question  does  not  allow  its 
currency to appreciate.” (2004 p. 186).
129 
In my view, McKinnon makes some sensible points. He is surely right in recalling the relatively 
larger importance of expenditure switching policies to increase US savings and reduce China’s 
reliance of export-led growth. Similarly, the scenario of a liquidity trap due to falling prices and a 
zero lower bound trap (due to negative risk premia and expected appreciation) is sensible. However, 
his considerations hinge on an important issue which is not discussed much in his contributions, 
that  is  the  equilibrium  level  (and  trend)  of  the  real  Renminbi  exchange  rate.  McKinnon,  for 
instance, argues that if the nominal appreciation of the Renminbi was too high, price deflation in the 
long term could kick in with disastrous consequences for the Chinese economy. The likelihood of 
this event, however, depends both on the current differential between the actual and the equilibrium 
exchange  rate,  and  on  the  expected  appreciation  of  the  equilibrium  rate  in  the  future.
130  If  the 
appreciation during the adjustment process is not too far from the equilibrium appreciation which 
accompanies China’s development, the initial appreciation need not bring in deflation. Eventually, 
it could even be accompanied by moderately higher inflation if further real appreciation is needed. 
In addition, the Chinese low inflation and interest rates depend on the sterilization policy and price 
controls that are currently implemented. If both were removed, inflation and interest rates could 
grow  in  the  short  run  and  this  would  make  more  unlikely  a  deflationary/lower  bound  trap. 
McKinnon suggests that the accumulation of foreign reserves by the Chinese central bank may well 
not be substituted by private demand for US assets in a context of expected appreciation and this 
                                                 
129 This was not the situation when the countries at the centre of the system (i.e. Britain in the 19
th century and US in the 
20
th) were lending in their own currencies. This observation goes against “the Bretton Woods II” hypothesis I will 
discuss in section X. 
130 The relative high Chinese productivity growth is likely to determine a steady real appreciation of the currency 
according to a Balassa-Samuelson effect.   62 
urges to maintain the peg.
131,132 However, since the relatively low domestic interest rates in China 
depend on the incomplete sterilization policy, it could be argued that the preservation of the peg 
cum sterilisation interventions weakens the domestic banking system and this urges to allow  a 
gradual appreciation of the Chinese currency,  
  Nouriel Roubini (2007) strongly opposes to McKinnon’s reasoning, even though the name 
of the Stanford based economist is mentioned only twice in Roubini’s work. Roubini argues China 
should allow its currency to appreciate significantly, and should move to a regime of more flexible 
exchange rates on the basis of a prudential cost-benefit analysis. First, even though expenditure 
switching policies may prove important to adjust global imbalances, exchange rate movements have 
effects on current accounts in the direction suggested by traditional elasticities analysis. Second, 
while Roubini agrees on the nature of the risks connected with an appreciation of the Renminbi, the 
occurrence of a scenario of over-appreciation of the Renminbi is judged unlikely: insofar as China’s 
productivity grows relatively to the world one, the Chinese equilibrium exchange rate has to in fact 
appreciate in the medium-long period. Third, the risks connected with keeping the exchange rate 
fixed get larger the longer the necessary appreciation is postponed. The significant market pressure 
for a currency appreciation - driven by the increasingly large Chinese trade and current account 
surpluses with additional pressure resulting from the massive amounts of foreign direct investment 
(FDI)  and  hot  money  flowing  into  China  –,  brought  about  a  massive  reserve  hoarding.  The 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (running at staggering figures of about $250 billion per 
year in 2005 and 2006) and the limited (70%) central bank’s sterilization of these purchases, in their 
turn, have caused domestic credit to boost: this makes more and more likely the occurrence of credit 
and  asset  bubbles,  and  risks  to  push  the  already  overheated  Chinese  economy.  In  addition,  if 
Chinese net exports keep on growing at current rates, protectionist policies in Western countries 
will  gain  further  legitimacy.  The  Chinese  authorities  themselves  recently  admitted  that  the 
composition of domestic aggregate demand is imbalanced because net exports and real investments 
are the only driving forces of domestic growth whereas private consumption is residual.
133 Roubini 
also warns that, if the Renminbi nominal exchange rate is not allowed to appreciate, there is not 
only the risk of an eventual surge in Chinese inflation but (if Chinese domestic inflation remains 
artificially repressed) also of a global world deflation. 
                                                 
131 Calvo and Talvi (2006) argue the contrary. See footnote 117. 
132 Cooper (2006) advances three proposals about what China could do instead of revaluating the currency. One is 
reducing controls on foreign capital flows. Another is reducing import tariffs so as to increase imports and reduce trade 
surpluses. The third is switching to institution building policies (such as the resolution of commercial banks weaknesses 
and  undercapitalization)  which  may  permit  further  exchange  rate  flexibility  and  the  relaxation  of  capital  controls. 
Interestingly, some of these considerations are at odds both with McKinnon’s and with Roubini’s observations despite 
from different angles. 
133 Notice that this observation goes against the “Revived Bretton Woods system” hypothesis I will discuss in section X.   63 
VI.3 Is it just an exchange rate issue? External and internal balance. 
 
In  previous  sections  I  have  discussed  the  complementarity  between  exchange  rate  and 
demand switching policies. I come back on this issue here and focus on John Williamson (2006), 
which reviews the contribution of Meade on external imbalances. In Meade’s analysis the internal 
and external balance is to be simultaneously met: both exchange rate and domestic absorption can 
be manipulated so as to reach such composite equilibrium.
134 Meades’ lesson matters today because 
it focuses on those concerns which make coordinating the adjustment process so contentious and 
controversial. The issue is about how to distribute the necessary improvement in the US current 
account  position  in  “deteriorations”  over  the  rest  of  the  world.  Since  countries  always  aim  to 
achieve the internal balance, one cannot engineer a solution which does not fully address internal 
concerns. Williamson proposes some natural principles that could guide the allocation of those 
current account deteriorations that are necessary to bring about global balances. First, “classical 
forces of thrift and productivity” need be considered. If a country can increase its inter-temporal 
welfare by boosting investment (given expected high returns) or reducing savings  (given current 
consumption  is  repressed),  then  it  has  to  do  so.  Second,  Keynesian  considerations  of  effective 
demand matter too. This suggests to avoid a cut to the trade balance surplus of a country which has 
no other means to stimulate demand for its own goods. The third issue refers to growth. If growth 
suffers because export demand falls after a revaluation or an overvaluation induced by a Dutch 
disease, the adjustment has to be limited. The fourth element is that the speed of change of the 
adjustment process has to vary across countries: the historically inherited net investment positions 
and the past track of current account records require variation in the contribution given by the 
diverse country to the global adjustment process.
135  
Interestingly, Williamson clarifies the original meaning of export-led growth strategies and 
argues against the systematic manipulation of the exchange rate. He points out that an “export-led 
growth strategy originally meant not discriminating against exports, so as to use export expansion 
rather than import substitution to solve the balance of payments constraint. A successful policy of 
export-led growth typically resulted in the international capital markets being willing to lend to the 
country in question. [..] Now one is told that the answer is to run an export surplus. This may have 
                                                 
134 The Salter-Swan diagram describes the principal elements of this approach. 
135 Williamson briefly discusses the implications of applying this fourfold approach to the oil exporting countries, 
Japan, China and the newly industrialised Asian economies (i.e. Taiwan Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore), Germany, 
and  Switzerland.  As  suggested  by  Meade,  some  mix  of  exchange  rate  adjustment  and  expenditure  changes  (both 
quantitative and qualitative) is required in all cases. In a nutshell, Williamson supports country-specific expansionary 
demand policies and exchange rate revaluations in countries which run surpluses. The exact variations in the exchange 
rate, the tax rate and the government spending will depend on trade patterns, public debt levels, domestic monetary 
policy, stage of development, expected duration of the shocks, and past economic performance.   64 
been necessary in order to re-establish confidence after the (1997 Asian) crisis and build safeguards 
against a repetition. And it certainly increases demand, at least for tradables. What it neglects is the 
supply-side. A current account surplus involves investing a part of savings in low-yielding US 
Treasury bills (or some other low-yielding foreign asset). This preempts resources that might have 
been invested or consumed at home, and in that way boosted either growth or living standards or 
both. To ignore this aspect is as foolish as it was to ignore the danger that an excessive deficit 
financed by short-term inflows would precipitate a crisis.” (2006 p.8)  
While many researchers merely treat internal balance as one of the several determinants in 
diverse  adjustment  scenarios,  Williamson  takes  an  original  stance  and  looks  at  the  internal 
consequences of the continuation of global imbalances. In particular, he notices, the persistence of 
the current trend is likely to generate noxious effects on the internal balance of several emerging 
markets and this fact indicates a reversal is likely to take place sooner or later. This exercise is 
original and shows that a change in the policy conduct of several Asian countries might come 
because it is their own interest to rebalance growth, not because the US is in trouble or “Asia 
bashing” is effective. This point is key if one adopts the concept of sustainability I adopt in this 
work. 
VII. The global imbalances debate: its impact on theory and 
policy. 
VII.1 In search of a new theory? 
 
To be sure, the evolution of the global economic environment is going to help ascertaining 
the merits of the various conceptualisations of the forces that led to and have maintained the current 
situation. However, the impact of the debate on the economic theory is already clear. The new open 
economy  macroeconomic  models  developed  in  the  90s  have  been  challenged  by  other 
conceptualisations  of  current  economic  conditions.  While  in  NOEM  models  capital  flows  are 
mainly treated as the residual component of countries’ balance of payments and they are driven by 
trade-related decisions, the recent global experience suggests that capital flows might be attributed a 
relatively more important and independent role.
136 Accordingly, these latter started playing a pivotal 
role in recent international macroeconomic models.  
                                                 
136 This observation is consistent with the empirical findings in Bergin (2006). By estimating a rather general two 
country NOEM model, he finds a high correlation between the current account movements and the deviations of interest 
rates from the UIP condition. He interprets this as a sign that current account movements could reflect financial shocks, 
rather than savings and investment decisions.    65 
In fact, that capital flows are crucial to explain small emerging market business cycles and 
crises had been recognised long ago
137: emerging markets have typically suffered i) the exogenous 
in-  and  out-flows  of  capital  (as  discussed  in  the  literature  devoted  to  sudden  stops  and  capital 
reversals)  and  ii)  the  vicious  interactions  of  such  financial  flows  with  their  financial  and 
institutional  imperfections.  The  novelty  in  the  current  debate  is  that  financial  flows  are  now 
considered as a key determinant of the economic and financial conditions of advanced countries and 
regions.
138 Bernanke’s (2005) account of global imbalances is clear : “Rather, the U.S. trade balance 
is the tail of the dog; for the most part, it has been passively determined by foreign and domestic 
incomes, asset prices, interest rates, and exchange rates, which are themselves the products of more 
fundamental driving forces”.  
As an example of how this difference in perspective may matter, I recall the two different 
approaches recently used to calculate the required US dollar exchange rate variation to close global 
imbalances.  One  approach  sets  the  required  depreciation  as  that  necessary  to  drive  the  current 
account into balance (as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006)); since valuation effects have a limited 
impact on current account balances, they do not significantly affect the adjustment process. The 
other approach sets the required depreciation as that necessary to keep the net investment position 
of the debtor country at a fixed and sustainable level (as in Cavallo and Tille (2006)); valuation 
effects matter and contribute to smooth the required adjustment of the exchange rate.
139  
Krugman (2007)’s recent warnings revolve around this point: since financial imbalances 
take much less time to unwind than trade-related current account imbalances
140, a tension between 
the  two  may  arise  according  to  the  nature  and  the  source  of  the  shocks  that  redress  global 
imbalances. In other words, since real and financial markets differ, financial shocks affecting the 
                                                 
137  See,  for  instance,  the  volume  of  the  Journal  of  Economic  Theory  (2004),  dedicated  to  the  macroeconomics 
implications of capital flows in a global economy. “The main features of the wave of financial crises that hit emerging 
markets since the Mexican crash of 1994 posed a serious challenge for conventional open-economy models of business 
cycles and current-account determination. Emerging markets crises featured the so-called “sudden stop” phenomenon, 
characterized by a sudden reversal of capital inflows and the current account, a large recession in domestic production 
and absorption, and collapses in real asset prices and in the relative prices of nontradable and tradable goods. These 
stylized facts are seriously at odds with the predictions of both conventional open economy models with nominal 
rigidities, in which devaluations are expansionary because they shift the terms of trade in favour of the country that 
devalues its currency, and standard neoclassical dynamic equilibrium models, in which the current account is modelled 
as  an  efficient  vehicle  for  consumption  smoothing,  risk  sharing,  and  arbitraging  of  the  returns  of  capital  across 
countries. Another set of important issues, as typified by the South East Asian Crisis, relates to contagion—economic 
crisis from one country seems to spread rapidly to others. These crisis-spillovers also pose a serious challenge to 
conventional dynamic economic models.” (Bansal et al 2004)  
138 In fact, the issue is not new to international macroeconomists. The so-called transfer problem has spurred several 
contributions in the 80s and early 90s. See, for instance, Kouri (1983), Sachs and Wyplosz (1984), Branson (1985) and, 
more recently, Tamborini (1992). 
139  The  empirical  literature  addressing  the  problem  of  estimating  the  correct  equilibrium  exchange  rate  also 
encompasses  a  third  approach,  called  the  behavioural  exchange  rate  equilibrium  approach.  In  sum,  these  models 
calculate  deviations  of  real  exchange  rate  from  extended  versions  of  (absolute  and  relative)  PPP  conditions.  (See 
Cheung et al (2007)). 
140 See also Mann (2002 p.140) on this.   66 
size and the patterns of the international capital flows are likely to have a strong impact on trade and 
current account balances.  
Such recent development in economic modelling is due to several controversial phenomena, 
more or less related to the global imbalances issue, which have characterised the last 7 years:  
·  housing market bubbles in many developed countries,  
·  a steady growth of international commodity prices,  
·  a rapid reduction of external debt in many developing countries
141,  
·  two  large  swings  in  the  external  value  of  the  US  Dollar  and  alleged  exchange  rate 
misalignments,  
·  relatively low international interest rates
142,  
·  a significant reduction of risk premia (in several markets and countries), 
·  a rapid growth of cross-country gross capital flows,  
·  a marked and widespread reduction in the volatility of GDP and inflation
143,  
·  the achievement of relatively low inflation rates in all developed economies and in most 
developing countries,  
·  an improvement in the level of financial development in several developing countries,  
·  a steady accumulation of large dollar denominated exchange rate reserves, 
·  an increase in the number and in the size of the sovereign wealth funds,  
·  the  development  of  new  sophisticated  financial  instruments  and  a  massive  resort  to 
securitization and asset-backed financial instruments, 
·  the surge in the number of private equity funds and hedge funds. 
 
These issues should not be seen and treated as separate; they do not only reflect diverse 
growth strategies (i.e. export-led versus investment-led), but also depend on the different levels of 
development across countries (Caballero (2006) and Dooley et al. (2007)). These latter, in their 
turn, reveal and come from substantial differences in a) the degree of financial development, b) 
demographic  trends,  c)  national  saving  and  investment  patterns,  d)  the  extent  of  government 
intervention  in  the  economy,  e)  the  degree  of  capital  account  liberalisation,  f)  the  structure  of 
property rights, and g) the respect of the rule of law. 
   
                                                 
141 This has been accompanied by the rapid increase in the level of domestic public debt. 
142 The low level of the US long-term interest rates since 2002 has been dubbed the Greenspan’s conundrum. 
143 This phenomenon is usually identified as the “great moderation”.   67 
Criticisms towards new open economy macroeconomic models should be balanced against a 
few  other  considerations.  First,  new  open  economy  macroeconomic  models  have  not  been 
developed to describe the interaction of numerous, big and fast-growing emerging countries with 
large  and  developed  countries.  Second,  these  models  were  not  meant  to  describe  the  general 
equilibrium  effects  stemming  from  the  interaction  between  a  large  series  of  domestic  financial 
constraints  and  market  failures  and  some  profound  changes  in  the  international  financial 
architecture. While it is reasonable to question  the reliability of the projections based on these 
models, it is misleading to claim they are ill-conceived or outright wrong because they  cannot 
account for all the peculiar features of the global economy. Certainly, however, further research in 
international  macroeconomic  modelling  area  is  warranted.  In  this  direction  the  attempts  of 
integrating  portfolio  choice  into  a  DSGE  model  seem  promising.  See  for  instance  Evans  and 
Hnatkovska (2006a, 2006b), Devereux and Sutherland (2006a, 2006b, 2006c) and Tille and van 
Wincoop (2007). 
VII.2 Related policy and political issues.  
 
Several  fellows  at  the  Peterson  Institute  for  International  economics
144  have  forcefully 
emphasised that global imbalances are strictly linked to other political important issues, such as 
international trade and investment policies. 
VII.2.1 The unpleasant rise of trade protectionism. 
It  is  a  simple  political  economy  consideration  that  exporters  and  import  competing 
producers increase the pressure on the government to obtain protection when their countries record 
repeated and large current account deficits. Therefore, it is clear that global imbalances, which by 
definition reflect unbalanced trade patterns, have made protectionist pressures mount in several 
advanced  countries.  Although  refrained  by  WTO  rules  and  other  political  considerations,  the 
governments in these countries find it harder and harder to disregard the requests of protection by 
several  anxious  domestic  lobbies:  this  clearly  appears  from  the  numerous  speeches  and  the 
restrictive bill proposals put forward by US Congressmen and European leaders.
145 Faruqee et al 
(2006b) examine the macroeconomic implications of a global shift to protectionist policies in a 
dynamic general equilibrium model with four regional blocs (i.e. US, Asia, Eu and Japan, rest of the 
world).
146 Trade measures turn out to be more expensive and ineffective means to correct global 
imbalances than other policy interventions. While the outcome of the analysis is unsurprising, the 
                                                 
144 Such as Fred Bergsten, William Cline and Morris Goldstein 
145 See The Economist (2007). 
146 They look at uniform and discriminatory tariffs followed by tariff retaliation.   68 
very  same  research  is  telling:  protectionist  pressures  have  grown  so  high  that  showing  the 
inefficiency of a set of unilateral trade restrictions appears a warranted exercise.  
 
The unwinding of global imbalances is also able to affect the success (or failure) of the 
Doha round of trade negotiations since the adjustment of few bilateral exchange rates could open 
the way to the multilateral reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. A constructive trade agreement 
in the Doha round, in turn, could implicitly include some exchange rate realignments and could also 
shape global trade in a way that favours the closing of the US current account imbalances.  
Similarly, the rapid increase in commodity and food prices during 2006 and 2007 is likely to 
affect both global imbalances and Doha negotiations. China is recently having serious problems in 
keeping inflation under control and this could force the authorities to appreciate the currency vis-à-
vis the dollar. The future pattern of the international prices of food, however, will depend both on 
national agricultural policies and on the results of the Doha negotiations.
147 This is another example 
of how trade negotiations, exchange rate adjustments and global imbalances are related issues.  
The  much  debated  problem  of  the  correct  Dollar-Renminbi  exchange  rate  is  politically 
extremely  controversial  exactly  because  of  its  impact  on  international  trade  relationships.  As 
noticed by Goldstein (2006), even though the US administration has unofficially complained for the 
Chinese practice of massively intervening in the foreign exchange markets - notwithstanding the 
large sterilised interventions China implemented in 2006
148 - , the Bush administration has always 
refrained from labelling China as a “currency manipulator”. The US Treasury department missed 
this opportunity in its 2005 and 2006 Reports, in the Strategic Economic Dialogue in May 2007
149 
and in the Treasury May 2007 report to Congress.
150 The reason why currency manipulation is a 
crucial  aspect  of  the  global  imbalances  debate  is  its  potential  impact  on  the  already  strong 
protectionist pressures growing in Europe and, even more, in the US. A declaration by the US 
Treasury (and even more, under the new Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members' Policies, 
by the IMF) whereby China is indicted to manipulate its currency, would open the way for the US 
administration to file a case against China before the WTO. The claim would be that exchange rate 
interventions amount to an export subsidy.
151  
                                                 
147 Both the European Union and the United States are to review their agricultural policies in the next few months.  
148 In fact, the real effective exchange rate of the Renminbi has moderately appreciated since 2005: nonetheless it is still 
depreciated with respect to 2001. The nominal Renminbi-US dollar has also appreciated by about 10% since June 2005. 
The exchange rate has fallen fallen from 8.28 Renminbi per dollar to 7.43. (Rate of the 21st November 2007) 
149 This is a US-China economic forum born at the end of 2006. 
150  A  US  declaration  in  this  direction  would  be  very  important  since  it  could  give  momentum  to  the  IMF  new 
surveillance scheme, modified in June 2007 with the revision of the 1977 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance. I will 
come back on this in the section VII.2.3.  
151 This was suggested by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, in a speech given in Bejing at the time 
of the first Strategic Economic Dialogue. See Bernanke (2006) and Hufbauer  et al  (2006).   69 
One could reasonably argue that the Chinese current account surpluses vis-à-vis the US are 
just a modest portion of US deficits (Figure 15). In fact, many maintain that US should push hard 
for a change in China’s approach to foreign exchange rate interventions not because the alleged 
misalignment of the Renminbi is per se responsible of the US deficits, but because China represents 
a key competitive benchmark for other Asian countries. A consistent appreciation of the Renminbi 
would probably also lead to the appreciation of the currencies which track the Chinese one.
152  
Such a rise of trade protectionism casts serious doubts on the political sustainability of the 
current situation. This reinforces the claim that global imbalances are not sustainable since their 
persistence contributes to make trade protectionism flourish .  
VII.2.2 The unpleasant rise of financial protectionism. 
  Even though much of the debate has focused on the political consequences of the China-
bashing rhetoric on trade protectionism, another politically sensitive form of protectionism is on the 
rise. I refer to the opposition, in the US and other developed countries, to state-backed FDI inflows 
from  developing  countries  directed  towards  the  acquisition  of  large  domestic  companies.  The 
authorities of many Asian and oil exporting countries have recently expanded or newly established 
sovereign wealth funds with the ultimate goal of diversifying the allocation of their large stocks of 
international reverses. According to Morgan Stanley, sovereign wealth funds in 2007 reached about 
$2.500 billion and this figure is likely to increase to $5.000 billion by 2010 and $12.000 billion by 
2015.   The typology of sovereign investors is much broader
153: besides sovereign wealth funds
154, 
there  is  a  also  large  range  of  sovereign  foreign  investors  which  includes  stabilisation  funds
155 
(devoted to risk diversification and to prevent the Dutch disease problem), sovereign private equity 
funds
156  (which  act  as  more  aggressive  investment  vehicles),  state-owned  or  state-backed 
enterprises (which undertake foreign acquisitions for business related reasons). 
While most of the already existing sovereign funds have played a minor role in foreign 
capital markets because of their little involvement in management stakes, new and more aggressive 
sovereign  funds  gather  little  favour  and  raise  major  concerns  abroad.  European  and  US 
policymakers,  for  instance,  argue  that  strategically  important  companies  (in  particular  in  the 
                                                 
152 The call for a Chinese currency reform has not to be confused with a call for rapid capital account liberalisation. 
Chinese banks risk to suffer much from a too fast liberalisation process. 
153 See Ziemba (2007) for the classification of the sovereign funds proposed in this paragraph. 
154 Such as Norway’s Government Pension Fund (incepted in 1990), Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (1976), Kuwait 
Investment Authority (1953), Singapore’s Government Investment Corporation (1981), Chinese Investment Company 
(2007) and, for a period of time, the Lybian Investment Authority (2007). 
155 Such as Kazakhstan National Fund (2000), Kuwait General Reserve Fund (1953), Russian Oil Stabilisation Fund 
(2004) and Hong Kong Exchange Fund (1997).  
156 Such as Singapore’s Temasek Foreign assets (1974), Qatar Investment Authority (2005) and several investment 
vehicles in Dubai.   70 
communication, transport and energy sectors) risk to be purchased by sovereign funds belonging to 
hostile and market unfriendly foreign governments. It would be paradoxical, in their view, that the 
long  process  of  privatisation  of  domestically  publicly  owned  companies  will  produce  foreign 
publicly owned companies.
157 So far, the degree  of discontent has varied between US and UK 
(pointing to reciprocity and transparency) and EU (stressing the benefits of local ownership); on the 
whole, however, discontent and concerns have considerably grown.
158  
From a mere economic point of view ownerships does not matter as long as the management 
of the companies receives the mandate of maximising profits and the value of the firms. However, 
delicate political issues may arise even when this is the case: lobbying pressures by foreigners and 
possible tax-based bail-outs of large foreign-owned companies are two examples of the sensitive 
political issues brought about by the new wave of international financial integration and the growth 
of sovereign investors.  
Some have argued that the activities of the sovereign wealth funds should be regulated so 
that they cannot act directly, yet only through national intermediary asset managers and private 
investment funds. These latter, however, have been involved in the financial turmoil burst in August 
2007 after the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage and CDOs markets. The question at the moment 
is  whether  these  financial  companies  are  sufficiently  reliable  to  assume  the  delicate  task  of 
intermediating large foreign sovereign funds. 
As a matter of fact, most sovereign investors are little transparent, both from the financial 
and the  governance perspective. One the one hand, since discriminating between domestic and 
foreign investors could be neither efficient nor sufficient, many argue that the most transparent 
funds should be favoured. Investment exporting countries, on the other hand, oppose such proposals 
and ask that investment laws and government scrutiny in the investment receiving countries will be, 
in their turn, transparent and non-discriminatory.
159 There seems to be some room for international 
coordination under the umbrella of the IMF or the BIS. 
  Without taking an explicit position on the sovereign funds debate, Cooper (2006) claims that 
even though foreigners will certainly own more of the US capital stock in the future, this will not 
produce any serious transfer of capital ownership. In fact, the US has several layers of financial 
assets above capital stock: this implies that, according to his calculation, foreigners could at most 
                                                 
157 See Summers (2007). 
158 In 2007, the US Congress enacted the Foreign Investment and National Security Act to revise the legal framework so 
as to define the circumstances for government scrutiny over foreign acquisitions. The focus of the Act is not too broad 
and  focuses  on  foreign  acquisitions  by  entities  controlled  by  foreign  government,  establishing  control  over  US 
companies and raising security concerns. 
159 The European case is emblematic. While most partners agree on the need of some form of control over foreign 
sovereign  investors’  acquisitions,  many  governments  are  concerned  that  unilateral  decisions  could  exacerbate  the 
traditional European propensity to create the so called national or continental “champions”.    71 
own the 10% of overall US physical capital. Even admitting this is true
160, western policymakers 
worry more about foreign strategic acquisitions than about a widespread joint-ownership of minor 
companies.  
The political debate on the issue is alive while little economic research has been done. It 
seems, however that a conclusion similar to that drawn for trade protectionism could be valid: 
global imbalances are unlikely to be sustainable if their persistence makes financial protectionism 
rise.  
VII.2.3 The IMF and global imbalances: reforms and recommendations. 
  The lack of international agreement on the channels through which the global adjustment 
will have to take place (i.e. demand switches vs. exchange rate modifications) is mirrored in the 
impasse shown by the IMF in recent years: its Managing Director rejected for the IMF the role of 
global unmpire for exchange rate policies and the Multilateral Consultations started with limited 
ambitions.  In this subsection I will briefly illustrate the IMF stance and I will divide the account in 
two  parts.  The  first  refers  (VII.2.3.1)  to  the  changes  in  the  IMF  activities  and  the  IMF  policy 
recommendations  (the  so-called  IMFC  Strategy)  to  address  imbalances.  The  second  subsection 
(VII.2.3.2) deals with the economic analysis the IMF has put forward in its WEO issues.
161 
 
VII.2.3.1  Revision  of  the  1977  Decision  on  Bilateral  Surveillance  and  the  Multilateral 
consultation initiative. 
 
  The IMF has gone through two important operational changes in recent years. The first is 
the adoption of a new Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members' Policies, which is part of 
its bilateral surveillance scheme. The second is the institution of the first Multilateral Consultation 
on global imbalances between US, Japan, EU area, China  and Saudi Arabia.  
In  June  2007,  the  Executive  Board  of  the  IMF  adopted  a  new  Decision  on  Bilateral 
Surveillance  over  Members'  Policies  which  repeals  the  1977  Decision  on  Surveillance  Over 
Exchange  Rate  Policies.
162  The  new  Decision  is  meant  to  update  the  practice  of  bilateral 
surveillance, to clarify the exchange rate policies countries should avoid and to allow the evaluation 
of  individual  economic  policies  in  light  of  global  concerns.  In  particular,  the  new  Decision 
introduces a new overarching organising principle of surveillance, that is the concept of external 
stability. The latter refers to “a balance of payments position that does not, and is not likely to, give 
                                                 
160 See Eichengreen (2006b) for a contrarian view. 
161 I look at the WEO issues because, besides being authoritative, they represent the most important tool of the IMF 
multilateral surveillance scheme. 
162 Both of the Decisions have been designed to implement the bilateral surveillance under the article IV of the IMF’s 
Article of Agreements.   72 
rise to disruptive exchange rate movements”. A balance of payments position in line with external 
stability is one in which, given the level and the structure of the net external asset position of the 
country, a) its “underlying” current account (i.e. the current account stripped of temporary factors) 
is in line with its equilibrium and with a zero output gap, and b) the capital and financial account is 
in order. Independently from the underlying current account position, to be in order the capital and 
financial account position has not to create risks of sudden and abrupt shifts in capital flows. This 
concept of external stability refers to both the current account and the capital and financial account 
of  the  balance  of  payments.  The  latter  component  was  excluded  in  the  1977  Decision  on 
Surveillance  Over  Exchange  Rate  Policies,  which  focused  exclusively  on  specific  aspects  of 
exchange rate policies, and this prevented so far the IMF to assess and to discuss with the country 
whether the level and the structure of its external balance sheet was vulnerable or even conducive to 
large swings in capital flows.  It follows that, even though the  IMF has been given neither the 
mandate nor the jurisdiction on international capital flows, it has now gained the possibility of 
assessing the compatibility of domestic economic policies of its members with the observed pattern 
of net and gross capital flows. Another important novelty of the Decision on Bilateral Surveillance 
over Members' Policies is the adoption of clearer criteria for the identification of exchange rate 
“fundamental misalignments”
163 and currency manipulations
164. The 1977 Decision had a rather 
narrow scope and required IMF’s members to abstain from pursuing exchange rate policies aimed at 
gaining  an  unfair  competitive  advantage  over  other  members;  the  new  Decision,  though  not 
imposing new obligations to IMF’s members, requires them to avoid any exchange rate policy that 
results in external instability, regardless of its purpose.   
Even though the new Decision is mainly directed to make sure that each member of the IMF 
undertakes exchange rate, monetary and fiscal polices that are consistent with its own external 
stability, the Decision gives new ammunitions
165 to the IMF to demand prompt and extensive policy 
interventions to the countries which are most involved in global imbalances and whose past and 
current policies are of concern to the international community.  
                                                 
163 A (real effective) exchange rate is fundamentally misaligned if the underlying current account is significantly far 
from its equilibrium level. 
164 A member allegedly manipulates its currency if it engages in policies aimed at setting the exchange rate (either 
moving it or preventing it from moving) at a level that is fundamentally misaligned (i.e. undervalued) with the purpose 
of gaining a competitive advantage and increasing net exports. 
165  The  Decision  identifies  seven  economic  developments  that  may  signal  the  need  for  the  IMF  to  review  the 
consistency of the domestic policies of some of its members with the principles of the Decision and, eventually, to 
initiate a discussion with them. One of them is the presence of large and prolonged current account deficits or surpluses. 
The  remaining  developments  are:  i)  fundamental  exchange  rate  misalignments,  ii)  large-scale  intervention  in  one 
direction in the exchange market, iii) the introduction or the prolonged maintenance of restrictions on, or incentives for, 
current payments and capital flows, iv) unsustainable or excessively risky (official or quasi-official) borrowing, v) large 
external sector vulnerabilities, arising from private capital flows, and vi) the pursuit of monetary and other financial 
policies that provide abnormal encouragement or discouragement to capital flows.   73 
  The Multilateral Consultation on global imbalances, instead, is an original initiative of the 
IMF  (based on the Fund’s mandate
166) which, by making countries talk closely on the issue, offsets 
the limited IMF capabilities of dealing with multilateral problems. The Multilateral Consultation 
initiatives are part of the Medium-Term Strategy to reform the IMF
167 and are meant to become a 
key  means  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  IMF  multilateral  surveillance  and  to  complement 
bilateral surveillance. The first Multilateral Consultation, which has been initiated in June 2006 by 
the then Managing Director of the IMF Rodrigo de Rato, has focused on “facilitating the resolution 
of global imbalances while sustaining robust global growth”. China, the Euro area, Japan, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United States accepted the invitation to cooperate and, after a series of bilateral and 
multilateral meetings, the participants and the IMF staff issued a joint report on April 14, 2007. The 
latter  had  been  discussed  and  welcomed  by  the  IMFC,  then  published  and  publicly  released. 
According to a paper prepared by the IMF Staff to review the initiative (IMF (2007b)) and to the 
IMFC assessment of the joint report, all participants have taken, since April 2007, some steps in 
line with the IMFC strategy. Nonetheless, it is early to say whether the Consultation has indeed 
changed the pace and the quality of the adjustment process.  
  Although  the  Multilateral  Consultation  initiative  has  been  lauded  by  those  international 
economists  and  political  scientists  content  with  any  new  multilateral  effort  to  address  global 
problems,  the  Staff  report  (IMF  (2007b))  reveals  a  few  interesting  shortcomings  of  this  new 
method. First, the participants to the Consultation have simply agreed to voluntary participate to a 
“highly informal and confidential” consultation.
168 Second, while there was consensus between the 
parties on the opportunity of a joint approach to address imbalances, “there was no support for 
‘grand policy coordination’. Participants emphasized that national policies were driven primarily by 
domestic requirements, although a positive impact on global imbalances was a welcome additional 
benefit.  The  direct  and  indirect  spillovers  from  policy  action  by  others  were  generally  seen  as 
positive …. However, such spillovers were not considered to be especially large, partly reflecting 
participants’  assessment  that  the  immediate  risks  from  the  imbalances  were  moderate. 
Consequently, the focus should be on ensuring the broad direction of policies across countries was 
appropriate, rather than striving for coordinated fine-tuning.” (IMF (2007b) p . 9) Third, given the 
Executive Board and the IMFC had already deployed a broad strategy to address imbalances
169, the 
Multilateral Consultation merely focused on “how best to accelerate policy action rather than on the 
design of the strategy itself, ensuring that the Consultations remained complementary to bilateral 
                                                 
166 Article 4  section 3a of the Article of Agreement. 
167 Its implementation has been proposed by the Managing Director Rodrigo De Rato in June 2006. 
168 Only the April report has been submitted and discussed by the IMFC and the Executive Board and the content of the 
Consultation has not been made public.  
169 The latter was made public with the September 2006 IMFC Communiquè and reiterated afterwards.   74 
surveillance.” (p. 13) Fourth, participants saw global imbalances as a fundamentally medium-term 
problem and, accordingly, favoured a gradualist policy strategy. (p. 8)  
Since the Multilateral Consultation is a new instrument of multilateral surveillance that is 
meant to i) focus on systemically important macroeconomic issues, ii) foster cooperation, and iii) 
build consensus. It offers few new ammunitions to the IMF to address global imbalances and to 
demand those changes in the national policies that would allow a proper collective management of 
the adjustment process.
170 It follows that, all in all, the countries participating to the Consultation 
did not accept a true coordinating role of the IMF and, probably, consented to discuss the issue as a 
confidence building means and a way of tampering the mounting protectionist pressures.  
 
VII.2.3.2 WEO Analysis and policy recommendations. 
 
A  gradual  and  smooth  solution  to  global  imbalances  certainly  requires  the  coordination  of 
national domestic policies. The individual adjustment efforts need to be consistent with each other 
for a global recession to be avoided. The importance of policy coordination and the global nature of 
the problems regarding global imbalances have urged the IMF to take the lead in analysing the 
nature of the problems and in the promotion of a cooperative approach. 
Accordingly, since 2005 the IMF has released a series of studies on global imbalances and some 
dedicated chapters of its World Economic Outlook (WEO) issues. The WEO 2005 (IMF 2005)), for 
instance,  emphasises  that,  notwithstanding  the  beneficial  effects  of  the  increasingly  global 
economic transactions, globalization has brought about new challenges and risks to the world and 
the individual countries. The simulations of the IMF’s new multicountry Global Economic Model 
(GEM),  in  fact,  reveal  that  trade  openness,  competition,  financial  integration  and  financial 
development may facilitate global rebalancing only as long as global financial conditions remain 
benign. Large imbalances, in effects, increase the individual and global exposure to financial market 
disturbances. The reason is that the larger the international investment positions grow, the higher 
are  the  risks  associated  with  unexpected  changes  in  investors’  preferences.  Deeper  financial 
integration, as shown by what occurred to some emerging markets in the past, makes countries 
more vulnerable to changes in investors’ sentiment and expectations.   
                                                 
170 “Formally, they are part of the Fund’s multilateral surveillance responsibilities, and are not intended to provide 
oversight over members’ observance of their obligations under Article IV, which is the role of bilateral Article IV 
consultations.  MCs  are  intended  to  build  on  and  complement  bilateral  surveillance,  focusing  less  on  diagnosing 
appropriate actions in each country, and more on addressing multilateral issues with the objective of building consensus 
around policy responses to issues of systemic or regional importance” (IMF (2007b) p.12).   75 
  In the WEO 2007 April, the IMF completes the analysis on the possible adjustment patterns 
and focuses on the role of the real exchange rates in the process of adjusting external imbalances.
171 
The analysis reaches two main conclusions. First, movements of real exchange rates can facilitate 
the smooth unwinding of external imbalances because a real depreciation of the dollar reduces the 
costs (in terms of GDP growth) that are associated with the reversal of the current account deficits. 
Second, in light of refined estimates on the responses of trade volumes to changes in the relative 
prices
172 and given trade volumes have become more reactive to changes in relative international 
prices, the real depreciation of the US dollar is likely to be smaller than usually claimed. In sum 
these conclusions are moderately optimistic: the US dollar depreciation is an inevitable outcome, 
yet it need be neither large nor fast. 
Notwithstanding its several merits, I believe this analysis is to be taken with caution; the size 
and the composition of the sample, in particular, may strongly influence the results. Half (i.e. 6 out 
of 13) of the large and persistent deficits recorded in advanced countries, in fact, are still going 
on
173: this reduces the number of reversal episodes, following large and persistent imbalances, that 
can be used for the econometric analysis. In addition, the chapter does not put sufficient emphasis to 
the large number of contemporaneous imbalance episodes that are currently going on. Moreover, 
even though in Box 3.2 (p.97) of the WEO it is claimed that there are no major differences among 
different  classes  of  reversal  episodes
174  (that  is  between  ‘normal’  imbalances  and  large  and 
persistent  imbalances
175),  the  reversal  episodes  that  follow  large  and  persistent  imbalances  in 
advanced  countries  are  too  few  to  check  the  equality  of  the  patterns.  Furthermore,  the 
contractionary  and  expansionary  deficit  reversals  in  advanced  countries  have  occurred  in  very 
distinct  periods:  contractionary  episodes  took  place  in  the  70s  and  80s  whereas  expansionary 
episodes  in  the  80s  and  90s.  This suggests  that  the  choice  of  enlarging  the  sample  to the  two 
decades before the 80s is controversial. Since most of conclusions of the chapter are based on 
                                                 
171 The chapter revises the experiences of countries which have gone through large and sustained current account 
reversals (i.e. large corrections from deficits to surpluses, and vice versa, defined as swings in the current account 
balance of at least 2.5 percent of GDP and at least 50 percent of the initial current account imbalance that are sustained 
for at least five year) and the identification of the episodes of large and persistent imbalances (i.e. a deficit/surplus 
amounting to more than 2 percent of GDP for more than five years). 
172 The study argues that both large differences in response across sectors (aggregation bias) and the fact that imports 
embody domestically produced intermediate products (vertical integration bias), tend to bias the standard estimates of 
exchange rate elasticities. Mann (2004) suggests other refinements to estimate trade income elasticities so as to keep 
into account the “new economy services” and the impact on foreign growth of the increased international tradability of 
such services. These extensions imply a reduction in the speed of opening of the CA deficits, yet they do not guarantee 
the trajectory is sustainable. 
173  According  to  the  analysis,  since  the  60s  there  have  been  20  large  and  persistent  episodes  of  current  account 
imbalances in advanced economies (13 of which are deficits), 24 episodes in emerging markets (16 deficits) and 5 in oil 
exporting countries (0 deficits). Of these, those which are still going on are 11 in advanced economies (6 deficits), 7 in 
emerging markets (4 deficits) and 3 in oil exporting countries. 
174 Reversals of large and persistent surpluses, instead, do differ from reversals of normal size and duration. 
175 7 out of 42 are deficit reversal episodes refer to large and sustained deficits and 2 out of 36 surplus reversal episodes 
refer to large and sustained surpluses.   76 
episodes  taking  place  in  the  60s  (when  the  exchange  rate  arrangements  and  the  stage  of 
development of the countries were different) and referring to relatively small and not persistent 
imbalances, the empirical findings of the chapter have to be interpreted with a grain of salt.
176 
Finally, even though the study claims that private credit and stock market growth were higher than 
usual during the 13 episodes of large and persistent deficits, the analysis does not focus on the 
reversal episodes associated to the fall out of financial market bubbles. This happened, for instance, 
in Finland and Sweden in 1991. Given the difficult state of the US real estate markets, I think this is 
an interesting aspect that deserves further investigation. 
Already in 2004, the IMFC did informally invite its members to take the necessary steps to 
redress global imbalances. The lack of enforcing power however did not produce concrete changes 
in  national  policies.  Later  on,  in  2006,  the  IMFC  developed  a  more  elaborated  strategy  and 
demanded a more active participation of its members. Such strategy is twofold. On the one hand, 
the  US  authorities  should  rebalance  internal  spending  -  by  improving  the  primary  fiscal 
consolidation and supporting the growth of private savings - and the surplus countries should raise 
domestic expenditures in a way consistent with their current absorption capacity.
177 EU and Japan, 
on the contrary, should put in place growth–enhancing reforms so as to increase domestic demand 
and investments. On the other hand, the US dollar should depreciate against the currencies of the 
countries  with  the  largest  current  account  surpluses:  this  change  would  improve  the  US  net 
investment position via a significant valuation effect and, more importantly, it would contribute to 
increase global absorption of US produced goods and services. In addition, members should try to 
remove  obstacles  to  international  trade  and  to  the  reallocation  of  resources  so  as  to  ease  and 
moderate the dislocation in economic activity that is likely to follow the adjustment. The IMFC 
argues  that,  short  of  these  changes,  the  world  will  undergo  serious  difficulties;  the  longer  the 
necessary  policy  measures  will  be  postponed,  the  more  likely  a  disorderly  adjustment  of  asset 
prices, including a sharp depreciation of the US dollar, will occur.  
Given the WEO is not only the outcome of in-house IMF research but is one official tool of 
its multilateral surveillance, I believe the timing of the exchange rate analysis (i.e. April 2007) 
reflects the fact that the IMF tried, as long as possible, not to be involved in the hazardous dispute 
on  the  appropriate  levels  of  the  bilateral  exchange  rates.  As  discussed  in  subsection  VI.2,  the 
alleged  misalignment  in  the  Dollar-Renminbi  exchange  rate  has  been  one  of  the  most  delicate 
                                                 
176 Since the chapter does not address the issue of why large and persistent imbalances are generated and why they 
revert, in addition, the estimates may also be affected by an endogeneity problem. 
177  It  has  to  be  noted  that  there  is  no  reference  to  foster  financial  development,  that  is  at  the  basis  of  some 
conceptualisations of global imbalances. Similarly, there is no discussion about capital account liberalisation in the 
emerging markets.   77 
political issue in the last years. If this deduction is correct, China’s growth has already produced a 
change in the praxis of the IMF: the latter has refrained from supporting the US concerns. 
VIII. The other side of the US coin: international reserve 
accumulation. 
 
Fast growing Asian countries and oil producers started accumulating large foreign reserves 
in 1999-2000. Higgins and Klitgaard (2004) analyse such pattern and show that central banks in 
Asia have accounted for almost 80 percent of the increase in global reserves over the period 1999-
2003.
178  Since  then,  the  pace  of  accumulation  has  accelerated.  Notably,  while  Asian  private 
investors tend, on net, to move capital flows within the region, central banks direct their funds 
outside it. This explains why reserve purchases in Emerging Asia and Japan have exceeded their 
saving surpluses. (Figure 16) Dollar reserve purchases in 2003 financed around 80% of the US 
current account deficit and, over the period from 1995 to 2003, dollar reserve purchases financed 
almost half of the cumulative US current account deficit (Figure 16).  
 
   
Figure 16. Balance of payments flows in Asia and Official flows in the US. (1995-2003) 
Source: Higgins and Klitgaard (2004). 
 
These stylised facts led many researchers to study what drives reserve accumulation, how 
costly the process is and how far it can go. Aizenmann and Lee (2007), Ranciere and Jeanne (2006) 
and  Wyplosz  (2007)  look  at  the  reasons  why  emerging  markets  accumulate  large  reserves. 
Aizenmann  and  Lee  (2007)  test  precautionary  and  mercantilist  motives  in  accounting  for  the 
hoarding of international reserves. They find that the variables related to mercantilist motive are 
statistically significant in the estimations, but help explaining only a small part of actual reserve 
accumulation. The empirical results are more in line with a precautionary demand of reserves. This 
                                                 
178 From the end of 1999 to end 2003, the roughly $1.2 trillion increase in global reserves can be attributed to $582 
billion purchased by developing countries in Asia and $375 billion purchased by Japan. Non-Asian countries that have 
built up large reserve holdings since 1999 include Brazil, Mexico, and Russia   78 
is consistent with the idea that the high individual and aggregate uncertainty in emerging markets 
requires  large  precautionary  savings.  In  this  light,  reserve  accumulation  is  a  self-insurance 
mechanism against the adverse consequences of possible sudden stops, capital flights and bank 
troubles. Even though exchange rate hoarding entails some costs in the medium run, Aizenmann 
and Lee (2007) argue that net welfare gains come from the cautionary management of international 
reserves.  
There is a widespread agreement that a precautionary motive is behind the accumulation of 
foreign reserves. However, it remains controversial which is the adequate and optimal level of 
reserves consistent with such a motive. For a long while, in the literature, a ratio of international 
reverses  over  three  months  of  imports  equal  or  above  1  has  been  considered  an  adequate 
benchmark. However, as clearly appears in Figure 17, reserves have far exceeded this level in 
recent years. 
 
Figure 17. Months of imports covered by reserves. 
Source: World Bank (2007),  Fig. 1.15 
 
In countries with current account surpluses, in fact, imports are not the major issue of concern. 
Capital flows are far more important. Accordingly, precautionary reserves are more likely to grow 
together with the level of the short-term external debt, whose roll-over requires a constant stream of 
capital inflows.
179 Accordingly, the so-called Guidotti-Greenspan-Fisher rule suggests that reserves 
should  be  at  least  equal  to  the  level  of  short-term  external  debt.  Wyplosz  (2007)  and  others, 
however, argue that there is little theoretical reason to look only at short-term debt: given capital 
outflows may generate shortages of financing well beyond what is required to roll-over the short-
term debt that falls due, indebted countries should insure for the overall level of liabilities. It turns 
out that most countries have accumulated reserves in a way consistent with such interpretation of 
                                                 
179 Short-term debt needs to be frequently rolled over; in periods of limited financial flows, countries strive to do so.   79 
the  self-insurance  motive.
180  In  addition,  oil  and  commodity  exporting  countries  typically 
accumulate reserves to avoid the negative impact of the dutch disease problem: this represents a 
different precautionary motive that has to do with the size and speed of the annual capital inflows 
rather than with the level of accumulated liabilities. 
Dooley and co-authors
181 argue that countries willing to receive foreign private flows need 
accumulate some collateral and this is the ultimate role of foreign reserves.
182 Following a standard 
method to calculate the amount of collateral associated with a certain amount of FDIs
183, they find, 
in many emerging markets, a close correspondence between the level and the growth of reserves 
and the collateral that would be necessary to insure the gross amount of FDI inflows. The analysis is 
consistent with the persistent and large US current account deficits, with the ability of the US to 
borrow at low interest rates and with the willingness of foreign investors (i.e. central banks and 
fiscal authorities) to purchase US low yield assets. The results hold for the whole group of emerging 
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Figure 19. FDIs Book value and Market to Market, estimated collateral and reserves stocks. (Billion $). 
Source: Dooley et al (2007) 
 
Given Chinese reserves have overcome $1.3 trillion in 2007, Cina is now ahead of Japan. 
Does  this  development  represents  a  problem?  Notwithstanding  the  plausible  precautionary 
advantages  that  come  from  holding  reserves,  such  an  activity  is  costly.  The  costs  of  reserve 
                                                 
180 See Figure 6 for some examples. 
181 See, for instance, Dooley et al (2004b) and (2007). 
182 See Roubini and Setser (2005)’s criticism in footnote 58. 
183 This is the result of the multiplication of the potential volatility of the underlying asset over a period of time by a 
measure of the credit risk of the counterparty   80 
hoarding are diverse. The so-called fiscal cost is the difference between the returns on the assets 
held as reserves and the cost of the interests paid on sterilisation bonds. The overall cost of holding 
reserves, however, may be larger than this if one considers that external reserves often come from 
external borrowing.
184 Thus, the difference between the cost of borrowing and the return on reserves 
is another possible measure of total costs. Finally, the difference between the returns on the reserves 
and  the  returns  on  other  alternative  domestic  investment  opportunities  represents  the  social 
(opportunity)  cost  of  reserves.  Besides  these  direct  costs,  sterilisation  that  accompanies  the 
accumulation of reserves tends to negatively affect domestic banks, which are forced to purchase 
low-yield central banks bonds. This hinders the strengthening of the domestic financial system in 
emerging markets and, indirectly, adds up to the costs of hoarding reserves.  
These considerations indicate that reserve hoarding has a natural limit and cannot proceed 
forever at current rates. This is another reason to believe that global imbalances are likely to unwind 
in the future, at least unless new forces stand in for the fading ones. 
IX. Oil and commodity prices. 
The growth of large emerging markets and the military  events occurred after 9/11 have 
contributed to push up the commodity prices since 2002. The real growth (deflated by US CPI) of 
oil and commodity prices boosted (Figure 20). The real price of oil, in late 2007, has reached values 






















Figure 20. Real (deflated by US CPI) commodity prices. (2002=100) 
Source: IMF ( WEO 2006 ) fig 5.5  
 
                                                 
184 “The increase in the private sector’s foreign liability matches the increase in the Central Bank’s foreign assets. 
Short-term borrowing abroad does not enhance the private sector’s overall capacity to invest.” (Rodrick 2006 p. 259).   81 
The contribution of higher oil prices to the current account imbalances is key and it is the 
object of the analysis of the IMF WEO 2006. Together with the oil price, in effects, the value of oil 
exports has doubled in 2005 in the sample of countries (Figure 21); conversely, the oil bill has 
increased in US and other industrial countries. In the US, one-half (or about 1% of GDP) of the 
deterioration in the current account in 2005 and 2006 can be attributed to the higher price of oil. On 
the  contrary,  imports  in  oil  exporting  countries  have  risen  only  marginally  since  domestic 
consumption  has  remained  quiet  and  government  expenditures  have  moved  only  gradually.
185 
Interestingly, imports in oil producing countries have gradually stirred towards countries other than 
the advanced ones: this implies that higher oil revenues have, both directly and indirectly, widened 
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Figure 21. Current account and oil trade balances (in % of GDP). Selected countries and regions. 
Source: IMF (WEO 2006) fig 2.5 
 
A natural question to ask is how much this situation is similar to what happened at the time 
of the two oil shocks in the 70s. One important aspect differentiates these two periods: in the 70s 
petrodollars  were  exported  via  official  reserve  accumulation  and  bank  deposits,  whereas  now 
capital outflows are also characterised by high portfolio investment flows and tend to be directed 
towards marketable financial assets. In some cases, these flows are prepayments of external debt 
accounts, in others they are purchases of US securities and portfolios investments (Figure 22). Since 
                                                 
185 The main reason is that they are more cautious in additional spending, probably because of past waste.   82 
this change in the patterns and composition of capital flows has contributed to keep the US interest 
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Figure 22.  Fuel Exporters' Cumulative Current Account Balances and Capital Flows (Billions of 2005 U.S. dollars)  
Source: IMF WEO (2006) fig 2.3  
 
Given the size of oil exporters’ current account surpluses (often above 15 percent of GDP), 
it is not unreasonable to expect a reversal process. If, as it seems, most of the increase in the oil 
price is permanent, the increase in net wealth and permanent income in the oil exporting countries 
should eventually be matched by an increase in spending. The process, however, is likely to be very 
gradual and limited in the medium-term given the inflationary consequences of oil price shocks 
have been contained in most oil importing countries. The adjustment of global current account 
imbalances, instead, requires a large increase in the absorption of oil-exporting countries. Some 
argue that oil exporters could use oil revenues to boost social expenditures (such as education and 
infrastructures), which could enhance their limited domestic production capacity and improve living 
standards.
187 So far, government expenditures and private investments have not changed much in 
these countries.  
A  recent  work  of  the  IMF  Staff  (IMF  2007c)  discusses  the  role  of  special  fiscal 
institutions
188 in fiscal management in oil producing countries. On average, governments in these 
countries  use  the  additional  fiscal  oil  revenues  in  a  way  that  does  not  increase  imports  and, 
                                                 
186 A throughout analysis on the differences between the 70s and the 2000s is offered by Blanchard and Gali (2007). 
They argue recent oil shocks did not have an impact on developed economies similar to what occurred in the 70s 
because  oil  is  now  used  much  less  intensively,  central  banks  have  improved  their  control  over  inflation  and  the 
economies got much more flexible over time. 
187 Limited government effectiveness, however, casts doubts on the efficient use of such additional resources.  
188 The study looks at oil funds, fiscal rules and fiscal responsibility legislation and budgetary oil prices.   83 
therefore, that does not contribute to close the imbalances. The surge in oil revenues, in addition,  
has boosted net domestic wealth and enriched the sovereign oil funds. While these latter may help 
governments to run solid fiscal policies and to sustain the aggregate demand, as in Norway,  this is 
less  likely  to  occur  in  many  oil-exporting  countries.
189  If  the  pattern  of  adjustment  of  global 
imbalances depends on fiscal behaviour of some oil-exporting countries, then additional political 
and institutional factors play a crucial role in determining the sustainability of global imbalances. 
Not  only,  as  anticipated  earlier,  global  imbalances  and  financial  protectionism  in  advanced 
countries  become  closely  related,  but  also  the  economic  and  institutional  development  of  oil 
exporting countries may turn out to affect their spending and investment behaviour. 
X.  A new international monetary system? Bretton Woods II 
versus Bretton Woods, reversed. 
 
In this section I briefly illustrate two extreme views about the current state of the international 
financial  architecture,  that  is  the  so-called  “Bretton  Woods  II”  view  and  the  “Bretton  Woods, 
reversed” view. The assessment of the current international monetary system is directly related to 
the various accounts of global imbalances illustrated earlier. In a nutshell, these alternative views of 
the international monetary system differ in the choice of which set of the countries represent the 
core of the international system: Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) focus on China, Asia 
and US, whereas Rose (2006) on the remaining developed and developing countries. 
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) argue that the current international monetary 
system operates like the Bretton Woods system. First, many countries limit the fluctuations of the 
exchange rate of their currencies against the dollar and maintain undervalued exchange rates in 
order to promote exports. Second, China and other emerging markets accumulate foreign reserves 
as a collateral to attract FDIs from more developed countries. Third, the US represents the main 
source of global spending and its assets work as a means to hoard international reserves. All this 
makes the current situation an equilibrium condition of global opposite forces; it resembles the 
international monetary arrangement that accompanied global growth after the World War II. 
Criticism to such view is multifaceted. First, China and other fast growing economies export 
to many countries, not just to the US: the focus on the Sino-American codependence, therefore, is 
too narrow. Second, foreign reserves accumulation started in early 2000s, while the US FDIs in 
                                                 
189 Many of them have in fact encountered serious difficulties to impose clear and rigid operational rules to these funds, 
in particular when extra-budgetary spending had been allowed. More generally, it turns out that well-designed fiscal 
institutions help to support sound fiscal policies only provided the appropriate institutional frameworks are in place and 
political authorities are committed to valuable goals. (IMF 2007c) This is in line with the literature which puts emphasis 
on institutions (i.e. governance) and policies.   84 
China  were  abundant  already  in  early  90s.  Third,  as  Barry  Eichengreen  (2004)  points  out,  the 
parallel with Bretton Woods is fragile because, in the years since the end of World War II until the 
collapse of Bretton Woods system, the US was running current account surpluses and large capital 
outflows. Fourth, the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate arrangements stemmed from an explicit 
and  official  agreement  while  the  current  situation  is  characterised  by  unilateral  pegs  around 
allegedly misaligned values. This difference has profound implications for the robustness of the two 
arrangements. If even a coordinated group as the Gold Pool failed to cooperate, it is unlikely that 
policy coordination will be realised between the various fast growing countries; in fact, they share 
very limited common interests, if not contrasting goals. The reasons why each emerging country 
could unilaterally break the peg to the dollar have already been discussed: one reason is that the 
continuous sterilization of foreign reserves is becoming increasingly difficult and costly; another is 
the flourishing of the sovereign wealth funds
190; finally, export-led growth strategies have boosted 
western protectionism and each country has an incentive to prevent that protectionist measures are 
taken against its own exports. In addition, since there is the risk that the fragility of the banking 
system and the dependence of the economy on exports will reduce growth once domestic economic 
liberalisation  will  take  place,  each  of  these  countries  has  strong  incentives  to  adjust  growth 
strategies in an uncoordinated manner.  
A radically different view on the international monetary system is proposed by Rose (2006). 
He argues that a new international monetary system has emerged in the 90s. Such a system diverges 
from  Bretton  Woods  in  several  aspects.  While  the  Bretton  Woods  system  was  hinging  on 
governments’ commitment to fix their exchange rates to the US dollar and to gold, the new system 
is  characterised  by  a  growing  number  of  independent  and  transparent  central  banks  adopting 
inflation targeting monetary policy frameworks and floating exchange rate regimes. In addition, 
while an explicit international agreement on the ‘rules of the game’ and on international monetary 
cooperation was present in Bretton Woods, it is absent nowadays.  Such new international system, 
therefore, looks diametrically opposite to the old one: this is why Rose dubs it as the “Bretton 
Woods, reversed” system. Table 1 summarises the main differences between the two systems. 
Rose also argues this new “spontaneous” architecture does not have obvious international 
costs and shows more resilience and stability than the former.
191 He concludes from this that the 
current situation is solid. I would argue that the resilience of inflation targeting regimes Rose finds 
is, in fact, not informative about the resilience of the current international monetary system. While 
                                                 
190 Sovereign funds have started targeting politically contentious foreign companies and US notes are destined to attract 
lower funds. The appreciation of emerging markets’ currencies against the dollar, in addition, increases the purchasing 
power of these sovereign funds abroad. 
191 Inflation targeters have lower exchange rate volatility, less frequent sudden stops of capital flows, similar current 
account and international reserve patterns to those of countries that do not target inflation.   85 
the destiny of exchange rate and monetary regimes go hand in hand in the case of fixed exchange 
rate regimes, they do not in case of flexible exchange rates. In an inflation targeting framework the 
exchange rate is free to move as long as its fluctuations do not impact on the expected rate of 
inflation. This means that, as long as the central bank keeps inflation under control, we can observe 
stable monetary policy regimes and large swings in the international exchange rate parities. 
 
    Bretton Woods  Inflation targeting 
1  Regime durability  Low  High 
2  Exchange rate regime  Fixed  Floating 
3  Focus on monetary policy  Partly International  Wholly domestic 
4  Intermediate target  Exchange rate  Non/Inflation forecast 
5  Capital mobility  Controlled  Relatively unrestricted 
6  Capacity for current account imbalances  Limited  High 
7  System Design  Planned  Unplanned 
8  International cooperation  Necessary  Not required 
9  Role of IMF  Key in principle  Small 
10  Role of Gold  Key in principle  Negligible 
11  Role of US as Center country  Key in practice  Small 
12  Key Members  Essentially large and Northen  OECD/LDCs, often small 
13  Central banks  Dependent, Unaccountable  Independent, accountable 
14  Transparency  Low  High 
15  Alignment with academics  Worrisome  High 
Table 1. Features of the Bretton Woods and Reversed Bretton Woods . 
Source: Rose (2006) Table 3. 
 
Roses focuses on flexible exchange rate regimes and inflation targeting countries. In doing so he 
neglects the role played in the current international arrangements by those countries that adopt fixed 
exchange rate regimes. Since global imbalances have grown also thanks to the behaviour of Asian 
and  oil-exporting  countries,  the  “Bretton  Woods  reversed  system”  is  not  as  general  and 
comprehensive  as  Rose  claims.  It  is,  at  most,  a  sub-system  which  accounts  for  some  global 
phenomena such as the great moderation, yet does not contribute much to understand issues as the 
global imbalances. 
XI. Concluding remarks. 
  In  this  work  I  have  reviewed  the  debate  on  the  origins,  the  sustaining  forces  and  the 
prospective scenarios of global imbalances. Several are the rationalisations offered to explain the 
current global conditions: some are compatible with each other and some in stark conflict. Each 
explanation, in fact, refers to a subset of a long series of different aspects that, to varying degrees, 
might have played a role in the evolution of global imbalances. Among them, I recall the US lax 
public policies, the US profligate private behaviour, the global saving glut, the global investment   86 
drought, the attractiveness of US investment opportunities, the intrinsic services provided by US 
assets,  the  cross-country  heterogeneity  in  the  degree  of  financial  development,  the  prolonged 
misalignment  of  several  bilateral  exchange  rates,  the  avid  hunger  of  emerging  markets  for  US 
Treasury bonds and foreign reserves, and the persistent increase in international commodity prices. 
I have discussed the similarities and the contradictions among the rationalizations focusing on some 
of  these  factors  and  I  have  extended  the  analysis  to  those  contributions  that  are  not  explicitly 
focused on global imbalances but on strictly related issues.  
The main conclusion I draw from this review is that not all explanations are reasonable or 
consistent with the data, yet many are plausible and fit the events for, at least, limited periods of 
time. In particular, I think it is useful to distinguish three periods: the first from mid-90s to 2000s, 
the  second  from  2000  to  2002,  and  the  third  from  2002  onwards.  In  the  first  period,  the  new 
economy approach is, in my view, the most reasonable explanation of the large capital inflows in 
the US. In the second period, the cross-country heterogeneity in the degree of financial development 
view  and  the  global  saving  glut  cum  investment  drought  are,  instead,  the  most  plausible 
rationalisations. During the last 5 years, finally, several factors have contributed to the maintenance 
and expansion of the imbalances: the lax US fiscal and monetary policies, the US real estate bubble, 
the rapid growth of international oil prices, the rapid accumulation of foreign reserve (in the form of 
US Treasury bills) in Asia and in oil-producing countries, the large cross-country heterogeneity in 
the degree of financial development, and the over-optimistic expectations of the investors over US 
future rates of growth.  
Large is the disagreement on what is going to happen in the future: will global imbalances 
grow further, will they last as they are, or will they unwind? The various projections are in sharp 
contrast with each other, not only because they build on different assumptions regarding the forces 
underlying global imbalances, but also because there is great uncertainty about the likelihood that 
certain  long  lasting  patterns  (such  as  foreign  international  reserve  accumulation  or  positive 
differentials in the US-foreign returns) will continue or revert in the future.  
Some researchers emphasise the fact that exogenous shocks and a worsening of investors’ 
sentiment may make global imbalances unravel. This, in their view, proves that the current situation 
is unsustainable. Other researchers, instead, claim these shocks are unlikely to occur and, therefore, 
the situation will probably last and remain sustainable.  
Even though I agree that some of these shocks are likely to happen in the future, I sustain 
that this says little on the sustainability of global imbalances. The definition of sustainability  I 
borrow  from  Mann  (2002),  in  fact,  requires  that,  to  be  defined  as  unsustainable,  a  situation 
generates some economic force of its own that affects its trajectory. The fact that there is a set of   87 
foreign exogenous shocks that are likely to unravel global imbalances has to do more with the 
vulnerability  than  with  the  sustainability  of  the  current  situation.  The  sustainability  of  global 
imbalances has to be assessed in terms of whether the situation itself has generated or is likely to 
generate the seeds of its own destruction. While many contributions assume that either something 
will change or that nothing will change, the endogeneity of the changes is not often analysed in 
sufficient detail. 
In  this  perspective  I  think  the  further  expansion  of  global  imbalances  is  indeed 
unsustainable. First, the accumulation of large foreign reserves by several emerging markets might 
have  produced  large  fiscal  and  social  costs  and  entailed  risks  that  grow  with  the  level  of  the 
reserves: in this case, foreign reserves could have already reached their maximum level and their 
growth could be contained by developing countries’ authorities. Similarly, the US negative external 
position might have become so large to entail a substantial increase in the risk premia required by 
foreign investors to finance the new and the accumulated US current account deficits. It is also 
possible  that  the  future  US  growth  will  be  reduced  either  because  of  persistent  exchange  rate 
misalignments or because the depreciation of the dollar will urge the Federal Reserve Bank to raise 
the interest rates to prevent inflation from picking up. Ceteris paribus, the increase in the cost of 
borrowing and the slowing down of the US economy may speed the accumulation of debt up to the 
point that some form of policy interventions will be needed to contain the further growth of debt. 
The flourishing of sovereign wealth funds around the world, in addition, has boosted a new wave of 
financial protectionism, which accompanies more traditional forms of trade protectionism fed by 
the large and persistent trade imbalances recorded in several developed countries. The threat of 
future protectionist measures, if not the measures themselves, makes more likely that domestic 
policies in developing and developed countries will be adjusted in the next future. Notably, in all 
these  examples,  the  possible  policy  reactions  of  developed  and  developing  authorities  to  the 
persistence of global imbalances would be endogenously determined by the size and duration of the 
imbalances. It follows that these cases are examples of why the current situation is likely to have 
grown to a point that makes in itself unsustainable its further expansion.  
Incidentally, most signs indicate some adjustment is already under way. Given the financial 
turmoil since August 2007, the US real estate markets are under stress, interbank liquidity has 
shrunk,  and  US  and  global  growth  rates  are  expected  to  slow  down  considerably.  The  abrupt 
changes in the housing and credit markets are shocks that, according to some, could eventually 
unwind  the  imbalances.  This  would  prove,  in  light  of  the  observations  above,  that  global 
imbalances, though persistent, are a vulnerable and fragile equilibrium. The resilience of global 
imbalances  to  such  shocks,  on  the  contrary,  would  say  little  about  the  sustainability  of  the   88 
imbalances.
192  In  light  of  these  examples,  further  research  in  the  direction  of  improving  our 
understanding  on  the  issues  of  the  sustainability  and  the  vulnerability  of  large  and  persistent 
external imbalances seems warranted. 
The  recent  US  current  account  deficits  have  been  unprecedented.  The  consequences  on 
global growth of an abrupt adjustment could, in the worst case scenario, be unprecedented too. 
Policymakers and international organisations need to prevent this scenario from taking place and 
this suggests that international policy coordination will become fashionable again. This represents a 
challenge both for the IMF and for the restricted groups of policy coordination, such as the G7/G8. 
Hitherto while the former has lacked the tools to stir national policies, the second ones did not give 
sufficient voice and power to the countries most involved in the global imbalances problem. Most 
likely, the names and the positions of the countries sitting at the bargaining table in the future will 
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 Appendix  A.  The  evolution  of  the  US  net  international 
investment position. 
 
In  this  appendix  I  reproduce  part  of  the  revised  historical  data  on  the  US  IIP  which  the  BEA 
released on June the 15
th 2007, following up the tradition, initiated in June 2005, of publishing the 
revised data and the components of the change. 
  The first table reports the changes in the IIP from 2005 and 2006. Besides financial flows 
(i.e. changes related to the balance of payments), BEA provides estimates of the changes due to 
capital gains, exchange rate fluctuations and other changes including variations in coverage, capital 
gains and losses of direct investment affiliates, and other adjustments to the value of assets and 
liabilities. The first evident fact is that the exchange rate valuation effects on the foreign owned US 
assets are negligible while they are large for US-owned assets abroad. This is due to the fact that the 
US, contrary to developing countries, obtain financial flows in its own currency (i.e. US dollar) and 
invest abroad in foreign currency. The currency mismatch typical of the countries afflicted by the 
so-called “original sin” problem does not apply to the US. 
  The second table, instead, focuses on the same revised historical data for the net IIP (not its 
individual items) on a year by year basis. Tables A.2 and A.3 show, respectively, the annual and 
cumulated changes in the US IIP when FDI are calculated at current costs. Figure 3 in the text refers 
to these calculations. Tables A.4 and A.5, instead, show, respectively, the annual and cumulated 
changes in the US IIP when FDI are calculated at market value. They do not differ much even 
though, once FDIs are evaluated at market value, the net IIP of the US slightly improves.
193 As 
mentioned in the text, the relative contribution of the various sources of change differs across time. 
In  the  aggregate  measures,  however,  the  relative  importance  of  “other  changes”  suggests  that 
statistical issues are really important and may radically change the overall picture one can get. The 
limited cumulated effect of the exchange rate is not surprising. In figure A.1 I plot the end of year 
change in the nominal effective exchange rate of the US dollar as calculated by the IMF, with the 
percentage change in the net IIP (data coming from table A.3).
 194 Admittedly, the trade weights 
used to calculated the effective  exchange rate differ from the relative  weights of each class of 
liabilities denominated in foreign currency.
195 Nonetheless, the two series go hand in hand. This 
tentative exercise shows that exchange rate led valuation effects are rather volatile and do not have 
a clear trend over a long period of time. 
                                                 
193 As discussed in the text, the market value evaluation made by the BEA is subject to some criticism by Hausmann 
and Sturzenegger (2006) who argue it does insufficiently takes into account the relative growth differential in the stock 
markets of different countries. 
194 Given the IIP is always negative, there are no sign switches. A negative number means an improvement in the IIP 
and a negative change in the NEER means a US dollar nominal depreciation. 
195 See Lane and Shambaugh (2007) on this.   98 
         Changes in position in 2006 (decrease (-), increase (+))    
             Attributable to:       
             
    Valuation 
adjustments         
Line  Type of investment  Position,               Position, 
      2005        Exchange-       2006  
         Financial  Price  rate  Other       
         flows  changes  changes  changes
196   Total    
         (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (a+b+c+d)    
1 
Net international investment position of 
the United States       -2,238,359  -833,183  347,585  220,653  -36,325  -301,270  -2,539,629 
4  U.S.-owned assets abroad       11,576,336              2,178,654  13,754,990 
7  U.S. official reserve assets           188,043  -2,374  31,123  3,092  -31  31,810  219,853 
8  Gold          134,175  0   31,123  .....   -31  31,092  165,267 
9  Special drawing rights            8,210  223  .....  437  0  660  8,870 
10 
Reserve position in the International  
Monetary Fund        8,036  -3,331  .....  335  0  -2,996  5,040 
11  Foreign currencies        37,622  734  .....  2,320  0  3,054  40,676 
12 
U.S. Government assets, other than  
official reserve assets       77,523  -5,346  .....  .....  12  -5,334  72,189 
13 
U.S. credits and other long-term  
assets         76,960  -5,337  .....  .....  12  -5,325  71,635 
14  Repayable in dollars            76,687  -5,337  .....  .....  12  -5,325  71,362 
15  Other         273  0  .....  .....  .....  0  273 
16 
U.S. foreign currency holdings and  
U.S. short-  term assets       563  -9  .....  .....  .....  -9  554 
17  U.S. private assets     10,120,741  1,062,896  644,786  265,511  131,450  2,104,643  12,225,384 
18  Direct investment at current cost      2,535,188  235,358  46,009  39,188  -124  320,431  2,855,619 
19  Foreign securities        4,345,884  289,422  598,777  198,181  0  1,086,380  5,432,264 
20  Bonds          1,028,179  150,884  -12,032  13,727  0  152,579  1,180,758 
21  Corporate stocks        3,317,705  138,538  610,809  184,454  0  933,801  4,251,506 
22 
U.S. claims on unaffiliated foreigners  
reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns    734,034  83,531  .....  13,075  17,824  114,430  848,464 
23 
U.S. claims reported by U.S. banks,  
not included elsewhere    2,505,635  454,585  .....  15,067  113,750  583,402  3,089,037 
24  Foreign-owned assets in the US   13,814,695          2,479,924  16,294,619 
28  U.S. Government securities           1,725,193  380,734  -8,563  .....  7,332  379,503  2,104,696 
29  U.S. Treasury securities           1,340,598  189,181  -8,600  .....  -411  180,170  1,520,768 
30  Other          384,595  191,553  37  .....  7,743  199,333  583,928 
31  Other U.S. Government liabilities           15,866  3,133  .....  .....  0  3,133  18,999 
32 
U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks,  
not included elsewhere        296,647  22,040  .....  .....  -22,000  40  296,687 
33  Other foreign official assets           268,586  34,357  29,403  .....  17,437  81,197  349,783 
34  Other foreign assets     10,376,289  1,419,333  307,484  47,950  194,769  1,969,536  12,345,825 
35  Direct investment at current cost      1,868,245  180,580  32,495  3,916  14,190  231,181  2,099,426 
36  U.S. Treasury securities           643,793  -35,931  -9,233  .....  -4,386  -49,550  594,243 
37 
U.S. securities other than U.S.  
Treasury securities        4,352,998  591,951  284,222  25,419  -26,054  875,538  5,228,536 
38  Corporate and other bonds           2,243,135  449,194  -12,143  25,419  -15,789  446,681  2,689,816 
39  Corporate stocks        2,109,863  142,757  296,365  .....  -10,265  428,857  2,538,720 
40  U.S. currency         351,706  12,571  .....  .....  0  12,571  364,277 
41 
U.S. liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners  
reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns      557,840  235,769  .....  9,605  -62,849  182,525  740,365 
42 
U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks,  
not included elsewhere     2,601,707  434,393  .....  9,010  273,868  717,271  3,318,978 
   Memoranda:                      
43  Direct investment abroad at market value      3,570,252  235,358  393,709  179,732  -1,221  807,578  4,377,830 
44  Direct investment in the US at market value     2,806,029  180,580  226,483  .....  9,387  416,450  3,222,479 
Table A1. Changes in the IIP between 2005 and 2006 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1 IIP of the US at Yearend, 2005 and 2006. Million $ 
                                                 
196 Changes in coverage, capital gains-losses of direct investment affiliates, other adjustments to the value of assets and liabilities. 
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Total    Year  Position 
Beginning 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (a+b+c+d) 
Position 
Ending 
1989  -178,470  -49,545  -38,017  -5,747  12,273  -81,036  -259,506 
1990  -259,506  -60,337  -26,636  43,845  57,287  14,159  -245,347 
1991  -245,347  -46,420  -63,179  4,272  41,415  -63,912  -309,259 
1992  -309,259  -96,253  -39,673  -54,691  68,678  -121,939  -431,198 
1993  -431,198  -81,490  109,707  -14,462  110,487  124,242  -306,956 
1994  -306,956  -127,052  39,636  45,741  25,234  -16,441  -323,397 
1995  -323,397  -86,298  -93,308  17,221  27,320  -135,065  -458,462 
1996  -458,462  -137,687  47,359  -42,287  96,022  -36,593  -495,055 
1997  -495,055  -221,334  -44,200  -140,151  80,058  -325,627  -820,682 
1998  -820,682  -69,740  -148,130  31,100  112,094  -74,676  -895,358 
1999  -895,358  -236,148  220,818  -36,392  180,843  129,121  -766,237 
2000  -766,237  -486,373  12,299  -199,581  58,696  -614,959  -1,381,196 
2001  -1,381,196  -400,243  -116,115  -111,724  89,848  -538,234  -1,919,430 
2002  -1,919,430  -503,167  -56,477  148,321  242,745  -168,578  -2,088,008 
2003  -2,088,008  -538,928  13,204  275,829  197,542  -52,353  -2,140,361 
2004  -2,140,361  -556,742  64,827  194,037  143,845  -154,033  -2,294,394 
 2005  -2,294,394  -777,356  658,323  -216,276  391,344  56,035  -2,238,359 
2006  -2,238,359  -833,183  347,585  220,653  -36,325  -301,270  -2,539,629 
Table A.2 Components of Changes in the Net International Investment Position With Direct Investment at Current Cost, 
1989-2006 Million $ 
Source: BEA, 15
th June 2007 
 






















  -178,470  -5,308,296  888,023  159,708  1,899,406  -2,361,159  -2,539,629 
Table A.3 Components of cumulated hanges in the Net International Investment Position With Direct Investment at 
Current Cost, 1989-2006. Million $. My calculations. 
Source: BEA, 15
th June 2007 
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Total    Year  Position 
Beginning 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (a+b+c+d) 
Position 
Ending 
1989  10,466  -49,545  7,129  -15,392  355  -57,453  -46,987 
1990  -46,987  -60,337  -148,620  57,042  34,407  -117,508  -164,495 
1991  -164,495  -46,420  -95,789  4,643  41,242  -96,324  -260,819 
1992  -260,819  -96,253  -75,554  -74,991  55,312  -191,486  -452,305 
1993  -452,305  -81,490  292,716  -21,969  118,780  308,037  -144,268 
1994  -144,268  -127,052  23,172  73,069  39,828  9,017  -135,251 
1995  -135,251  -86,298  -152,461  39,018  29,156  -170,585  -305,836 
1996  -305,836  -137,687  84,188  -66,076  65,387  -54,188  -360,024 
1997  -360,024  -221,334  -92,069  -207,625  58,320  -462,708  -822,732 
1998  -822,732  -69,740  -287,874  68,120  41,457  -248,037  -1,070,769 
1999  -1,070,769  -236,148  329,672  -125,970  65,778  33,332  -1,037,437 
2000  -1,037,437  -486,373  133,716  -270,594  79,681  -543,570  -1,581,007 
2001  -1,581,007  -400,243  -224,184  -151,685  17,671  -758,441  -2,339,448 
2002  -2,339,448  -503,167  -59,481  231,247  216,521  -114,880  -2,454,328 
2003  -2,454,328  -538,928  -3,291  416,183  240,782  114,746  -2,339,582 
2004  -2,339,582  -556,742  157,875  269,874  71,857  -57,136  -2,396,718 
2005  -2,396,718  -777,356  1,097,890  -390,288  325,393  255,639  -2,141,079 
2006  -2,141,079  -833,183  501,297  365,113  -32,619  608  -2,140,471 
Table A.4 Components of Changes in the Net International Investment Position With Direct Investment at market value, 
1989-2006 Million $ 
Source: BEA, 15
th June 2007 
 




















  10,466  -5,308,296  1,488,332  199,719  1,469,308  -2,150,937  -2,140,471 
Table A.5 Components of cumulated hanges in the Net International Investment Position With Direct Investment at 
Market value, 1989-2006. Million $. My calculations. 
Source: BEA, 15
th June 2007 
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year to year exchange rate change  year to year valutation effect in % of initial IIP
Exchange rate fluctuations and valuation effects
 
Fig A.1 Changes in the exchange rate and % valuation effect in the net IIP. 
Source: Bureau of Economics Analysis and Rose (2006). 
 
Appendix B. Current account balances: a comparison. 
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B1 Current account balance in selected countries 2005 (% GDP) 
Source: IMF, WEO 2007 dataset 
 
Similarly, it is not the only advanced (or emerging) country to have run persistent deficits 
over time. Figure B.2 shows the current account balances (as a % of domestic GDP) for a sample of   102 
countries over the period 1980-2006. As discussed in the main text, these graphs do not allow to 
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Figure B.2 Current account balance in selected countries (% GDP) 
Source: IMF, WEO 2007 dataset  
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